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 Despite the presence of open elections and contestable political offices, opposition parties 
in electoral authoritarian regimes face barriers – formal and informal – that prevent them from 
attaining de facto power. Yet, these parties still decide to spend the time, money, and effort to 
run candidates in unfair elections. This dissertation seeks to uncover the reasons that opposition 
parties decide to compete in such an uncompetitive environment, and what sustains opposition 
parties though cycles of defeat. It proposes that opposition parties compete not for the purposes 
of unseating the ruling party, but rather for controlling their own local affairs away from interfer-
ence on the part of an autocratic regime. Opposition parties have a natural affinity with foreign 
investors, who also wish to do business without dealing with arbitrary government taxes and 
regulations. 
 However, while the dissertation does find a relation between foreign direct investment 
and opposition party strength in the parliament, this relationship runs in the opposite direction 
than what the theory proposes. Case studies of three countries reveal that opposition parties re-
flect ethnic divisions within each country and that these ethnic parties serve as mechanisms for 
distributing patronage goods to their co-ethnics. A transition away from one-party rule did not 
bring democracy or even a recalcitrant elite reluctantly getting away with as little liberalization 
as possible while still holding power, but instead, a protracted conflict fought in the electoral 
arena over limited patronage opportunities, with ethnicity used to form the division between in- 
and out-groups. The dissertation concludes that one possible way out of ethnic competition is by 
increasing economic opportunities for the citizenry so that they need not rely on ethnically based 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 On October 9, 2013, a smartphone app run by the Azeri Central Election Commission 
listed 72.76% of the vote for the incumbent president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. Aliyev’s vic-
tory came as no surprise, as intimidation against political activists and reporters characterized his 
ten-year period of rule even before this election. What was surprising with the 2013 returns, 
however, was that the official results were accidentally released the day before the actual elec-
tion took place. Even though the Central Election Committee claimed the leak was merely a test 
of the system, but the message received by many Azerbaijanis was that Aliyev’s victory was al-
ready a foregone conclusion. 
 The wave of democratization that swept the world in 1976 through the early 1990s had 
within it a strong undemocratic undertow, leading some scholars to classify these regimes initial-
ly as regimes in transition, or even as “partially” or “imperfectly” democratized regimes. Since 
then further research has recognized that these regimes are not in fact stuck in a state of transi-
tion between full democracy and outright authoritarianism, but rather are the deliberate attempts 
of elites to retain power in a new geopolitical and ideological environment inimical to outright 
authoritarianism. Electoral manipulation, violence against challengers, and weak protection of 
civil liberties became a worryingly common trend for those countries that became stuck. As the 
years wore on, scholars of democratization and of regime transition recognized that such irregu-
larities were not the birth pangs of a country gradually stumbling its way toward democracy, but 
were instead deliberate acts of political elites maintaining their rule behind a democratic façade. 
 Given a political environment in which a dominant party ensures its electoral success 
against its political rivals through unfair competition, the costs in terms of time, effort, and funds 




believers” who find a moral conviction to oppose the regime on matters of principle will always 
find purpose in competing in elections regardless of the chances of success. Politicians with less 
conviction in the rightness of their cause, however, should be able to understand the barriers 
placed before them. Yet still opposition parties convene, campaign, and compete. What drives 
members of the opposition to participate in contests that offer titular representation in the nation-
al legislature? What do the supporters and the sponsors of these parties gain by financing races 
repeatedly that will not lead to any greater hopes of influencing public policy? When do voters 
decide to “waste” their votes by choosing the underdog and not the regime? 
Nature of the Problem 
 While the phenomenon of nondemocratic regimes using elections to shore up legitimacy 
is far from new, the practice of allowing open contestation by the regime’s opposition in these 
nondemocratic elections has only became widespread after the end of the Cold War, a period 
marked by Huntington’s (1991) “third wave” of democracy. Collapse of the Soviet Union dis-
credited other one-party socialist states entirely, and allowed the West to shift its focus from 
supporting anticommunist regimes regardless of their own lack of democratic credentials to pro-
moting democracy abroad (Levitsky and Way 2010). With the West’s considerable economic 
influence encouraging transitions to democracy, dictatorship had become passé – if not untena-
ble. Countries wishing to benefit from Western aid and trade had to comply with Western politi-
cal demands for democratization. 
 The pervasiveness of these regimes in the post-Cold War world is such that they are now 
the prevailing form of nondemocratic rule (Reuter and Gandhi 2010; Diamond 2002).1 Single 
party states like North Korea and China, military states like Thailand (since the 2014 coup), and 
                                               
1 Though when compared to democracies, electoral authoritarian regimes occur less frequently, thus making the 
post-Cold War era the first time that democracies comprise the modal category of overall regime type (Schedler 




traditional monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Brunei now make up a decidedly small percentage 
of all regime types (Hyde and Marinov 2012, 193). Faced with a growing global consensus to-
ward adopting democratic norms and institutions and the concomitant domestic pressures from 
their citizens for greater governmental accountability, autocratic leaders have had to adapt their 
methods of rule to ensure their survival. As such, many leaders have chosen to adopt a form of 
rule that is neither solidly democratic nor solidly authoritarian but appear to have features of 
both. These regimes may disguise themselves as democracies, but their costume is a ragged one 
as the practices of the incumbents rend the fabric of democratic norms that make electoral com-
petition meaningful. 
 Huntington’s (1996, 137) quip that “the halfway house does not stand” has proven not to 
be completely true. Cassani (2014, 551) finds that electoral authoritarian regimes are in fact the 
least likely form of nondemocratic rule to experience regime breakdown. Using my own data, I 
find that the mean age for electoral authoritarian regimes since 1991 is 11.35 years, while all EA 
regimes since 1945 show a mean age of 13.38 years. Notably durable electoral authoritarian re-
gimes in Malaysia, Mexico, and Singapore have lasted for decades. Neither do all regime transi-
tions out of electoral authoritarianism move toward democratization; some regimes, like Iran, 
Syria and Uzbekistan, drift instead into full authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism remains 
significant as a body of study because of its predominance amongst nondemocratic regimes, its 
relative newness as a form of rule, and its threats to establishing fully democratic political sys-
tems. In addition, several important countries in the world operate under electoral authoritarian 
regimes, including Russia, Turkey, and (until recently) Malaysia. 
 Contemporary nondemocratic regimes have held elections much like democracies with 




toral regimes and nondemocratic/non-electoral regimes no longer accurately portrays the world. 
Carothers (2002, 7) identifies an assumption (among others) in the transition literature following 
the third wave “that democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages” beginning with 
rifts forming among regime insiders that then spill over into an incremental liberalization of the 
political process. This liberalization in turn leads to a complete regime collapse and the first in-
stance of competitive elections, finally culminating in the consolidation of a functioning liberal 
democracy, much like a dam bursting from too much water pressure. 
 This assumption regarding democratization was itself theoretically flawed, as Przeworski 
(2000, 62) demonstrates with his game theoretical model of transitions to democracy. Full de-
mocratization only accounts for one equilibrium out of five possible equilibria, the remaining 
four outcomes resulting in the regime’s retaining some degree of nondemocratic control. Elec-
toral manipulation, violence against challengers, and weak protection of civil liberties became a 
worryingly common trend for those countries that became stuck. As the years wore on, scholars 
of democratization and of regime transition recognized that such irregularities were not the birth 
pangs of a country gradually stumbling its way toward democracy, but were instead deliberate 
acts by political elites to maintain their rule behind a democratic façade. 
Definition of Terms 
 At its most basic, electoral authoritarianism is a form of authoritarian rule masked by 
democratic features such as open elections and a (relatively) free civil society. Initial conceptual-
izations of electoral authoritarianism originally classified such regimes as subtypes of democracy 
(Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1988; O’Donnell 1994; Zakaria 1997), a perception shaped by an 
ebullience following the third wave. The problem of identifying electoral authoritarian regimes 




competitiveness. The use of the term “electoral authoritarianism” follows from the third wave of 
democratization (Huntington 1991), in which observers noticed that, while many countries did 
adopt democratic institutions such as multiparty elections, the regimes in place nonetheless 
seemed unable, or even unwilling, to respect civil liberties and the rule of law. 
 Rather than classify these regimes as defective democracies, scholars opted to use varia-
tions of “authoritarianism with adjectives” (Schedler 2006, 220) to describe these regimes that 
seem to occupy a classificatory “gray zone” (Carothers 2002, 9) in between liberal democracies 
and otherwise closed autocracies. However, the above definition still does not distinguish which 
democratic or authoritarian features are necessary – if any – to determine whether a particular 
regime counts as electoral authoritarian or not. Nor does this definition indicate how shared insti-
tutional features across regime types interact with distinctive institutional features to generate 
different outcomes. 
 Contemporary theories of democracy tend to conceive of democracy between minimalist 
definitions (Przeworski, et al. 2000; Schumpeter 1942) that focus on procedural rules, and max-
imalist conceptions (Dahl 1971, Lijphart 2012) that include indicators of the political rights and 
civil liberties that fulfill democratic life.2 Though the definition of a democracy may differ be-
tween minimalist and maximalist definitions, whichever list of attributes one chooses to use for a 
regime typology will nonetheless divide governments into one of two categories: a category of 
democracies, and a residual category of nondemocracies. 
 Nondemocratic regimes, in contrast to democracies, have not had such extensive theoriz-
ing on their behalf: they have a negative definition derived from what they lack compared to the 
democratic model rather than on any unifying method, quality, or theme of their own (Hadenius, 
Teorell, and Wahman 2013, 19). Indeed, the myriad ways in which a regime can fail to live up to  
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any one part of the democratic ideal leads to several alternative typologies for nondemocratic 
regimes (see for example Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 
2012; Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman 2013). An analogy used by Schedler (2002) regarding the 
“menu of manipulation” used by nondemocratic rulers is one of multiplication by zero, in which 
the lack of any one indicator of democracy nullifies the entire democratic credentials of the re-
gime in question. The proliferation after the Cold War of nondemocratic regimes that rely on 
electoral mechanisms to fill political office blurs the boundary between democratic and nondem-
ocratic regimes, while also necessitating a further clarification of the division between “open” 
forms of nondemocratic rule from other, “closed” forms of authoritarianism. 
 The term “electoral authoritarianism” used in this study begins with Schedler’s (2006, 8) 
description of electoral authoritarianism as a political regime that “hold[s] multiparty elections 
for presidents and legislative assemblies…yet, as they subject these processes to systematic au-
thoritarian controls, they deprive them of their democratic substance.” That is, despite the pres-
ence of institutions typically associated with democracies, such as multiple independent parties 
and competitive elections, electoral authoritarian regimes are nonetheless “plainly authoritarian” 
in their nature for usurping those very democratic institutions to reinforce authoritarian rule. 
Schedler (2006) and Kinne and Marinov (2012) maintain that competitive and hegemonic vari-




 An instructive first step to clearing any conceptual confusion over electoral authoritarian 
regimes, therefore, is to define electoral authoritarianism based on its individual institutions 
(Munck 1996, 5) in order to differentiate it both from democracies and from other, closed forms 
of authoritarianism. This practice also helps establish shared traits across electoral authoritarian 
regimes unique to that regime type. Heeding the set of requirements set forth by Cassani (2014) 
to investigate the micro-level similarities amongst regime types, my list of electoral authoritarian 
regimes must start with the particular electoral dynamics that differentiate it from other authori-
tarian regime types with uncompetitive elections on the one hand, and democracies with fair 
elections on the other. Cassani (2014, 550) identifies four “micro-level” institutional features 
common to various conceptualizations of electoral authoritarian3 regimes: institutionalized peri-
odic elections, a multiparty legislature in which the opposition has some representation based on 
electoral outcomes, few limits to the chief executive’s arbitrary use of power, and frequent viola-
tions of the citizen’s political and/or civil rights. The first two components – periodic elections 
and the formation of a multiparty legislature – comprise the democratic elements while the lack 
of restraints placed on the chief executive and the violation of political and civil rights make up 
the authoritarian elements. 
 Cassani’s requirements explicitly institutionalized periodic elections, a multiparty legisla-
ture in which the opposition has some representation based on electoral outcomes, make no men-
tion whether the chief executive is likewise subject to elections. Part of the confusion regarding 
the various lists of cases results from the degree to which to extend electoral competition to the 
de facto seat of power. Historically, democratization in Western Europe came in the form of a 
                                               
3 Cassani, along with Gilbert and Mohseni (2011), specifically uses the term “hybrid” to denote a small subset of 
electoral authoritarian regimes in which electoral competition is unfair, but competitive enough to pose a credible 
challenge to incumbents, closer to the use of the term “competitive authoritarianism” by Levitsky and Way (2010, 
12). Interestingly, Levitsky and Way (2010, 14) opt to use the term “hybrid regime” as the umbrella term for any 




series of political concessions made to portions of the citizenry (Posada-Carbó 1996). The royal 
governments of England/Great Britain, the French Second Empire, and Imperial Germany all 
incorporated democratic features in their institutional arrangements in the form of elected legisla-
tures. However, in each instance, executive power remained vested in a hereditary monarch; not 
until popularly elected national parliaments asserted their supremacy over their monarchs to 
make law and shape policy could those countries claim to become full-fledged democracies. 
 In the present day, non-democratic regimes have added elections in their political institu-
tions in a variety of ways, depending on what function or outcome these leaders want elections to 
serve (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Hereditary monarchs still exercise executive power along-
side elected legislatures in Jordan and Morocco, while Iran’s system of government permits the 
election of the president and the legislature, but only after the Guardians Council has vetted all 
candidates for the Islamic credentials. Schedler’s definition does specify elections for the execu-
tive, however, due to the resemblance that an executive subject to frequent (unfair) elections in 
electoral authoritarianism would have to an executive subject to frequent (fair) elections in a de-
mocracy. The point of electoral authoritarianism, after all, is to cloak authoritarian rule under the 
guise of democracy. 
 Utilizing multiple conceptual dimensions overcomes problems of relying on terms that 
are neither mutually exclusive nor conceptually exhaustive. The label “nondemocratic,” as men-
tioned earlier, applies to a heterogeneous collection of regimes, past and present, which differ 
from one another in their institutional forms, ideological dispositions, procedural norms, and 
evolutionary origins. Building off Sartori’s (1976) work on political party systems of the world, 
Gilbert and Mohseni (2011, 280) utilize three regime dimensions for their conceptualization of 




avenue to political office; 2) competitiveness, or to what degree elections translate to political 
selection; and 3) tutelary influence, or the presence of an unelected body that can overturn elec-
toral outcomes to maintain the status quo. Notably, Gilbert and Mohseni exclude regimes that 
may hold multiparty elections but without serious enough competition to threaten the incumbents 
as belonging to the “hybrid” category. In other words, though many non-democratic regimes 
may now allow multiparty elections to take place, the lack of any real of competition is insuffi-
cient to make these elections meaningful in any way. Thus, a hybrid regime properly understood, 
is one in which the incumbents must compete electorally, albeit unfairly, in order to win. 
 Kinne and Marinov (2012, 359) identify two “fundamental properties” of elections to de-
termine regimes’ accountability to electoral outcomes: the degree of pro-incumbent bias in an 
election and incumbent’s vulnerability to an opposition victory. In democracies, candidates are 
highly vulnerable and the degree of pro-incumbent bias approaches zero; closed authoritarian 
regimes, in contrast, effectively eliminate the incumbent’s vulnerability even though the re-
gime’s pro-incumbent bias can range in degree. Echoing Gilbert and Mohseni’s (2011) own con-
ceptualizations of competition and competitiveness respectively, Kinne and Marinov consider 
“the degree of pro-incumbent bias and the vulnerability of the incumbent to a de facto loss of 
power following an opposition victory” as the “fundamental properties of electoral institutions.” 
While Gilbert and Mohseni stress the competitiveness of the multiparty elections as the distin-
guishing mark of hybrid regimes from other nondemocratic forms of governance, Kinne and 
Marinov treat all examples of multiparty, nondemocratic regimes as belonging to one of two sub-
types, “hegemonic” and “competitive,” based on the degree of electoral competitiveness a given 
regime exhibits. “Competitive” authoritarian regimes as defined by Kinne and Marinov corre-




 Since elections have become ubiquitous across regime type, the presence of elections 
alone is no longer the distinguishing mark for determining regime type: advancement through a 
party, installment by the military, or inheritance via heredity can be the actual mechanism a re-
gime uses to fill political offices. Electoral regimes are simply regimes that institutionalize peri-
odic elections for filling political offices (Cassani 2014, 550). Cassani adds that allowing multi-
ple parties to compete for seats in the legislature is enough to consider a regime sufficiently 
based on electoral selection to distinguish a hybrid regime from authoritarian regimes, as the re-
gime’s opposition has political representation. 
 The difference between a fully closed authoritarian regime and an electoral authoritarian 
regime is a matter of dominance.  Even though China does have elections for village-level posi-
tions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by law has sole control over the political system, and 
so it can afford to experiment with methods of attracting new talent without worry that any com-
petition with a rival party will overturn the Party’s monopoly of political power. After all, where 
else will skilled political leaders go if they want to enter Chinese politics, but through the CCP’s 
own channels? United Russia, however, has hegemonic control, but not exclusive dominance, 
and so the party’s leaders must watch for the entry of a successful opposition that can overturn 
United Russia’s position of preeminence if it proves to be far better at capturing the electoral 
market. 
 Such a criterion of allowing opposition parties to take seats in the legislature ignores the 
fact that, even though elections decide the makeup of the legislature, executive selection relies on 
some other criterion, such as hereditary succession like in Morocco or the dedazo in Mexico un-
der the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI). A legisla-




of elections in a regime: the office of the leader must also be contestable, and thus vulnerable, to 
regime outsiders (Kinne and Marinov 2012, 362). Electoral vulnerability allows for the possibil-
ity of alternation and “concretely impacts the distribution of power in a regime” by introducing a 
wider set of policy preferences into the political arena (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 285). Contes-
tation forces the incumbents at the very least to heed their opponents’ preferences lest the in-
cumbents alienate too many voters in the next election (Przeworski 2010). Even in electoral non-
democratic regimes wherein electoral outcomes count for less than in democracies, the costs of 
listening are usually always lower than the costs of repressing. 
 Using elections as the main mechanism of political selection differentiates electoral re-
gimes from non-electoral regimes that insulate incumbents from external scrutiny, influence, or 
competition. However, not all elections are created equal, as a wide range of electoral quality 
reveals variation amongst electoral regimes. Not only must elections determine political office 
and make incumbents vulnerable to the electorate’s decisions, they must translate voter prefer-
ences into political representation; that is, elections must be more than a façade for the regime to 
claim extensive popular support (Kinne and Marinov 2012, 364). Fraud, blackmail, coercion, and 
other underhanded methods taken from a “menu of manipulation” serve to shift electoral out-
comes away from voters’ true preferences toward electoral outcomes favorable to the regime in 
power (Schedler 2002). 
 One can draw from the work done by Gilbert and Mohseni (2011), Kinne and Marinov 
(2013), and Cassani (2014) is that incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes willfully submit 
themselves to frequent and periodic elections that they may potentially lose (to varying non-zero 
degrees of risk), which differentiates this regime type from other forms of nondemocratic rule. 




ly Gilbert and Mohseni explicitly identify tutelary influence as a specific dimension. Electoral 
mechanisms are meaningful in hybrid regimes, as the regime puts itself at risk (albeit not to the 
same degree as democracies) every time the public goes to vote. 
  Nondemocratic elites have many reasons for adopting democratic procedures and institu-
tions. Numerous scholars have noted the ways in which parties (Brownlee 2007, Geddes 1999,   
Smith 2005), legislatures (Gandhi 2008, Wright 2008), and elections (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 
2009; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006) serve to prolong a non-
democratic regime’s survival. Elections serve a number of functions in for nondemocratic re-
gimes. Elections can provide non-democratic leaders with information whether of the rivals’ 
(Ames 1970, Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007) and the public’s preferences (Blaydes 2008, Lust-
Okar 2006), or of the loyalty of their peers within the regime (Boix and Svolik 2008). Elections 
can also provide information about the regime itself by signaling the strength of the ruling coali-
tion to other domestic actors (Magaloni 2006, Malesky and Schuler 2008) or by legitimizing the 
regime in power (Schedler 2006). Non-democratic elections can also serve to co-opt rivals within 
the ruling coalition (Magaloni 2006) or from without (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Lust-Okar 
2006, Boix and Svolik 2008). Finally, by accepting the presence of electoral competition and 
partisan identities, non-democratic leaders can use elections to signal to the public that the re-
gime will “abandon ideologies of collective harmony, accept the existence of societal cleavages, 
and renounce a monopolistic hold on the definition of the common good” (Schedler 2006, 14). In 
other words, regime incumbents willfully allow regime outsiders to organize for mounting peri-




Table 1.1. Conceptualizations and Definitions of Hybrid Regimes 
 
Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) Kinne and Marinov (2012)4 Cassani (2014) 
Competition 
“produces an alternation in rulers and con-
cretely impacts the distribution of power in a 
regime” (285). 
Vulnerability of the incumbent (α ∈ [0,1]) 
 
“the probability that electoral victory confers  
    de facto leadership on the opposition” (365)5 
1. Institutionalization of periodic elections 
2. Formation of multiparty legislature in   
    which opposition is represented (550) 
Competitiveness 
“strong enforcement of civil liberties creates a 
fairer electoral playing field for competing par-
ties … regimes that protect civil liberties provide 
a broad arena in which citizens can participate 
and thus have fair competition” (285). 
Degree of pro-incumbent bias (β ∈ R>0) 
 
“voters can translate their preferences  
  accurately into political representation”  
  (364). 
3. Presence of few limits to the arbitrary  
    power of the chief executive 
4. Frequent violations of the citizens’  
    political and/or civil rights (550) 
Tutelary interference6 
“non-elected institutions … that engage in pol-
itics” to “constrain the agenda of elected offi-
cials or veto their decisions” (286). 
— — 
“Democracies are competitive regimes with 
fair competition whereas authoritarian regimes 
are uncompetitive regimes with unfair compe-
tition. Hybrid regimes occupy the conceptual 
void of competitive regimes with unfair com-
petition” (280). 
Competitive Authoritarianism: “a regime where-
in elections put the incumbent leader’s job at 
risk, but the playing field is skewed in favor of 
the incumbent and against opposition” (364). 
 
Democracy: α = 1, β = 0 
Com. Auth.: α = 1, β > 0 
Heg. Auth.: α = 0, β > 0 
*Autocracy: α = 0, β = 07 
“A form of regime that … combines both 
democratic and autocratic institutions, whose 




                                               
4 Coding rules for regime type listed on page 366 of their article 
5 Kinne and Marinov define competitive authoritarianism as regimes “where elections may be flawed and competition unfair, but leaders nonetheless submit to 
contested elections and thus give oppositions a chance to win executive power (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010)” (361) 
6 Levitsky and Way (2010; 14, 32) mention that “tutelary regimes” are a form of hybrid regime distinct from their definition of “competitive authoritarianism” 




Significance of the problem 
 Overwhelmingly, the literature of electoral authoritarianism has focused on the regime 
itself, the coalition of elites who control the state for their own benefit. The reasons for scholars’ 
oversights are simple enough: the regime is the locus of political power in a given country. That 
is, the regime has the general motivation of securing its power against any encroachments from 
the public at large and from elites outside of the coalition; and, most importantly for matters of 
simplifying the interpretation of data, only one regime exists per country. Studying the behavior 
of opposition parties is much more difficult, as their motivations for challenging the regime party 
differ not only amongst parties in the same election, but even within parties over time. This study 
seeks to elucidate the reasons for why parties, facing overwhelming odds against their success, 
would want to expend the time, effort, and money to compete in elections themselves rigged to 
ensure the opposition as a whole remains a permanent minority. 
 Previous studies have investigated party dynamics in electoral authoritarian regimes at 
the national level. As the following chapter will make clear, the district level is where subsequent 
studies should focus its attention. Opposition parties generally may legally organize and compete 
in elections; they may even win some seats in the legislature. What they cannot do is win nation-
ally. Barred from exercising control over the state, opposition parties must instead turn to local 
affairs to exercise political power. Any district where an opposition party has achieved electoral 
victory over the regime becomes a sort of stronghold for that opposition party. Where the opposi-
tion is no less rapacious than the regime, these electoral strongholds may themselves become au-
thoritarian in their own right, serving as little fiefdoms for a local magnate to derive his rents. 
Some opposition parties do believe in democratization, and as such, their districts can become 




 The plan of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 surveys previous studies on electoral 
authoritarianism including the various conceptualizations and definitions of these regimes, cri-
tiques offered theories on party dynamics within electoral authoritarianism, and proposes a theo-
ry on opposition party behavior in electoral authoritarian political systems. Chapter 3 will con-
tain a discussion of the methods used to test the theory from Chapter 2. The variables and their 
measurements, and the statistical method used. I will also detail my selection criteria for identify-
ing the case studies I use in subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 will briefly explain the findings of 
the large-N study without dwelling too long on them; as the theory calls for analysis at the sub-
national level and the large-N study makes use of country-year observations, any findings from 
the regression analysis will be of limited utility on its own. Case studies will provide the bulk of 
evidence for my argument, and as such, the second half of Chapter 4 will justify my case study 
selection. Chapters 5 through 7 will illustrate the political histories of Azerbaijan, Mozambique 
and Malaysia, respectively. These case studies will elucidate the formation and identities of these 
countries’ respective opposition parties, answering why these parties expend themselves through 
unfair elections. Chapter 8 will conclude the dissertation, summarizing the study with a discus-
sion of its design limitations, implications for future research, implications for policy, and prof-





CHAPTER 2: THEORY 
Theory: A Center-Periphery Conflict 
 Starting with the regime in power rather than the behavior of opposition parties is neces-
sary in order to describe the political environment in which opposition parties find themselves. 
The regime structures the political environment in such a way to maintain its dominance from 
the wider public and from rival elites alike, including resorting to fraud, intimidation, blackmail, 
coercion, among other underhanded techniques (Darden 2002, Schedler 2002, Ottaway 2003). 
 Elections in electoral authoritarian regimes do allow the opposition to form political par-
ties and contest elections, but the regime still has ways to ensure that it remains in power. Re-
cruitment from within the party (Malesky and Schuler 2013), careful gerrymandering (Magaloni 
and Diaz-Cayeros), appointment of political loyalists in key governmental positions (Nye and 
Vasiliyeva 2015, Reuter and Robertson 2012), and (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 
2003; Greene 2007) all serve to disadvantage the opposition from attaining real political power. 
 Control of the state brings with it control over the state’s assets including but not limited 
to the police, the bureaucracy, any state-controlled media, political appointments, and the nation-
al treasury. These functions of the state become politicized to one degree or another in service of 
the regime, creating what Greene (2007) calls resource asymmetries, which allows the regime to 
coopt, coerce, and control any challengers. Nationalization of the oil industry in Mexico under 
President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938 provided a lucrative source of rents to the ruling PRI, which 
it then disbursed to politicians and supporters alike essentially to buy their loyalty. Maintaining 
access to oil rents provided a major motivating factor for politicians to remain loyal to the PRI, 
and contributed to the party’s hegemony over Mexican politics for the next sixty years. Mexico’s 




Revolution (PRD) had no comparable sources of party funds, and as such, both parties could not 
provide any material incentives to politicians or voters to prefer them to the PRI. 
Control of the state grants the regime access to resources that its competitors could only 
dream of having: police, bureaucracy, state media, and most importantly state revenues, all of 
which grant regime elites the ability to maintain their dominance over their rivals. The state 
treasury thus serves as a secondary pool of resources available to the regime party. The regime 
can use public resources as additional campaign funds to increase its vote share (Magaloni and 
Kricheli 2010) and as patronage to regime supporters (Franz and Kendall-Taylor 2014, Greene 
2007). In a democracy, the winners of elections must still respect the barrier between the party’s 
funds and the state’s funds, even if public funding can be used in partisan ways. In an electoral 
authoritarian regime, the barrier is much weaker, and plundering the national treasury creates a 
second set of coffers for the regime, one that has the added benefit of taxpayer subsidies. In other 
words, every single taxpayer – even those who vote against the regime – indirectly subsidizes the 
regime’s electoral activities. Research on the effect of campaign spending on electoral outcomes 
has shown a positive relationship between increased spending and electoral victory (Scarrow 
2007, 207). Thus, by accessing public finances for its purposes the regime can vastly outspend its 
competitors, and do so with help from the public itself in order to ensure its continued hold on 
power. 
 The regime can also distribute public resources as patronage goods to its members. Elites 
create and maintain a system of governance in which those close to the regime can draw from the 
regime’s resources for their own enrichment (Boix 2003, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Otta-
way 2003). Patronage goods attract into the ruling coalition rival elites who would not otherwise 




distribution of patronage goods, the regime creates a governmental pay-for-play scheme, in 
which the only way to exercise any meaningful political power (and not simply hold office) re-
quires that one join the regime (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003; Magaloni 2006). 
Principled politicians can, of course, shun graft and instead campaign for office on their own 
merits as candidates. However, when compared to a political machine this strategy has a built in 
limitation of failing to deliver any sort of material profit to less scrupulous individuals. Greed 
transcends ideological boundaries, and thus less committed members of opposition parties defect 
to the regime in order to take advantage of the patronage goods offered by the regime. 
 One electoral beneficial consequence of distributing patronage goods is that the regime 
can straddle the political center and thus appeal to both left- and right-leaning moderates. Ac-
cording to Down’s (1957) model of electoral competition, two rival parties position themselves 
on either the political left or right, but would ultimately fight over capturing the greatest number 
of moderate voters to win the election. Even though the two parties remain ideologically distinct 
from one another, the nature of electoral competition forces them to moderate their views to be-
come palatable to the political center where the greatest number of voters resides.  
 However, by its nature electoral authoritarianism does away with the assumption of per-
fect competition implicit the Downsian model. One party within an electoral authoritarian regime 
can capture the political center not through espousing an ideological position, but rather by using 
patronage to bind politicians from the left and the right of any given ideological axis together 
into a large “catch-all” party (Gel’man 2006, 554; Greene 2007). Personal greed, in effect, trans-
cends ideological allegiance. Russia’s centrist, liberal party, Yabloko, should have no problem 
attracting votes for its pro-civil liberties, pro-democracy, and pro-business platform, but it unfor-




United Russia can simply buy off all of Yabloko’s support and render Yabloko as completely 
harmless to United Russia. 
 Control of the state means control over the appointment of the state’s functionaries. The 
regime’s acceptance of elections creates a degree of risk for the regime during each election cy-
cle: the regime may actually fail to win enough votes to retain power. As such, the regime values 
appointees to subnational offices who can win votes consistently and reliably for the regime 
(Nye and Vasiliyeva 2015, Malesky and Schuler 2013, Reuter and Robertson 2012). Appointing 
loyalists comes at the expense of appointing experts and technocrats who can administer the dis-
trict, region, province, etc. effectively. Loyalists may not have the proficiency to foster economic 
development in their districts, as their talents focus instead on ensuring the regime’s political 
survival. Incompetency, corruption, underdevelopment, and even outright neglect worsen the 
long-term public welfare for a district. 
 Yet local economic development nevertheless occurs within electoral authoritarian re-
gimes. The amount of foreign investment most readily increases generally under all forms of 
nondemocratic rule – and within electoral authoritarian regimes specifically – when the state fac-
es constraints on its ability to derive rents from businesses. Since the regime derives its patron-
age goods from public funds, the regime has an interest in expanding the state into the economy 
(Greene 2007, 307), which may come at the expense of independent businesses. Nondemocratic 
regimes are more successful in attracting foreign investors to invest in their countries by tying its 
hands, either through offering policy concessions to the affected groups via access to the legisla-
ture (Escribà-Folch 2008, Hankla and Kuthy 2013, Reuter and Turovsky 2014, Wright 2008). 
Since foreign investors themselves cannot hold office, the investors work through representatives 




make for natural allies to business interests. Granting concessions come at a price for the regime, 
however, as further concessions placed on the regime means less opportunities for it to engage in 
the rent-seeking behavior necessary to maintain the ruling coalition. 
 Mexico’s electoral history demonstrates the relationship between foreign entrepreneurs 
and opposition parties. Since its founding in 1929, PRI was able to maintain its dominance over 
Mexican politics until 2000, when an opposition party won a presidential election for the first 
time.8 PRI maintained its electoral supremacy through patronage opportunities, weaponized gov-
ernment transfers to poor districts, and manipulation of electoral law. 
 PRI developed out of a left-populist tradition, as exemplified by the presidency of Lázaro 
Cárdenas who pursued a populist economic program with heavy state intervention and land re-
distribution.9 Through their incorporation, PRI could mobilize vast portions of the population to 
turn out to the polls in support of the party, while subsidies quite literally bought the loyalty of 
these groups to continue their support for the party (Greene 2007, Magaloni 2006). After Car-
denas’s death, his successor, President Manuel Ávila Camacho, sought to gain support from the 
country’s private sector in order to begin Mexico’s industrialization. This “critical juncture” of 
the state and business marked PRI’s gradual rightward shift (Camp 1989, 21) and marked the 
beginning of “friendly, fluid relations” between the state and Mexico’s private sector (Mizrahi 
2003, 16). This abandonment of its original revolutionary principles for a pragmatic ideological 
flexibility allowed PRI to appeal to a broad swathe of voters on both the left and the right 
                                               
8 PRI lost control of the legislature for the first time (specifically the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies) in 
1997, but scholars typically consider the end of PRI’s dominance in Mexican politics with the loss of the presidency. 
9 Cárdenas served his term from 1934-1940, and did so as a politician from Partido de la Revolución Mexicana; PRI 
is the third incarnation of the Partido de Nacional Revolucionario founded by President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-





(Greene 2007), which, when backed up by an extensive patronage machine allowed PRI to dom-
inate Mexico’s political system for decades.  
 PRI had shored up its electoral hegemony through incorporating key sectors of Mexico’s 
population into official organizations subsidized by the state: the peasants (Confederación 
Nacional Campesina, CNC), industrial workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico, 
CTM) the so-called “popular sector” of government employees and the urban middle class (Con-
federación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares, CNOP) (Wuhs 2003, 12-13). In 1936 the 
Cárdenas administration required similar corporate organs for businesses, originally through one 
organization for the commercial sector (Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio, 
CONCANACO) and another for the industrial sector (Confederación de Cámaras Industriales, 
CONCAMIN), that were later conglomerated into a single organization (Confederación de 
Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio y de la Industria, CONCANACOMIN) (Wuhs 2010, 112). 
 During the late 1970s, Mexico began experiencing sluggish economic growth, signaling 
the end of the rapid economic growth of the postwar period, commonly referred to as “the Mexi-
can miracle.” In response, the government opted to liberalize its economy in order to counteract 
the slowdown. Foreign investment would breathe new life into Mexico’s industries and revitalize 
the economy, even as this turn away from state-led economic management threatened PRI’s cor-
poratist political machine. The government under President Luis Echeverría placed PEMEX in 
the center of its revitalization efforts (spurred by the 1973 oil crisis), which – to the govern-
ment’s credit – did return high growth rates to Mexico’s economy. 
 An economic crisis beginning in 1982 prompted PRI to liberalize Mexico’s economy, 




tor from 25.4 percent of GDP in 1983 to about 7.5 percent by 1993 (El Financiero 1992, 2).10 
Liberalization did return the economy onto a path of growth, but reducing the state’s involve-
ment also deprived PRI of many of its resource advantages (Greene 2007, 173). Meanwhile, lib-
eralization opened up the economy to foreign investment: foreign investors, worried about PRI’s 
expropriative behaviors in past, sought districts that were either under control of the opposition 
or where the opposition was strong enough to challenge PRI candidates in elections. Sustained 
and genuine electoral competition in these districts constrained PRI’s predatory actions, which 
signaled to foreign investors a better business environment than districts where PRI did not face 
any constraints from the opposition (Stuckatz 2014, 20). PAN’s business-friendly ideology al-
lowed it to attract foreign investments to its districts over districts under control of either PRI or 
PRD (Timmons and Broid 2013). Foreign investment proved to be a boon for politicians, as the 
benefits of economic growth for the local economy as not only were PAN politicians building 
close relationships with wealthy investors into the party, but PAN politicians could also point to 
a successful record in improving the livelihoods of Mexican voters in its districts through ex-
panded business opportunities. 
 The crisis of 1982 ended Mexico’s corporatist strategy of development. The government 
abandoned heavy state involvement in the economy and began the process of liberalizing in or-
der to spur high growth rates. To this end, the government discarded import-substitution indus-
trialization as its primary development strategy, privatized nearly all of its nationalized indus-
tries, and – most importantly – opened the economy to foreign investment.  
 Founded in 1939, the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) served as 
the main opposition party to PRI. PAN formed in 1939 as a conservative Catholic party opposed 
to PRI’s anti-clerical policies, as well as the increasing authoritarian nature of PRI. PAN and its 
                                               




left-wing rival PRD had none of PRI’s resource advantages as neither party controlled the state. 
Both PAN and PRD languished on the ideological margins as niche parties, resigned to the role 
of political malcontents and ideological extremists. Initially PAN sought a strategy of ideological 
purity, even if such a stance would drive to the fringes of Mexican politics, which scholar Yemi-
le Mizrahi (2003) likens to a self-inflicted “martyrdom” on the part of PAN party leaders. PAN 
provided a moral voice in Mexican politics against the venality and self-interest of PRI, while at 
the same time it allowed business groups opposed to PRI’s corporatist structuring of the econo-
my an outlet for organizing their interests. So long as PAN expected to remain in the political 
wilderness, the Catholic traditionalists predominated over the pro-business liberals. However, 
liberalization of Mexico’s economy changed not only the political landscape within Mexico, but 
it also changed the intra-party dynamics within PAN. 
 The prospect of actually winning elections against PRI prompted PAN leaders to recon-
sider the party’s electoral strategy: instead of accepting its fate as perpetually remaining in the 
opposition (Mizrahi 2003, 18), PAN accepted a new wave of activists dissatisfied with faltering 
economic conditions in Mexico rather than inspired by PAN’s doctrinaire Catholic platform. An 
internal clash between PAN’s traditional wing and the new surge of anti-PRI activists  
 Voter support for PAN came from Mexico’s wealthiest regions (Molinar 1991) and mu-
nicipalities, especially those municipalities integrated into the global economy (Magaloni 2006; 
88-89, 96). Regions of Mexico most likely to vote for opposition candidate against PRI were 
those regions most integrated into the world economy (Diaz-Cayero, Magaloni, and Weingast 
2003), namely Mexico City and State, Baja California, Chihuahua and Sonora (Escobar Gamboa 
2013, 5). Entrepreneurs in these states had made their fortunes through the increased flow of for-




to various benefits gained from supporting PRI (Camp 1989, 246). By being less dependent on 
PRI, these entrepreneurs were less inclined to support PRI in elections. 
 Nationalization of the banks in 1982 under President José López Portillo “convinced en-
trepreneurs that even the most pro-business president could betray them” (Mizrahi 1994, 83). 
Sensing that PRI was no longer advancing their interests, Mexico’s entrepreneurs sought to in-
fluence governmental policy by turning to opposition parties, namely PAN. PAN was already 
inclined toward pro-business policies thanks to its ideological position, especially considering 
other parties in Mexico at the time were leftwing parties, but PAN never won the support of en-
trepreneurs until the 1980s when foreign direct investment created a new class of entrepreneur 
separate from PRI’s patronage machine. These new entrepreneurs recognized that a lack of polit-
ical transparency could not prevent PRI from appropriating private property if it perceived that 
its interests were under threat, as nationalizing the banks in 1982 proved. The entrepreneurs de-
cided to constrain PRI by supporting opposition party to defend their interests, namely creating 
an economic environment in which foreign investors would not fear having their money appro-
priated by the state. 
 Most studies on FDI in Mexico focus on the socioeconomic factors of the Mexican states 
that attract FDI, such as labor openness (Cabral 2013), educational levels and delinquency rates 
(Escobar Gamboa 2013), and international infrastructure (Mollick, Ramos-Durán, and Silva-
Ochoa 2006) rather than political factors, leaving a dearth in the literature about this particular 
connection. However, a study by Samford and Ortega Gómez (2012) does establish a positive 
and statistically significant link between partisan control and FDI, according to which states gov-




PRD.11 Since the 1990s, states in Mexico have made use of greater political decentralization to 
experiment with different schemes to attract FDI (Dussel Peters 2009). Entrepreneurs who 
backed PAN in Chihuahua came from a “new generation” of entrepreneurs who benefitted from 
the maquiladora program (Mizrahi 1994, 84), which was designed by the Mexican government 
to attract foreign investment (Stoddard 1991). In contrast, business owners in neighboring Nuevo 
León remained loyal to PRI because they comprised that state’s “old money” class that had made 
its fortunes not through foreign investment but through their connections to PRI. 
 The presence of FDI empowers local party functionaries to ignore or even defy orders 
from the central government in order to keep the revenue stream intact. Attracting FDI to one’s 
district brings with it “both physical capital and employment opportunities that may not be avail-
able in the host market” (Jensen 2003, 587). Elites within the regime begin to defect on order to 
capitalize on the FDI, as they no longer need to curry favor with the regime in order to gain ac-
cess to rents from the state.  
 In districts firmly under United Russia’s dominance bureaucratic (Reuter and Buckley 
2015) and gubernatorial (Reuter and Robertson 2012) appointments reward those who promote 
economic development, while in regions where United Russia must compete against opposition 
parties such appointments instead prioritize loyalty to the regime. In United Russia’s competitive 
districts, the overarching need to ensure the regime’s survival takes precedence, and thus the bu-
reaucrats appointed to these regions are those who can create a reliable political machine that 
will ensure that such districts will continue voting in United Russia candidates. “Safe” districts 
can focus instead on delivering goods and services to its public, as the opposition has too weak a 
                                               
11 The authors disaggregate FDI into one of three types: resource, market, and efficiency. The relationship between 




showing to upset the regime’s presence. In these districts, merit and competence in fostering de-
velopment leads to career advancement. 
 Even while the regime values the ability of party functionaries to deliver satisfactory 
election results for the regime, the regime must also ensure that it can maintain a minimal level 
of economic performance lest it provide a cause for dissatisfied regime insiders to defect from 
the regime (Reuter and Gandhi 2010). Defection of elites from the regime coalition often signals 
the end of the regime’s rule (Langston 2006, Levitsky and Way 2012, van de Walle 2006) since 
the elites can no longer rely on the regime to ensure their own political survival. Thus, to make 
sure the ruling coalition remains intact, the regime has a vested interest in improving the coun-
try’s economic environment (or at least not making it any worse) so that it can thus continue 
supplying the patronage necessary for binding elites to the regime. 
 Evidence from developing democracies such as India show that increasing electoral com-
petition at the local level in turn increases the level of public funding directed towards economic 
development. In Argentina, Gervasoni (2010) finds that provinces that derive rents from federal 
fiscal transfers also tend to engage in autocratic behavior to bolster their own political standing 
within their province when compared to their more self-sufficient counterparts. Similarly, in ful-
ly authoritarian regimes, local cadres willfully disobey central party directives in pursuit of eco-
nomic policies beneficial to their own provinces, as these benefits strengthen their prestige with-
in the provinces far better than any benefits the central government can provide (Malesky 2008, 
101). Studies on electoral authoritarian regimes themselves are few12, but the implications drawn 
from democracies and closed authoritarian systems alike suggest that an increasing the con-
straints on politicians decreases the likelihood that they will engage in confiscatory behaviors. 
                                               
12 Hankla and Kuthy (2013) mention hybrid regimes by name as a distinct subset of authoritarianism rather than 




 The transformation of public finance into patronage goods allows the regime to use pub-
lic finance as a tool for ensuring voter support (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003; 
Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2011; Gonzalez-Ocantoz, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014; 
Greene 2007; Hidalgo and Nichter 2012; Magaloni 2006). Studies on patronage indicate that the 
practice has two purposes. The first purpose is to reward partisans for their continued support 
(Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2011; Gonzalez-Ocantoz, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014). 
Since these are voters who would vote for the regime anyway, patronage towards them do little 
to swing their vote away from the opposition; rather, the goal of providing such patronage is to 
encourage those supporters to come out and vote – even to vote in districts in which those sup-
porters are not registered (Hidalgo and Nichter 2012).13 The second purpose is to entice swing 
voters away from the opposition. Just as the regime can sway the more unscrupulous politicians 
to join the regime in exchange for access to rents, so too can the regime buy off voters’ support 
in exchange for additional public goods. The regime can thus skew voter preferences through its 
resource advantage via its use of state revenues. 
 Given the formidable barriers placed before them by the regime, why would the opposi-
tion want to compete for political office? By definition some kind of opposition has to exist lest, 
but even if contenders to the regime make use of the legal openings to run against the regime, 
why would they bother to do so time and time again? In other words, in the first election any 
number of opposition parties can run; they will all lose capturing the country’s de facto seat of 
power, even if they do win some seats in the legislature and maybe even some local contests. 
Fewer and fewer parties, however, should continue to compete in subsequent elections, as they 
                                               
13 However, Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) find that vote buying has the opposite effect of ensuring voter turnout, as 




would all learn that they could not dislodge the regime. Yet, opposition parties do exist, and fur-
thermore do compete in multiple elections.  
 Methods at the regime’s disposal for skewing voters’ electoral preferences include coer-
cion against supporters of rival parties, stuffing ballot boxes, and most insidious of all, the provi-
sion and distribution of public goods. Ruling parties benefit from asymmetric resources vis-a-vis 
opposition parties: rent-seeking behavior by the ruling party allows it to take advantage from a 
much greater resource pool to outspend its rivals. On top of that, the ruling party can also use 
these same rents to coax other elites into the ruling coalition, pulling away potential candidates 
from the opposition. Since the national treasury essentially becomes the ruling party’s treasury, 
the regime can induce voters to support the ruling party through the select use of public spend-
ing. Mexico’s PRI would routinely deny public monies to punish districts that voted against 
them; in poor districts where public spending was a vital supplement to families’ livelihoods, 
such a weapon would provide strong incentives for voters to continue supporting PRI. 
 Nevertheless, some districts would still defect to the opposition despite the ruling party’s 
attempts to pressure voters into compliance. Voters are not distributed randomly throughout the 
country. Political preferences tend to cluster together, whether through due to custom, internal 
migration, economic activity, class dynamics, or charismatic political leadership, among others 
(Rodden 2010). However, since preferences do cluster in certain districts, those certain districts 
may show a preference toward one party over another, and in a system of perfect competition, 
the distribution of parties to votes should map on to one another. 
 Electoral authoritarianism is not a system of perfect competition (and even established 
democracies fall short from some Platonic ideal of perfectly free elections), and as mentioned 




ences to ensure that it remains in power. Withholding public transfers or other services vital to 
the livelihood of opposition voters serves as a powerful disincentive to continue supporting op-
position parties, such as when the PRI would deny poverty-reduction funds to electoral districts 
under PAN or PRD control (Timmons and Broid 2013, Magaloni 2006). Nevertheless, even 
when taking into account the skewing effects of patronage goods, some districts may still vote 
for the opposition over the regime. 
 The defecting district, now without public funds, would need some way to cover its 
budgetary shortfall. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one such revenue source. Debate still ex-
ists within economics about whether foreign investors prefer democracies to nondemocratic re-
gimes. Nondemocratic regimes streamline the decision-making process, stifle workers’ collective 
bargaining, and can protect the investor from populist governmental policies (Oneal 1994), while 
corrupt politicians can be bribed in the investor’s favor. The argument contends further that de-
mocracies hinder FDI investment through a lack of long-term consistency and their abundance of 
veto players (Jensen 2008, 1042). One hallmark of elections in democracies is a turnover of the 
politicians (Huntington 1991, 267; Przeworski et al. 2000, 28), and with it a turnover of policy 
preferences. Business leaders investing in a democratic country must bear in addition to the costs 
of setting up in a host country the additional costs of complying with new regulations and an in-
consistent business environment. Democracies also open up the decision-making process to 
many different groups, increasing the number of veto players who can obstruct the passage of 
FDI-friendly policies. 
 On the other hand, nondemocratic regimes may engage in rent-seeking behaviors and na-
tionalization projects that eat away at investors’ profits in the first instance and eliminate them in 




FDI:  standing for election increases the audience costs of politicians from overturning popular 
policies, while the number of veto players compared to nondemocratic regimes can prevent any 
one group from engaging in illegal behavior. Indeed, recent studies have demonstrated that limit-
ing the ability for nondemocratic leaders to engage in any form of confiscatory behavior creates 
environments favorable for attracting FDI (Asiedu and Lien 2011, Bastaiaens 2013, Jensen 2008, 
Madani and Nobakht 2014). 
 At the local level, increasing electoral competition should bring with it the benefits of 
democracy, even when the overall political structure falls short. Where the regime faces a strong, 
credible opposition in a given district, the regime should resort less to manipulative tactics as the 
chance of an opposition victory and the subsequent exposure of foul play are too great to risk, 
even if the blame remains a local political affair. The risk of being caught engaging in fraud in 
competitive districts leads to greater electoral oversight and decision-making transparency over-
all. Greater transparency in turn allows businesses to assess the political risks better when mak-
ing decisions of where to invest; districts with less political risks offer better environments for 
firms to make returns on their investments. 
 Foreign investors not only make a decision about into which countries to expand, but 
they also make strategic decision regarding in which region of a country to set up business (Ar-
regle, Miller, and Hitt 2013; Ghemawat 2003; Rugman and Verbeke 2004). Nondemocratic re-
gimes that face some level of constraint on their confiscatory behaviors tend to attract more FDI 
than nondemocratic regimes that allow their leaders free rein to engage in rent seeking. Aside 
from the particular resources or capital advantages that a given region may offer, the political 




 The same political institutions that shape foreign investors decisions can be found in min-
iature within that country’s districts. Foreign capital concentrates itself in localities (at the pro-
vincial level, or in select cities) that investors believe will turn them a profit, rather than in an 
even distribution over the entire country. Districts that have greater transparency and more con-
straints placed on the governments from confiscatory behavior should attract more FDI than dis-
tricts that exhibit greater predatory behavior, ceteris paribus. At the national level, the regime 
maintains its hold on power through its resource asymmetries derived through its rent-seeking 
behavior; districts controlled by the regime should expect the same behavior from the regime’s 
local offices, namely rent seeking and confiscation of the foreign investors’ assets. 
 Opposition parties have the incentive to attract FDI into their districts. By doing so, they 
can compete against the regime on matters of economic performance since they cannot hope to 
match the sheer resource advantage held by the regime. Foreign investors also have an incentive 
in investing in districts controlled by opposition parties as such districts curb the regime’s preda-
tory behavior. The benefits of attracting FDI moderates opposition party behavior from creating 
patronage networks of their own, lest they too should scare off foreign investment and deny 
themselves one of the few economic resources available to them as opposition parties. If foreign 
investors fear the predations of the regime, then local opposition groups make for natural allies. 
Opposition parties form to keep these sites of foreign capital away from the predations of the 
dominant party. Thus, where one finds greater concentrations of FDI, one should also see oppo-
sition candidates show stronger electoral presence than ion locations where FDI remains low or 
nonexistent. Local leaders with greater ties to the global economy not only have the desire to op-
pose a rapacious central government, but also the means to finance their defiance in an otherwise 




 The presence of FDI empowers local party cadres to ignore or even defy orders from the 
central government in order to keep the revenue stream intact. Elites within the regime begin to 
defect in order to capitalize on increasing flows FDI, as they no longer need to curry favor with 
the regime to gain access to rents from the state. Regions of Mexico most likely to vote for oppo-
sition candidate against the PRI were those regions most integrated into the world economy (Di-
az-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003). Kazakhstan’s regions developed a level of financial 
and political autonomy vis-à-vis the central government thanks to local leaders’ use of FDI for 
local development projects (Jones-Luong 2003). The political monopoly enjoyed by the Com-
munist Party of Vietnam (CPV) excludes that country from this study as a case, but Vietnam’s 
experience with reforms at the provincial level designed to attract FDI nonetheless offers valua-
ble theoretical insights in the political consequences of newfound economic resources. Malesky’s 
(2008) findings rely on the fact that the state media routinely condemn subnational leaders who 
attract FDI to their provinces for acting on their own initiative and for wresting away policymak-
ing from the central government. Subnational leaders who defy the CPV’s economic directives in 
favor of policies more appropriate to their own provincial needs find that the economic boons 
therefrom give them greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the Party in favor of greater local auton-
omy. In electoral authoritarian regimes, which are defined by the fact that they do not prohibit 
the existence of an opposition (even as they prohibit certain opposition from existing), elites can 
defect to the opposition and ride voter discontent in order to strengthen their own positions in the 
political system (Reuter and Gandhi 2010). The presence of an opposition gives elites the oppor-
tunity to defect from the regime; FDI gives these same elites their motive to do so. 
 Foreign capital concentrates itself in localities (at the provincial level, or in select cities) 




country. Opposition parties take advantage of these sites of foreign capital by keeping it away 
from the predations of the dominant party. Thus, where one finds greater concentrations of FDI, 
one should also see opposition candidates show stronger electoral presence than in locations 
where FDI remains low or nonexistent. 
 As opposition parties lack access to patronage goods to ensure loyalty the same way that 
the regime can, they must instead turn to other forms of partisan cohesion. Ideology, sectarian 
identity, performance, or some combination of these, can serve to mobilize activists and voters. 
Ideology lays out a society-wide plan, and a blueprint of sorts of how government will achieve 
such goals, the implementation of which motivates voters to political action. As Gel’man (2006) 
and Greene (2007) both point out, while adopting an extreme ideological position will garner the 
opposition a guaranteed set of votes, it also places a natural limit on the number of votes that a 
party can attract in the first place. While many opposition parties in electoral authoritarian re-
gimes do in fact adopt extreme ideological positions, forced to the margins by the regime party’s 
monopolization over the political center, not every opposition party chooses to relegate itself to 
an inherently small pool of voters from which to draw support. Ideologically driven, program-
matic appeals targeted to a select portion of the electorate may guarantee that a party’s base does 
come out to vote, but such appeals also dissuade newcomers to the party who do not share the 
same ideological position. 
 An opposition party based on a sectarian identity (religious, linguistic, ethnic, etc.) can 
elicit public support if that party makes itself the advocate of a certain community’s interests. Of 
course, this gambit only works if identity as such has some sort of political salience (de Miguel 




identity can become tools for a particular community to pursue its political aspirations as well as 
participate in the political sphere (Birnir 2007, Lublin 2014, Madrid 2012). 
 Performance offers opposition parties greater advantage against the regime party, firstly 
by targeting the innate unfairness of the system, and secondly by adopting a platform that univer-
sally shared by voters regardless of ideological disposition. The regime party finds itself in a 
bind when confronted with opposition parties running on anti-corruption platforms: the regime 
party benefits from graft and rent seeking, but it must follow the lead of the opposition parties’ 
campaign rhetoric and adopt an anti-corruption platform of its own lest it gain the reputation of 
implicitly being the pro-corruption party. Even if a substantive change in government corrupt 
does not change (Golden 2006), the regime party nonetheless benefits by creating the perception 
that it is taking steps to curb politicians’ excesses; when opposition parties adopt anti-corruption 
platforms, the regime party can at least mitigate rhetoric. Of course, the regime party must find 
the threat from the opposition party credible enough that it would change its behavior. An oppo-
sition party too small to challenge the regime party would likely not alter the regime party’s be-
havior, but an opposition party that could threaten the regime party’s dominance just may.  
 The most apparent benefit that FDI brings to the opposition is overall democratization, 
even at the level of a given electoral district. As the opposition becomes increasingly competi-
tive, it forces the regime party to react to the new challenge to its rule (Meguid 2008). An oppo-
sition party campaigning on an anti-corruption platform forces the regime to adapt to and adopt 
anti-corruption policies of its own – as the regime is obviously the target of such campaigns. 
Madani and Nobakht (2014) find that the overall level of democracy within a country affects the 
likelihood of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), with more democracy translating into 




for fully authoritarian countries: Vietnamese provinces that attract the most FDI are those where 
local party leaders willfully disregard central directives from the Communist Party (Malesky 
2008). However, such a policy presents a double-edged sword to the regime: reining in insubor-
dinate local party leaders would return overall political control back to the party’s leadership, 
even as the policies pursued by the local party leaders spearheads Vietnam’s economic growth. 
 In districts that would have voted for the opposition anyway, the use of revenues derived 
from FDI replaces the public funds withheld by the regime. FDI allows the district to continue 
providing public services; meanwhile, the opposition party can take credit for attracting new 
economic opportunities (Jensen and Malesky 2010). In districts where public funding plays a 
smaller, but still important, role to the public’s economic well-being, FDI allows opposition par-
ties leverage against the regime party by positioning itself as the party of business, entrepreneur-
ship and economic growth.  
 Opposition parties, by design, lack the influence to set national economic policy. The re-
gime can generate its own performance legitimacy, and due to its size and influence in the politi-
cal life of the country, it has many more resources to marshal to its ends. Lucky for opposition 
parties, though, the regime must wrestle with the inherent tension between maintaining private 
goods for a select group of regime insiders and providing enough public goods to win the votes 
of the much larger electorate within the country (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). While generat-
ing legitimacy via performance is possible (e.g., Singapore), the relative ease of relying on the 
provision of private goods to key elites over the provision of public goods to the electorate at 
large hinders most regimes from capitalizing on such policies designed to increase the people’s 
general economic well-being. Democratic parties and candidates rely on techniques, (stump 
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which are designed to attract voters in an election in a relatively fair contest against opponents 
using the same techniques. Electoral authoritarian regimes have even more tools at their disposal,  
such as ballot stuffing, buying off the opposition, “misplacing” opposition candidates’ registra-
tion forms, and outright intimidation, among others – all of which serve to weaken the opposition 
enough to prevent its threatening the regime’s dominance. 
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Fig. 2.1. Graphical Depiction of Electoral Authoritarian Political Space 
 
 Radnitz’s observations of political contestation against the regimes of Central Asia ulti-
mately rest on the informal structure of social movements: the central government has greater 
difficulty tracking down and cracking down on leaders since they may change with each new 
demonstration. In addition, the independent elites within the Central Asian republics have limited 
goals, in that they simply want the central government out of their own demesnes. The fluid 
structure and spontaneous growth of social movements fit more with the ends of the independent 
elites who would prefer to stay out of national politics, and only react to any encroachments on 
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 A party, on the other hand, exists to put individuals into political office. The first decision 
made by any political party is to decide whether to compete in the first place (Przeworski and 
Sprague 1986). As an organization, a party directs and coordinates the actions of its members 
toward shaping politics (Brownlee 2007, 11; Duverger 1954, 1-2; Sartori 1976, 27; Ware 1996, 
4-5). As organizations, political parties have a more durable presence in politics than social 
movements. The organizational structure of a political party allows it to curb its members’ per-
sona ambitions in the pursuit of long-term goals (Brownlee 2007, 13) through its ability to con-
trol the disbursement of incentives to its members (Panebianco 1988, 38). These incentives in-
clude access to donations and campaign funds. 
 At the same time, what would normally be a party’s organizational strength such as iden-
tifiable leaders and a bureaucracy, turn out to be weaknesses as they lower the costs of targeted 
repression for the regime party. Opposition parties face the risk of blackmail, imprisonment of 
their leaders and supporters, vandalism of their offices, among other forms of harassment and 
dissuasion. On top of all these potential hazards, parties also face the problem of sustaining 
themselves financially through a series of electoral defeats. At some point, an opposition party’s 
less-ideological backers would want to see a greater return on their investments, and they could 
choose to withdraw their funding in favor of the dominant party, or even pull out of politics al-
together. In an environment where repression, coercion and intimidation exist to ensure the rul-
ing party remains in power, why would individuals opt for a permanent organization that would 
face these various constrains to competition? 
 Studies on electoral dynamics under electoral authoritarianism typically focus on the na-
tional level of electoral competition. At the national level, opposition parties should expect to 
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bents’ numerous advantages in any one given election. However, the theory described above 
suggests that opposition parties are not necessarily trying to win nationally, but rather seeking 
only to wrest control over certain districts away from the regime. Relying on a national level of 
analysis ignores a crucial distinction that separates electoral authoritarian regimes from other 
forms of nondemocratic rule: the opposition can, and often enough, do win some district elec-
tions against regime candidates. The variables at play in a local setting may differ substantially 
from the conditions at the national level, and an investigation at those factors that allow for op-
position success will elucidate which factors have the greatest effect on sustaining opposition 
parties through electoral cycles. 
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Fig. 2.2. Causal Relationship between FDI and Opposition Party Sustenance 
 
 A lack of local- or district-level data have hindered studies at the subnational level until 
recently, but recent research at the effects of local democracy on the provision of the types of 
publics goods have demonstrated that local elections mater as much as – and perhaps more so – 
than national elections regarding the crafting of public policy. With better data, the level of anal-
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costs of competition must shift away from the national level, where they frequently lose elec-
tions, to the local-level, where they do have some political representation. 
 The theory just described is deductive, though with evidence for regime behavior drawn 
from empirical studies. As such, the major assumptions upholding the entire theoretical argument 
are the three premises that lead to the problem tackled by the research, and a fourth premise that 
attempts to explain opposition party behavior under electoral authoritarian regimes. For clarity, 
the premises are as follows: 
 Premise 1: the regime plunders the state treasury to sustain its rule through kickbacks and 
rents 
 Premise 2: office-seeking politicians join the regime to gain access to rents 
 Premise 3: politicians remaining are ideologues who are too principled to join the regime 
and therefore too radical to gain mass public appeal 
 Problem: not all opposition parties consist of radicals and ideologues 
 Premise 4: access to outside sources of funding allows otherwise politically moderately 
politicians to oppose the regime through their own party apparatuses 
 Conclusion: politicians sustained by outside funding oppose the regime in order to protect 
that source of outside funding for themselves 
 Nothing in this theory suggests that opposition candidates are themselves democrats; in 
fact, because they form political parties to maintain local control from the encroachments of oth-
er elites (namely elites with the dominant party), they may act rather undemocratic when assert-
ing their own local control. However, as North and Thomas (1999) noticed with the rise of the 
business class in England, a liberal economic outlook tends to have spillover effects in increasing 




der the control of FDI-friendly parties should also exhibit political openness as a result, if for 
nothing else than to continue attracting additional foreign investments. 
Alternative Theories 
Alternative Theory 1: Ideological Voting 
 One alternative explanation for why opposition parties form and compete against the 
dominant party is for the expressed benefits of opposing a corrupt and repressive regime on mor-
al principles. Dominant parties enjoy resource advantages over their competitors as they can 
make use of state funds to supplement party funds (Greene 2010, 2008; Magaloni 2006; Diaz-
Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003). In other words, the state treasury becomes an extension 
of the party treasury. The consequence of this dynamic is that the opposition parties will be more 
ideologically extreme compared to the dominant party, as they can only rely on their ideological 
difference vis-à-vis the ruling party in order to attract votes. This ideological-voting model sub-
verts the democratic logic of the median voter theorem (Downs 1957), in that the dominant party 
establishes itself as a catch-all party and secures the median for itself, capturing a broad swathe 
of voters and elites of the left and the right by prioritizing access to patronage over adherence to 
ideology. Opposition parties cannot offer the same levels of patronage goods as the dominant 
party, so instead they cater to ideological purists of the extreme left and right. 
While rent-seeking behavior motivates politicians to join the dominant party, the same 
behavior does nothing to persuade opposition members motivated by their ideological convic-
tions from giving up their cause; they only gain electoral success when the dominant party loses 
its ability to dispense rents and therefore its financial advantages over its poorer competitors. The 
dominant party can attract less ideological individuals from competing parties by offering access 




more ideologically committed – they oppose the dominant party for some deeply held conviction 
of how politics ought to operate (Greene 2008, 121-124). In Mexico, the PRD and the PAN com-
pete against the PRI on classic-left-right economic issues14, while Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood 
opposes the corruption and pro-Western orientation of the ruling National Democratic Party 
(Leiken and Brook 2007). 
According to Greene’s (2007) theory, opposition parties face no barriers to forming, only 
in competing, as access to rents binds elites and the public to the dominant party; violence only 
becomes necessary when economic downturns or privatization shrink the state’s revenues, and 
thus the dominant party’s source of patronage. In Mexico, the ruling PRI relied on rents derived 
from the state-owned oil company to maintain a coalition of rightist and leftist politicians. A pol-
icy shift in favor of neoliberalism in the 1980s dried up the rents available to keep this electoral 
coalition viable. Party members defected to opposition parties of similar ideological disposition 
in the hopes of finding better electoral prospects (Greene 2007, 62). What is tentatively called 
the center-periphery theory (mentioned above) suggests that funding the party through several 
losing election cycles is itself a very real barrier to entry, and that many people will simply not 
be willing to pay the cost in time or money in backing a loser. FDI changes individuals’ calculus 
by offering a source of revenues that are not only worth protecting from the central government, 
but also a means to the end of sustaining competition against the dominant party. 
Alternative Theory 2: Cleavage Theory 
 Electoral authoritarian regimes tend to exist in countries that possess deep societal fis-
sures within them. Political liberalization provided the impetus for creating a new party system 
based on the most salient cleavages that emerge after the chaotic sorting process following liber-
                                               
14 Originally, the PAN was a Catholic identity party, strongly opposed to the anti-clericalism following the Mexican 




alization (Zielinski 2002). Where ethnic, confessional, or regional differences persist, parties are 
vehicles of identity and advocacy. Dominant parties maintain their dominance to ensure that their 
group holds a privileged place in society. “Protection pacts” that allowed the rise of strong states 
in Southeast Asia formed out of a multiethnic coalition of elites to protect themselves from a 
much larger, hostile underclass (usually consisting of a single ethnic group) (Slater 2010). The 
divide in these countries is class-based, with a hint of ethnic tension thrown in for good measure, 
suggesting that regime parties reflect the most salient political issue in that country, at least as 
understood by the elites themselves. 
 The idea of using parties as a vehicle for advancing the interests of a particular social 
group is not new: Western Europe’s party families developed out of the class-based cleavages 
that formed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) study on 
the development of political parties from their class-based conflicts over resource allocation pro-
vides a theoretical blueprint for analyzing party formation in the present as the outgrowth of so-
cietal cleavages manifesting themselves in the political realm. An alternate theory for why oppo-
sition parties form and compete against a dominant party despite any strong chance of winning 
de facto political power is due to the nature of identity politics. The opposition parties form to 
advance the interests of a particular clan, ethnicity, or religious sect. Parties in electoral authori-
tarianism thus differ little in their motives from parties found in democratic states. Rather, they 





CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 This chapter details the measurements and the methods used to test the theory of how the 
presence of FDI supports opposition parties in a biased electoral environment. The ability of the 
theory herein presented to explain the behavior of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian 
regimes against competing theories of opposition party behavior lends the theory credence, that it 
is capturing some real-world phenomenon in a meaningful way. 
Measurements 
 Studies on electoral dynamics under electoral authoritarianism typically focus on political 
outcomes at the national level. Poor or lacking local- or district-level data have hindered studies 
at the subnational level until relatively recently, but recent research at the effects that local de-
mocracy has on the provision of the types of publics goods have demonstrated that local elec-
tions matter as much as – and perhaps more so – than national elections regarding the drafting of 
public policy. With better data, the level of analysis for investigating why opposition parties in 
electoral authoritarian regimes bother to bear the costs of competition must shift away from the 
national level, where they frequently lose elections, to the local-level, where they do have some 
political representation. 
 Even though the theory places the level of interaction among the regime, the opposition 
parties and foreign investors at the local level, the study makes use of a large-N, cross-national 
dataset merely to test the theory’s validity. If a large-N study can at least demonstrate correlation 
between the levels of FDI as a percentage of GDP and shares of seats controlled by the opposi-
tion, then it would demonstrate that some relationship exists between FDI and opposition party 




 This chapter will consist of three sections. The first section will define electoral authori-
tarianism and my operationalization of the same. The second and third sections will explain the 
methods used for the large-N and for the case studies, respectively. 
Definition 
 Constructing a list of electoral authoritarian cases has spawned a veritable cottage indus-
try within comparative politics, and no shortage of ready-made lists exists for researchers. The 
lack of consensus comes from the nature of these countries’ regimes themselves: electoral au-
thoritarian regimes deliberately attempt to play up their superficial democratic aspects while also 
hiding the autocratic behaviors and practices that ultimately keep the regime in power.15 A work-
ing definition that I used in Chapter 1 describes an electoral authoritarian regimes as a regime in 
which outwardly democratic features like frequent elections open to an independent opposition 
and a (relatively) free civil society hide a fundamentally authoritarian core. This deliberately du-
plicitous design makes identifying electoral authoritarian regimes challenging. After all, the per-
fect authoritarian regime is the one that seamlessly passes as a fully-fledged democracy. 
 However, some distinction between electoral authoritarian regimes from democracies on 
one hand and from closed forms of authoritarianism on the other hand, requires a clear set of op-
erationalization criteria. The first step is to distinguish electoral authoritarianism first as a form 
of non-democratic rule, and that means identifying non-democracies in whole from democracies. 
 Two forms of identifying democracies exist: a “minimalist” definition preferred by Prze-
worski (1999; 1991) and Schumpeter (1942), and a “maximalist” definition as developed by 
Dahl (1971), Marshall and Jaggers (2008), and Freedom House. Under a minimalist definition, 
                                               
15 To this effect, Botswana under the Botswana Democratic Party is often cited (Przeworski et al. 2000, 26; Magalo-
ni 2006, 34; Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014, 47-8) as the paradigmatic case of classification uncertainty: though 
the BDP has controlled Botswana’s government since independence, it does so with no apparent signs of coercion, 
manipulation, or violence. At the same time, no historical situation has yet occurred to indicate whether the BDP 




democracy is little more than the competition between organized groups of politicians for politi-
cal office. Przeworski (1999) argues that a minimalist definition is precise in its simplicity be-
cause it focuses only on quality of elections. Minimalist definitions benefit from easy conceptu-
alization as it looks only at the integrity of electoral outcomes without worrying about concepts 
that require greater subjectivity in their measurements. Limiting the number of democracy’s at-
tributes makes causality easier to identify with minimalist definitions by reducing the number of 
possible causes that could possibly generate some observed outcome. 
 Maximalist definitions expand democracies beyond their simple electoral facet, and look 
at the degree of rights and liberties that infuse political life and give democracy much of its value 
compared to other forms of rule. Principles such as the rule of law, popular sovereignty, and the 
individual autonomy of the citizen, among others, characterize democracies, but identifying de-
grees of difference in these traits across regimes is much more subjective, even though adding 
additional dimensions than just a procedural method of distinguishing a democracy may yield 
more substantive definitions. Recent qualitative research on non-democracies generally and elec-
toral authoritarianism specifically has tended toward minimalist definitions of democracy likely 
for their greater analytical clarity. 
 A related measurement issue revolves around whether to measure regime type on a con-
tinuous scale or as a collection of discrete categories, an argument that remains open to debate 
(Wilson 2014). Differences in selection criteria affect which cases one includes in a given study, 
which in turn affect the conclusions one reaches about a political phenomenon. Two approaches 
to classifying regime types are by sorting regimes either according to a scale (Polity and Free-
dom House), or by coding regime types into discrete categories (Geddes, Wright and Frantz; 




 The oft-used Freedom House (2015) and Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) datasets 
measure democracy on a scale, suggesting that all regime types differ only in the degree to which 
they exhibit democratic norms and practices. Confusion over identifying electoral authoritarian 
regimes as separate regimes in their own right has resulted from previous conceptions that rank 
all governments along a continuum, with full authoritarianism on one end and full democracy on 
the other, such as the Polity IV or Freedom House data. Using a continuous scale to measure re-
gime type is finding appropriate thresholds to differentiate among fully authoritarian, electoral 
authoritarian and fully democratic regimes. Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman rely on a combined 
Freedom House and Polity score “to compensate for the weaknesses of both,” scaled on a 0-10 
scale with “10” measuring the greatest amount of democracy (2013, 23). From this scale, they 
use 7.5 as the threshold for determining which regimes are sufficiently democratic, and which 
regimes fail to be so. The researchers defend their decision to use the 7.5 cutoff as the score used 
by Freedom House and Polity for their own determinations of where the boundary between de-
mocracy and non-democracy lies. 
 Freedom House and Polity IV contain a number of problems that hinder their ability to 
classify regime types. First, both hold an implicit normative view that non-democratic regimes 
differ from democratic regimes only by their deficiency of democracy. Scholars such as Levitsky 
and Way (2010), Schedler (2002, 2006), Ottaway (2003), and Carothers (2002), among others, 
have noted the deliberate intent of rulers in electoral authoritarian regimes to stay in power de-
spite any outward democratic appearances their regimes may show. That the democratic ideal 
has triumphed globally since the end of the Cold War does not mean that every country now 
yearns to be free. Freedom House’s own data show that the level of freedom in the world has 




democratic tide may have reached a high water mark. While a significant non-democratic rever-
sal has so far spared the third wave (Diamond 2011, Levitsky and Way 2015), at the same time 
surviving authoritarian regimes remain stubbornly resistant to democratization. 
 Another problem with placing regimes on a continuum based on this reasoning conflates 
state capacity with regime type. A common assumption in the literature is that, since regimes 
found in the middle of a continuous scale share elements of authoritarianism and democracy, 
they cannot consistently repress or reward opposition groups. These middle-range regimes must 
be weak compared to the “purer” types, and must therefore be more susceptible to civil violence. 
However, state capacity is separate from regime type. The existence of durable electoral authori-
tarian regimes such as Mexico (1929-2000) or Botswana (1966-present) on the one hand and 
short-lived authoritarian regimes (Greece 1967-1973 and Thailand 2006-2007) or short-lived 
democracies (Argentina 1958-1965 and Ghana 1969-1971) on the other hand provide empirical 
evidence that electoral authoritarian regime are not inherently weaker than fully authoritarian or 
fully democratic regimes. 
 Finally, coding regimes on a continuum introduces normative qualities to empirical 
measurements. Placing regimes on a continuum between fully autocratic and fully democratic 
endpoints leads to the assumption that regimes found in the middle of the range are somehow 
“arrested,” “transitory,” or even “imperfect democracies.” Empirically, this reasoning lacks 
grounding. Authoritarian regimes exist in a wide array of regime types themselves, and make use 
of institutions to co-opt any opposition into the regime, to maintain a unified ruling coalition, or 
to subvert democratic norms and institutions to perpetuate authoritarian rule.  The intentional 
misuse of democratic norms and institutions by electoral authoritarian elites runs counter to tele-




Initial Case Selection 
 The cross-national study uses a list of cases drawn from the dataset on electoral authori-
tarian regimes involves using Svolik’s (2012) dataset on authoritarian institutions, itself an ex-
tension of the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck 2001; hereafter DPI). The 
NELDA dataset is valuable for its wealth of electoral data, but it does not contain any coding in-
formation for non-election years. The original DPI dataset only reaches back to 1975, whereas 
Svolik’s extension covers the years 1946-2008. Since its original release, the World Bank has 
updated the DPI to cover 1975-2012, so my data will come full circle by using the updated DPI 
dataset to cover the four years from 2008 to 2012 that Svolik does not have in his extended da-
taset of the original DPI data. 
 Svolik identifies four dimensions of authoritarian rule: method of legislative selection, 
method of executive selection, and restrictions placed on political party formation, and the de-
gree of military involvement in politics. Of Svolik’s four dimensions of rule, only the degree of 
military involvement in politics does not factor into the construction of my list of cases. While 
militaries can and have fulfilled a tutelary function in some regimes by overturning the outcomes 
of otherwise democratic elections that they deem to be unsatisfactory, Svolik’s dataset includes 
only authoritarian country-years in its observations in the first place. Thus, factoring in the mili-
tary’s role in the government is not only outside the scope of this study, but methodologically it 
also makes considering any military violations of elections effectively a redundant exercise. 
 I follow Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and Svolik (2012) in excluding country-year 
observations during which the country in question experiences a breakdown of central authority, 
transitional rule, or foreign occupation, as these states lack a monopoly of the legitimate use of 




a functioning state before I determine its classification (Huntington 1968, 1). Svolik provides 
data within his dataset that allow researchers to determine when such periods of fragmented state 
capacity occur, and I exclude these cases accordingly. 
 Following the coding principles used by as Brownlee (2009) and Higashijima and Kasuya 
(2016), I distinguish cases of electoral authoritarianism from other forms of authoritarian rule 
according to three criteria. A regime is electoral authoritarianism if 1) elections legally allow 
multiple parties to compete, even if one party wins all offices; 2) multiple parties compete, and 
the largest party wins more than 75% of seats in the legislature; and 3) multiple parties compete, 
and the largest party wins less than 75% of seats in the legislature. Cases in which 1) no legisla-
ture exists, 2) neither the executive nor the legislature are elected, or 3) where elections consist 
of only one candidate, or multiple candidates belonging to the same party, fail to qualify as ob-
servations of electoral authoritarianism. 
 Finally, I divide my list of electoral authoritarian cases between “competitive authoritari-
an” and “hegemonic authoritarian” variants, consistent with the two subtypes of electoral author-
itarianism identified in the literature (Diamond 2002, Levitsky and Way 2002, Schedler 2002). 
Competitive authoritarianism allows opposition parties greater scope to compete in elections 
compared to the hegemonic parties, which keep tight control over the electoral arena. As such, 
one would expect the greater potential gains available in competitive authoritarian regimes to 
encourage more opposition parties to form. Kinne and Marinov (2013) use a threshold of 55% of 
seats in the legislature or greater to establish hegemonic control, while Brownlee (2009) uses a 
threshold of 75%. Kinne and Marinov use the lower limit as the dividing line between competi-
tive and hegemonic subtypes to allow for instances of electoral authoritarianism (usually coun-




but fails to command a majority in the legislature. While comparatively rare, these circumstances 
do happen: about 12.6 percent of my cases consist of regimes that fail to command a majority in 
the legislature. Select examples include, but are not limited to, Azerbaijan 1992-1999, Cambodia 
in 1997, Ecuador 2000-2003, Paraguay 1993-1998 and 2003-2008, and Tajikistan 1996-1999.16 
 A third alternative comes from Magaloni (2006), who considers ruling parties as being 
hegemonic when they control 67% or more of seats. This level of control over the legislature not 
only allows parties to enact legislation and governmental policy without any support from other 
parties, but it also grants them the ability to amend constitutions unilaterally. While a party ob-
taining 75% or more of seats in the legislature certainly commands a position of political domi-
nance, I opt for the threshold of 67% consistent with Magaloni’s practice. Appendix A lists the 
cases included in this study and their years under electoral authoritarianism including the divi-
sion of cases into competitive and hegemonic subtypes.17 
 Two cases prove to be problematic in deciding whether to include them as electoral au-
thoritarian or not, to wit South Africa and Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe). In South Africa, the Na-
tional Party held a majority of seats during the Apartheid era, but little data exists that it abused 
its position to shut out other white opposition parties out of power, even though it readily shut 
out the country’s black majority from participating in politics. White minorities ruled over both 
South Africa and Rhodesia, and severely disenfranchised the black majority in favor of white 
minority rule. By severely curtailing citizens’ right of political participation in favor of uphold-
ing the dominant minority’s privileges, I count both countries as electoral authoritarian regimes.  
                                               
16 Belarus’s parties are weak organizations that have few seats in the legislature, the overwhelming majority of seats 
belonging to independents. Formally, the regime thus lacks partisan control of the legislature, but President Alexan-
der Lukashenko ensures that the many independent parliamentarians are loyal to him thereby securing legislative 
compliance (Kulik and Pshizova 2005). 
 
17 Appendices B and C include the same lists, but with the threshold between competitive and hegemonic subtypes 






 The dependent variable Share measures the percentage of seats belonging to opposition 
in the legislature, lagged by one year to make the model more dynamic, and more accurately cap-
ture how the present year’s elections reflect to the previous year’s FDI flows rather than measure 
their relationship within the same year. The variable runs from 0 to 100. In instances where a na-
tional legislature has two chambers, I only consider the lower chamber. My observations for 
Share show wide variance, with 78 country-years having no opposition seats, and four observa-
tions (Tajikistan 1996-2000) recording the opposition controlling roughly 93% of seats. The 
mean for Share, however, is at 22.7 percent, indicating that the bulk of my country-year observa-
tions have the opposition making up only a small fraction of the legislature.18 Share is expected 
to have a positive relationship with my independent variable, FDI, i.e., that an increase in FDI as 
a percentage of GDP leads to an increase in the percentage of seats in the national legislature 
controlled by opposition parties. 
 Electoral authoritarian regimes complicate how to count opposition parties, as incum-
bents may create “official” opposition parties composed of candidates whose only roles are to 
lose graciously to the incumbent. Furthermore, if electoral tampering is especially heinous, op-
position parties may boycott an election, and not run any candidates (Chernykh 2014, Lindberg 
2006). Even though these parties still provide the organizational vehicles that allow political ac-
tors to attain control of the government (Aldrich 1995, 5; Sartori 1976, 58-9; Schattschneider 
1942, 35), they are not participating in that particular election. That is, these parties have made 
the decision not to bear the costs of electoral participation – or more importantly, the costs of 
                                               
18 My definition of electoral authoritarianism does not explicitly rule out any case in which the regime party fails to 
control at least half of legislative seats, though these circumstances should be relatively rare compared to instances 




electoral defeat. As my dependent variable only codes parties that compete in elections, then my 
variable by default ignores parties that boycott elections. 
 Share does have its downsides compared to a count variable: for one, a percentage-based 
variable only considers parties that have won seats in the legislature, and thus it excludes both 
parties that compete but have not won any seats and parties that only contest presidential elec-
tions. Furthermore, electoral authoritarian regimes purposefully bias election results in their fa-
vor, thereby casting doubt on the reliability of the variable as an indicator of actual opposition 
strength, let alone diversity. Using a variable for percentage control of the legislature neverthe-
less provides some measure of opposition party competitiveness vis-à-vis the regime party. 
 In addition to the original DPI variable reporting the wrong measure in some instances, I 
also found some cases where opposition party seats were not reported (Cambodia, Comoros), or 
instances in which opposition parties were counted even though they had in fact won no seats 
(Djibouti, Mauritania, Singapore). In the former cases, I turned to data from the International 
Parliamentary Union’s data on elections, cross-referenced with Dieter Nohlen’s many data hand-
books on elections to fill in the lacking or incorrect information on opposition seats.  
 The DPI dataset only goes as far back as 1975, and Svolik does not have any comparable 
data on the number of opposition parties within his extension to the DPI dataset. The lack of ob-
servations in the years 1970-197519 forces me to make use of alternative resources to get election 
data. Two such resources, the Global Elections Database (Brancati 2016) and the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems, extend the dataset used in the survey regarding the number of 
parties for the years 1946-1974, thereby increasing the overall number of observations. For cases 
missing from the DPI data, I turn to the Inter Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) PARLINE data. 
                                               
19 The cutoff point of 1970 is not some arbitrary year I picked: my FDI data only go as far back as 1970 (as indicat-
ed below), and so adding any election data from before then would be pointless, as these observations would drop 




PARLINE archives facsimiles of countries’ official ballot returns, using optical character recog-
nition software to create digital copies of official results. Some of these digital facsimiles are of 
sufficient quality to gain information needed to fill in missing data on opposition seat shares; in 
others, the software has rendered the original returns to gibberish. I used Nohlen’s election data 
to fill in these missing observations. 
 Finally, the original DPI variable was also including independent candidates as opposi-
tion parties in their own right, and even then applying this counting rule haphazardly. My study 
looks at parties specifically, because parties provide an institutional apparatus designed to unite 
candidates with each other and with voters under a specific political program. Independent can-
didates eschew parties explicitly (even though they may still decide to vote with particular par-
ties after the election) during their campaigns. Thus, I have made the decision to exclude inde-
pendent candidates entirely; while I may lose observations, I will take the conservative route and 
avoid overinflating my data. 
Independent variable 
 The theory suggests a relationship between FDI and the number of opposition parties in 
an electoral authoritarian country. The independent variable in the large-N study is FDI, which 
measures the net inflow of FDI as a percentage of total GDP in a given country-year. The data on 
FDI come from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which 
tracks the flow of FDI for all countries from 1970 to 2014. Given that FDI measures the net in-
flow, some values may be negative – an indication of foreign investment fleeing the country. 
 The UNCTAD data covers the period 1970 to 2014. Iran and nearly all of the Latin 
American cases fall out of the study due to the lack of FDI data on those countries for that peri-




censored at 1970. Out of 976 country-years in my list of electoral authoritarian regimes, exactly 
200 observations drop out of the study due to the dependent variable beginning at 1970. Despite 
this one setback, however, UNCTAD covers all country-year observations from 1970 onward, 
leaving no missing observations in the data for this variable. 
Control variables 
 Controls used in the large-N study will consist of standard demographic indicators in-
cluding a population variable and a variable measuring GDP Purchasing Power Parity to capture 
to overall level of wealth in the countries under study. I have taken the log of both variables to 
regularize the variance between countries with low and high measures on each respective varia-
ble: the marginal effects of population and wealth are similar. When the population or level of 
wealth is small, a single defection from the regime (voter, politician, contribution) has a greater 
effect than at higher levels of population or wealth. Taking the log of both variables helps to 
make their distribution more normal, while also capturing the non-linear effects of what would 
otherwise be linear measures. Further, three variables taken from Alesina et al. (2003) measure 
the degree of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, respectively, in the countries in-
cluded in the cross-national analysis. A rich literature on party systems in sub-Saharan Africa 
finds that political parties serve as distribution mechanisms to provide material benefits to co-
ethnics (Bates 1981; Berman 1998; Easterly and Levine 1997; Enloe 1980; Francois, Rainer, and 
Trebbi 2015; Koter 2013; Lemarchand 1972; Londregan, Bienen, and van de Walle 1995; Posner 
2004; Zolberg 1969). Thus, including societal fractionalization measures controls for any influ-
ence that underlying societal cleavages may have on the relationship between FDI and opposi-
tion party strength. I have transformed these three variables because their effects on the depend-




cients for the variables to show two significant figures in the regression tables. Transforming my 
fractionalization variables in this way distinguishes them from all of the other percentage-based 
variables in my model, which depict values between 0 and 100.  
 One variable taken from the World Development Index measures the urban population as 
a percentage of the country’s total population. Urban districts foster the development of opposi-
tion parties and become centers of opposition electoral strength due to the greater concentration 
of regime opponents in one location, which reduces the transaction costs of organizing (Diaz-
Cayeros and Magaloni 2001, 280; Wallace 2013). Cities also supplant traditional societal ties 
with new relationships (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 409; Lust-Okar 2006), and provide new 
economic opportunities, thereby reducing the dependence on state transfers for goods and ser-
vices (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast 2003; Magaloni 2006) that otherwise bind poor 
rural voters to the regime. A greater percentage of the population living in urban centers should 
translate into a higher percentage of opposition seats. 
 A large part of the theory relies on the regime’s ability to make use of rents from state-
owned enterprises as additional resources at its disposal for retaining political power. The aptly 
named variable Resource measures rents from natural resources (diamonds, petroleum, cash 
crops, etc.) as a percent of GDP. Another variable, Oil Rents, specifically targets rents derived 
from the extraction of petroleum, which the literature has found to be a particularly significant 
determinant of authoritarian rule (Collier and Hoeffler 2005, Jensen and Wantchekon 2002, Ross 
2001, Ulfelder 2007, Wantchekon 2000; though Ahmadov 2014, Dunning 2008, and Herb 2005 
disagree on the specific effects of oil on democracy). Additionally, rents allow the regime to buy 




 The literature on electoral authoritarianism makes a distinction between “competitive” 
and “hegemonic” authoritarian regime subtypes. The difference between these two subtypes is 
that competitive authoritarian regimes face an opposition strong enough to make the regime wor-
ry about actually losing an election, whereas under hegemonic authoritarian regimes incumbents 
remain comfortably insulated from the political risks to their offices posed by holding elections. 
Yet despite consensus over the presence of these two subtypes, the literature is unsure over 
where to place the boundary between them. Kinne and Marinov (2013) place the boundary at 
55% of seats in the legislature belonging to the party in power, arguing that an outright majority 
is enough to dwarf the opposition as whole, let alone any one opposition party. Magaloni (2006) 
instead opts for 67% of seats in the legislature; as such, a supermajority allows the regime to 
amend the constitution unilaterally. Others such as Brownlee (2009), Donno (2013), Higashijima 
and Kasuya (2016) and Svolik (2012) use a 75% threshold, indicating clear examples of a re-
gime’s political hegemony.  
 The case of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) demonstrates why 55% is too low a 
figure for establishing the boundary between competitive and hegemonic regimes. The CPP has 
had to rely on coalition partners ever since Cambodia reinstated elections in 1993. In 2008, the 
CPP was expected to win a two-thirds majority, allowing it to amend the constitution to allow 
just one party to achieve a simple majority in order to govern, and thus remove the CPP’s need to 
form a coalition with a rival to maintain power. Alternatively, the 75% threshold ensures that, 
under that criterion, all of my cases would hold a clear supermajority status, and would consider 
only those countries whose constitutions require three-fourths support to pass any amendments. 




is the required supermajority. Its popularity amongst researchers is due primarily to the fact that 
the widely used DPI dataset codes whether the executive or the legislature wins by 75% or more. 
 When two-thirds of seats in the legislature belongs to one party, that party gains a super-
majority sufficient to pass normal legislation unopposed by the opposition. In some cases at 
least, depending on each country’s constitutional provisions and parliamentary procedures, a 
two-third supermajority can also pass constitutional amendments, and if that supermajority be-
longs to just one party, then clearly that party has hegemonic control of the country’s legislative 
processes. A limit of 55% favored by Kinne and Marinov is too low, for, while it does mean that 
the regime has majority support within the legislature, it must also try to gain opposition support 
for anything that requires a supermajority to pass. A regime that controls a supermajority, on the 
other hand, can act alone and pass laws over and above the opposition’s protestations.  
 Magaloni’s arguments for placing the threshold between competitive and hegemonic sub-
types provide a better theoretical argument than the 55% threshold or the 75% threshold used in 
other studies. I built my variable, heg67, by dividing the ruling party’s seats by the total seats in 
the legislature, using the lower house in bicameral systems, in which a value of “1” indicates that 
the case counts as competitive authoritarian, and a value of “0” when the case counts as hege-
monic authoritarian. My dataset includes dummy variables for 55% and 75% control of legisla-
tive seats, labeled as heg55 and heg75, respectively, for the sake of completeness. 
 A few of my cases do contain country-year observations (33 observations in total) in 
which the regime’s control of the legislature drops below 50% of seats.20 In these regimes, the 
legislature is essentially superfluous, as its control by the opposition still fails to yield any mean-
ingful exercise of political power. Tajikistan is one such example in which the president holds 
                                               
20 These cases are Belarus (1996), Ecuador (2000-03), Georgia (1993-95), Haiti (2007-08), Kazakhstan (1995), 
Mexico (1998-2000), Paraguay (2004-08), Samoa (2003-06), São Tomé and Príncipe (1991), Tajikistan (1996-




significant decree power to overrule any bills passed by the legislature; whereas in Ecuador, Par-
aguay and Thailand the military acts in a tutelary capacity, intervening on behalf of the executive 
to limit democratic or popular demands placed on the regime. The remaining cases consist of re-
gimes that historically are either not fully consolidated upon independence (Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan) or are in transition between regime types (Mexico). I have decided to include these 
cases in the dataset, as they do still qualify as electoral authoritarian regimes according to my 
selection criteria, and they account for roughly 4.8 percent of all my observations, which will not 
be substantial enough to affect my quantitative analysis. 
 Electoral rules matter in how they structure the incentives for parties to form and compete 
in elections. Electoral rules that incentivize minor parties to coalesce rather than stand for elec-
tion separately may override FDI’s capacity to support opposition parties through electoral cy-
cles. Despite all of the FDI that flows into the United States on a yearly basis, its political system 
nevertheless has only two major parties as a consequence of the electoral rules in place there 
(Sartori 1997; Taylor et al 2014). Institutional factors controlled for in the study include a dum-
my variable for electoral rules. Duverger’s (1954) observation that electoral rules shape the 
number of parties in a given district stands as one of the few “laws” in comparative politics; the 
variable Plurality codes elections under proportional voting rules as a “0,” and elections under 
majoritarian voting rules as a “1.” Even in an unfair electoral environment, an opposition party 
has a conceivably greater chance to win seats under a proportional system than under majoritari-
an voting rules due to the greater number of seats per district for candidates to contest. 
 Finally, the variable Federal states as “1” and unitary states as “0.” Federal systems cre-
ate a separate layer of subnational offices for opposition parties to contest, thus allowing parties 




Furthermore, subnational units within federal systems tend to have exclusive power over some of 
their own affairs, allowing any subnational government controlled by an opposition party to exert 
control over some aspect of the political process. As my theory states that the conflict between 
the opposition and the regime is won and lost not at the national level but rather in each electoral 
district, I expect that federal systems will have more opposition parties represented, and thus a 




CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 I ran multiple models each with a different set of control variables to test for alternate ex-
planations for the opposition’s control of the legislature in a given year. Regression results indi-
cate a statistically significant relationship between levels of foreign direct investment and oppo-
sition party control in the legislature, but this relationship is negative, contrary to what my theory 
would expect. The regression models themselves are not proof positive of my theory’s validity 
regarding the relationship between net inflows of FDI and the percentage of seats controlled by 
the opposition parties in the legislature, especially since my theory indicates that the relationship 
occurs at the subnational and not the national level, nevertheless the models can demonstrate cor-
relation between these two variables. That is, the regression models’ purpose is to show that the 
relationship between FDI and opposition party share at the very least exists. 
 After the Cold War’s end, the mean value for the opposition’s share of seats in the legis-
lature discernably increases compared to the mean value for opposition party share of seats dur-
ing the Cold War. The mean value during the Cold War is 0.195, while after that period the mean 
score rises to 0.242. This change in the mean scores between the two periods indicates that oppo-
sition parties did gain greater representation in their respective legislatures, commensurate with 
the observations made by other scholars regarding the rise in political liberalization and multi-
party elections with the Cold War’s end (Diamond 2002, Huntington 1991, Levitsky and Way 
2010, Schedler 2006). A difference in mean scores between the Cold War era and its aftermath is 
more readily apparent with FDI. The net amount of foreign direct investment as a percentage of 
GDP flowing into electoral authoritarian regimes after the end of the Cold War (4.19) is more 
than three times greater compared to the amount of FDI flowing into electoral authoritarian re-




 The first model is a simple bivariate test meant to show that the net level of FDI as a per-
centage of GDP does have a statistical effect on opposition parties’ share of seats in the legisla-
ture. A statistically significant relationship does exist, but it runs in the opposite direction of 
what my theory proposes.  Even if the relationship between FDI and opposition party strength is 
statistically significant, the real-world effect is relatively weak: every one percent increase of net 
FDI as a percentage of total GDP reduces the opposition’s share of seats in the legislature by 
about one-third of a percent. The R-squared also backs up the faint substantive effect by indicat-
ing that the bivariate model only captures a mere one percent of the total variance for the de-
pendent variable. Nonetheless, a relationship does exist between FDI and opposition strength. I 
suspect that foreign entrepreneurs are more likely to accept working with a given regime (how-
ever arbitrary it may be) because it is the party in power (Asiedu and Lien 2010, Escribà-Folch 
2008, Oneal 1994), rather than try to support opposition parties through rigged elections with 
little to show for such support.  
 Model 2 adds socioeconomic controls (logged GDP per capita, logged population, per-
centage of the urban population and oil rents as a percentage of GDP). This model also includes 
the dummy variable for the Cold War. FDI maintains its statistical significance, and the coeffi-
cient has a greater effect on opposition seats as well, increasing in value from -0.36 in Model 1 to 
-0.45 in Model 2. Of course, the substantive effect is still negligible. Only two of the control var-
iables achieve statistical significance: percentage of urbanization and the Cold War dummy. 
However, even with two more statistically significant variables – and one of those showing a 
substantive effect on the dependent variable – compared to Model 1, the R-squared value still 





Table 4.1. OLS Regression Predicting Net FDI and Opposition Party Seat Share 
 













Variables b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE   b SE 
FDI, net inflow (% of GDP) -0.36 ** 0.11 
 
-0.45 ** 0.12 
 
-0.39 ** 0.11 
 
-0.38 ** 0.10 
 
-0.35 ** 0.11 
 
-0.37 ** 0.11 
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-3.98 ** 1.22 
 
-5.19 ** 1.40 
 
-5.09 ** 1.40 
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16.02 ** 1.13 
 
16.94 ** 1.28 
 
16.20 ** 1.37 
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20.15 ** 8.02 
 
24.19 ** 1.86 
 






21.28 * 9.82 
                        N 732 
   
704 
   
693 
   
732 
   
678 
   
678 
  R-squared 0.01       0.05       0.02       0.25       0.29       0.29     
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 




 The positive sign for the Cold War dummy variable provides yet another point of evi-
dence for the geopolitical watershed event that was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War, especially as it pertains to the loss of legitimacy (and external support) that ful-
ly authoritarian regimes once enjoyed. Unlike FDI’s coefficient, however, its substantive effect 
does translate into the real world more readily: opposition parties could expect to gain an addi-
tional six percent control of the legislature simply by waiting for the end of the Cold War. Non-
democratic regimes not only liberalized overall with the end of the Cold War, many of them be-
coming the electoral authoritarian regimes that one sees today, but even electoral authoritarian 
regimes themselves felt the global pressure for more electoral accountability with the third wave. 
 Urbanization is also statistically significant, but its effects lack substantive importance. 
As a country’s urbanized population increases by one percent, the effect is only to increase the 
percentage of seats controlled by the opposition by 0.13 percent, or less than a fifth of a percent, 
which is hardly much of an effect. What is surprising about the urbanization variable, however, 
is that its sign is negative, suggesting that in my model urban populations are more likely to vote 
against the opposition, not for it. This particular effect stands in opposition to other findings by 
Magaloni (2006), Timmons and Broid (2013) and Wallace (2013) that urbanized populations 
tend to be less dependent on the state for their economic wellbeing. 
 My third regression model utilizes the ELF variables (Alesina et al. 2003) that measure 
ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization. FDI maintains its statistical significance, while 
none of the control variables do. This finding (or rather the lack thereof) suggests that a vast lit-
erature on the relationship between ethnicity and the number of parties (Bates 1974, Bogaards 




electoral authoritarian regimes.21 Religious fractionalization is also not an explanation for the 
formation of opposition parties, as this variable also fails to achieve statistical significance. Ex-
amples of opposition parties formed along either ethnolinguistic and religious lines do exist (the 
People’s National Congress and People’s Progressive Party that represent Afro-Guyanese and 
Indo-Guyanese, respectively provide two examples), but within my large-N study these factors 
are not sufficient to explain the percentage of seats in the legislature held by opposition parties. 
Perhaps dishearteningly, though it should not come as much of a surprise given the lack of statis-
tical significance, the value of the R-squared for Model 3 is 0.02, falling back to the same lowly 
level of (poor) accounting as in Model 1. 
 The variables controlled for in Model 4 look at institutional and political features that 
would either facilitate or inhibit the proliferation of multiple parties, especially as they pertain to 
the proliferation of opposition parties. These factors are electoral system, federalism, and the 
percent of seats in the legislature held by the regime. Model 4 demonstrates a few of the many 
ways that authoritarian rulers can violate democratic norms in order to engineer electoral victo-
ries for themselves (Schedler 2002). In this case, deliberately selecting electoral systems that dis-
courage the formation of small parties (Duverger 1954) provides the regime with a less costly, 
legal alternative to other forms of electoral fraud such as mobilizing votes or ballot stuffing (Di-
az-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001). Manipulating electoral results beforehand is one way to ensure 
the continued rule of the regime party, and the propensity of majoritarian electoral systems to 
favor the largest party adds yet another option for electoral authoritarian rulers to further bias the 
electoral arena in their favor. 
                                               
21  The literature is quite clear that in general parties in sub-Saharan Africa form along ethnic lines and function 




 Institutions are the framework and the rules that structure society. That is, they set the 
norms of behavior and the incentives of actors. Institutions are the core actors in comparative 
politics because of the central role that institutions play in combining and distilling actors’ deeds 
into political policies. By constraining the range of permissible behaviors, institutions provide 
incentives and constraints on the actions of individuals and groups. The institution, which is to 
say the election rules, places limitations on the range of political behaviors within society. For 
the same reason, institutions create incentives that shape the strategies of political actors (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). Electoral authoritarian regimes can make use of these institu-
tional factors to create barriers that hinder the opposition’s ability to contest the regime legally 
without resorting to extralegal mean of maintaining power. Adopting a single-member voting 
system alone can reduce the opposition’s share of seats by nearly four percent. Even within a 
(purposefully) flawed electoral environment, the particular incentives put in place through a ma-
joritarian voting system penalize smaller parties (Duverger 1954); adding various forms of elec-
toral manipulation such as vote buying, intimidation or even outright fraud, should only serve to 
magnify this effect. 
 Federalism does not achieve statistical significance, likely because electoral authoritarian 
regimes tend to keep the locus of political power within the (national) regime, and not share or 
disperse that power to all provincial governments. If so, then that power goes toward either em-
powering local magistrates to act as functionaries of the regime, or to attract the support of local 
potentates and ensure their support for the regime. Another explanation is that my list of cases 
contains relatively few federal systems, and so the sheer number of country-year observations of 




 The literature on electoral authoritarian regimes makes a clear distinction between those 
regimes in which the incumbents enjoy certain unfair advantages over their opponents but must 
still work at winning elections (competitive) and those in which the incumbents have such a clear 
advantage that their elections are virtually devoid of competition (hegemonic). I set the demarca-
tion between competitive and hegemonic subtypes at the 67% level for Model 4, meaning that a 
country in which the regime controls 67% or more of seats in the legislature I would score as 
hegemonic; any percentage less than 67 would score that case as competitive. Scoring the varia-
ble in this manner means that I can read the coefficient for this variable in a more intuitive fash-
ion, as the greater competitive nature of competitive authoritarian regimes would incentivize op-
position parties to form and contest elections. I tested alternative models with different thresh-
olds separating competitive and hegemonic subtypes, and the coefficient remains significant 
whether the threshold was set at 55%. I have included both models with the different threshold 
levels in the Appendix as Tables A.4 for the 55% threshold and A.5 for the 75% threshold. 
 Competitive authoritarian regimes by definition must rely to some degree on their elec-
toral competitiveness to ensure their dominance of the political system, and so the opposition 
will necessarily have a greater share of seats compared to hegemonic authoritarian regimes. The 
substantive effect found in Model 4 reflects this fact, as the opposition will statistically control 
sixteen percent more seats under competitive authoritarian regimes compared to the opposition 
under hegemonic authoritarianism. 
 In Model 5, net FDI loses its statistical significance, while the socioeconomic variables 
retain theirs. The value of the R-squared for Model 5 is 0.29, meaning that this particular model 
is much better at explaining the variance in the dependent variable; the fact that two of my three 




previous models. Nearly all control variables fail to achieve any level of statistical significance 
in this model except for the two structural variables (plurality voting and hegemonic party) re-
main statistically significant, and their effects actually increase compared to their effects in Mod-
el 4. The Cold War dummy variable loses its statistical significance in this model, though rents 
from oil extraction becomes statistically significant. My guess for why the Cold War variable 
loses significance is because of the explanatory power of the institutional variables. Even though 
the number and prevalence of electoral authoritarian regimes did increase after the end of the 
Cold War, outright ignoring electoral competition prior to 1992 was far more permissible, and so 
electoral authoritarian regimes were more likely to belong to the hegemonic subtype. When the 
Cold War ended and democracy became the global norm, competition or some facsimile of it 
became the expected behavior of regimes, the variance that the Cold War dummy variable would 
capture is being absorbed by the Hegemonic dummy variable. 
 The variable for rents achieves statistical significance in Model 5, though the coefficient 
has a small substantive effect. Nevertheless, the relationship is negative meaning that greater re-
liance on the extraction of natural resources reduces the share of seats in the legislature con-
trolled by the opposition.  
 The results for my fully specified model are found in Model 6, which differs from Model 
5 in that it includes a dummy variable for Africa. This dummy variable codes country-year ob-
servations taking place in sub-Saharan Africa as “1” and all other country-year observations as 
“0”. Some scholars (Basedau 2005, Bogaards 2008, Manning 2005) have noted that electoral au-
thoritarianism is especially prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, where the continent’s one-party 




digm.22 Nonetheless, this variable proves not to be statistically significant. What I find to be the 
most interesting about the Africa dummy variable is that it becomes significant when I set the 
threshold between competitive and hegemonic at 55% and at 75%, yet the 67% threshold some-
how fails to achieve this same statistical achievement. I have included both alternative models in 
the appendix in Tables A.4 and A.5, respectively. 
 Population achieves statistical significance in model 6, and its effects on opposition party 
share are negative. Since this variable only has statistical significance when the Africa dummy 
variable is included, this significance may only be an artifact of the variance introduced by the 
Africa dummy. Much like in the previous two models, the dummy variables for electoral system 
and hegemonic control remain significant and with rather strong coefficients. The impact of their 
coefficients are weaker compared to their coefficients in Models 4 and 5, but nonetheless elec-
toral system and hegemony have substantive effects on the percentage of seats in the legislature 
controlled by the opposition. 
 Once again, rents have a statistically significant effect on opposition party representation, 
at about the same degree as in Model 5. More surprisingly is that fact that ethnic fractionalization 
becomes statistically significant in Model 6. Its effects have been magnified by a factor of 100, 
meaning that the substantive effect of ethnic fractionalization is so slight that it is effectively of 
no impact on the percentage of seats controlled by the legislature. Yet, the variable did achieve 
statistical significance all the same, so it is worth mentioning at least for that fact. 
 In all of my regression models, FDI does achieve statistical significance, albeit in the 
wrong direction.  The dummy variables for plurality electoral system and a hegemonic threshold 
are statistically significant in all models of which they are a part, and their coefficients exert a 
strong effect on the dependent variable. Surprisingly, the Cold War dummy lost statistical signif-
                                               




icance when the variables for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization and the institution-
al features were added. However, as I mentioned in my discussion of Model 5, this fact may be a 
result of the greater explanatory power of the institutional variables than any contradiction of 
what other scholars have found about the prevalence of electoral authoritarianism after the end of 
the Cold War. 
 One conclusion to draw from the regression models indicate that a link between FDI and 
opposition party competitiveness does  exist, but my theory does not explain that relationship. 
My theory applies to the subnational level, yet my large-N study uses countries as the unit of 
analysis, which does cast doubt on the validity of my findings in Table 4.1. The purpose of the 
large-N study was to establish correlation: that is, as long as the relationship was statistically sig-
nificant and, more importantly, positive, then I could make use of my case studies to detail that 
relationship. However, my large-N study found a negative relationship, which complicates the 
exact relationship between FDI and opposition strength and casts doubt on the relationship pro-
posed by this study. 
CASE STUDIES 
 The theory for how FDI sustains opposition parties through an otherwise hostile electoral 
environment requires an investigation of the relationship of foreign investors, opposition parties, 
voters and the regime as political actors at the subnational level. The large-N regression merely 
serves to show a correlation between FDI and opposition parties. Case studies will explore this 
relationship in greater depth, and can delve into the subnational factors that sustain opposition 
parties. Case studies provide an in-depth look at a country’s political particular characteristics, 





Table 4.2 Case Study Selection 
 Low FDI High FDI 







Low percentage of 
opposition seats 
Mexico (1970-79) 
Azerbaijan (1992-95, 2006-) 




 My intended criteria for selecting case studies was to choose one case with low FDI in-
flows and low share of opposition seats in the legislature, one case with high FDI inflows and 
high share of opposition seats, and possibly one case of high FDI inflows but low share of oppo-
sition seats. The first case would show how the lack of FDI has starved any opposition parties 
from realistically challenging the regime, while the second case with high FDI and high opposi-
tion representation would demonstrate how high levels of FDI provide opposition parties with 
the financial support needed to compete against the regime. My third case would provide an ex-
ample of a country in which the opposition fails to win a percentage of seats within the legisla-
ture despite the predicted values suggested by the model to illustrate how a regime could miti-
gate the effects of FDI and still constrain the political activities of the opposition. Ideally, most 
of my observations in the large-N study would have fallen within the range of the two white 
boxes, which would indicate a positive relationship between FDI and share of seats controlled by 
the opposition. However, as the quantitative study shows that the relationship actually has the 
opposite effect than what my theory predicts, I need to determine what the relationship between 
FDI and opposition party representation actually is. 
 Table 4.2 shows that the relationship between FDI and opposition party strength in the 




to another, suggesting that the relationship between my independent and dependent variables is 
due to some other factor. After all, the quantitative study does suggest a statistically significant 
correlation between the two variables, but the negative sign on the coefficient and the fluctuating 
position of my case studies on the two-by-two table rules out that FDI is having a clear causal 
effect on opposition parties’ ability to win seats in the legislature. 
 In Models 5 and 6 shown in Table 4.1, rents, plurality voting and whether the regime is 
sufficiently hegemonic within the political system are significant, while population and ethnic 
fractionalization reach statistical significance in Model 6. My second alternative theory proposes 
that political parties reflect societal cleavages, and the coefficients for both variables are both 
statistically significant and show a relationship in the correct direction. In light of the fact that 
the quantitative model did not support my own hypothesis, exploring the politics of ethnicity 
may prove fruitful in explaining why opposition parties compete in rigged elections. The existing 
literature suggests that ethnicity (at least in sub-Saharan Africa) plays some role in opposition 
party formation and support in electoral authoritarian regimes (Fearon 1999). 
 The intent of my dissertation is, ultimately, to explain how opposition parties support 
themselves repeatedly through unfair elections. Given the statistical significance of ethnic frac-
tionalization in Model 6 and large body of literature on ethnic competition in non-democratic 
regimes, looking at how opposition parties may exist to promote communal interests may yield 
insights on the formation and sustenance of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes. 
According to a model based on ethnic competition, each election would serve as an informal 
census that would measure voting strength as a function of the relative distribution of ethnic 
groups within the population. As such, opposition parties would only have a minority vote share 




with foreign investors for transparent, and thus democratic, governance, fails based on the unex-
pected direction of the relationship between my independent and dependent variables. Alterna-
tive explanations such as institutional barriers, the presence of a rent-generating extractive econ-
omy or ethnic fractionalization may provide an alternative explanation for opposition party for-
mation and support. 
 The cells in Table 4.2 contain names of countries that can serve as possible case studies 
for demonstrating the relationship between levels of FDI and percentage of seats in the national 
legislature controlled by opposition parties. My first case study, Azerbaijan, actually occupies 
two cells, and shows that as FDI increases the opposition generally gains more seats over time, 
as my hypothesis suggests. Conversely, Mozambique’s political development is more static as it 
remains confined in a single cell, and actually exists as a disconfirming case to my hypothesis.  
 Finally, though it is not included in any of the boxes depicted in Table 4.2, my third and 
final case study will look at party formation in Malaysia. Malaysia’s political environment is dis-
tinct from Azerbaijan and Mozambique in that its political parties have obvious ethnic orienta-
tions. Thus this case study will not use Malaysia as a study how opposition parties under elec-
toral authoritarianism reflect ethnic cleavages (as that would be selecting on the dependent vari-
able), but rather to demonstrate what an obviously ethnically-divided political system would look 
like. Further, a case study on Malaysia can show how opposition parties can overcome their eth-





CHAPTER 5: AZERBAIJAN 
 Of my cases for electoral authoritarian regimes, Azerbaijan combines high-FDI with high 
opposition party representation in the National Assembly. Though the ruling New Azerbaijan 
Party controlled less than a majority of the National Assembly after the 2005 parliamentary elec-
tions (48%), the country’s party system is completely fractionalized into small opposition parties 
consisting of little more than one or two candidates. Flows of FDI into Azerbaijan are not the 
highest of my cases (the greatest level of FDI as a percentage of GDP in any one country-year 
belongs to Cambodia in 2003), but Azerbaijan’s FDI levels in country-years 1996 to 2004 occu-
py five of the top twenty positions. 
 Even though the cross-national test failed to yield any significant findings that would 
support the main hypothesis, viz. that an increase in the number of opposition parties represented 
in a given national parliament would correspond with a rise in the levels of FDI to that country.  
By turning to a cased study of Azerbaijan, I can better understand what factors drive opposition 
parties to continue competing within an unfair electoral environment. 
Historical Background 
 Azerbaijan’s history as an independent state revolves around the issue of the Nagorno-
Karabakh region. Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region disputed by Armenia and Azerbai-
jan. The territory lies within Azerbaijan’s legal borders, though currently Armenian separatists 
have established a de facto independent state in territory captured by the Republic of Armenia. 
Nagorno-Karabakh was the site of a territorial and ethnic dispute between the Soviet republics of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan that in the late 1980s rather quickly eventually escalated to the point of 
open warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan and secession of both republics from the Union 




 The seeds of the Nagorno-Karabakh War lie in the geopolitical turmoil surrounding the 
collapse of the Ottoman and Russian empires in the early twentieth century. Armenians suffered 
large-scale oppression within the Ottoman Empire, especially in the empire’s latter days. World 
War I gave Turkish nationalists in control of the Ottoman Empire the excuse to engage in whole-
sale genocide against the Armenians, among other groups (Schaller and Zimmerer 2008). Arme-
nians fled to find refuge in Armenian territories within Russia. The genocide perpetrated by the 
Ottoman Turks created a distinct sense of nationalism within Armenians all over the Caucasus, 
and a driving mission for future Armenian states to protect Armenians everywhere. 
 When the Bolshevik Revolution shattered the Russian Empire in 1917, the various ethnic 
groups in the Caucasus region seized the opportunity to assert themselves as independent states 
for the first time (Mammadova 2016, Saparov 2016). Azeri intellectuals helped to form the first 
Republic of Azerbaijan, which included the Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh region. Al-
most immediately, Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war over the Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia 
wanting to include all Armenian-majority lands within its borders, and Azerbaijan wanting to 
protect its territorial integrity from a hostile foreign power.  
 In 1920, the Soviet Union reasserted control over the Caucasus and ended the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict. The Bolsheviks incorporated Armenia and Azerbaijan within the nascent 
Soviet Union, first as part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic then as 
separate Soviet republics (Mammadova 2016, Saparov 2016). A special commission was ap-
pointed to settle the territorial disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and it awarded Nagor-
no-Karabakh and the Nakhchivan region to Azerbaijan as autonomous territories without com-
pensating Armenia (Mammadova 2016, Saparov 2016). The Soviet Union’s heavy centralization 




SSR, but Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms allowed for the political space that allowed the 
Karabakh Armenians to reopen the ethnic divisions that would eventually lead Azerbaijan and 
Armenia down the path to war with each other. 
 The Nagorno-Karabakh War had serious repercussions for Azerbaijan’s political and so-
cial development as an independent country. The territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-
Karabakh stemmed from a strong sense of Armenian national identity and a desire to unite all 
ethnic Armenians into a single homeland (Saparov 2016, 6). Azeri nationalism, in contrast, de-
veloped in reaction to Karabakh Armenians’ desires to secede from Azerbaijani territory 
(Rumyansev 2016). The opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) party formed in reaction to 
the Karabakh Armenians and managed to join Azerbaijani citizens within an independence 
movement against the Azerbaijan SSR’s Communist leadership (Kamrava 2001). However, after 
independence rather than follow the APF’s leaders toward a unified effort to fight the Armeni-
ans, various factions within Azerbaijani society resorted to using armed militias recruited by the 
different clans to pursue their own sectarian interests. The use of clan-based militias instead of a 
single national army serving the country as a whole later shaped the development of Azerbaijan’s 
splintered party system after the war. 
 During the Nagorno-Karabakh War, then-president Mutallibov maintained close ties with 
the USSR. Mutallibov was a committed member of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (AzCP), 
and, though the political reality of a newly independent Azerbaijan forced him to abandon any 
ideas of an eventual reintegration into the Soviet Union, he still refused to build a national army 
to counter Armenian paramilitaries. Dawdling on building this key state institution (especially 
one so vital to fighting a war) left a vacuum that allowed the clans to form their own militias.23 
                                               
23 Armenia was also able to capitalize on Mutallibov’s refusal to create an Azerbaijani army by creating a national 




The purpose of these militias was two-fold: 1) to protect Azeri villages in Nagorno-Karabakh 
against Armenian incursions; and 2) to challenge rival clans’ ambitions within the new republic.  
 The militias carried out most of the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. Notably, the Lachin, 
Fuzuli, and Gubatli militias had such close ties to clan interests that they resembled “extended 
families” themselves. Within Nagorno-Karabakh, another six militias controlled by criminal or-
ganizations operated amidst the chaos of war, fighting against Armenian forces as well as against 
each other (Bölükbaşı 2011, 188). A militia formed by Heidar Aliyev, the former Communist 
Party leader of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and future president of the newly inde-
pendent republic, operated from Aliyev’s home base of the Nakhchivan region. Finally, Azerbai-
jan’s prime minister at the time, Surat Huseinov, maintained a private militia once hostilities 
broke out with Armenia, the notorious “Ganja Brigade,” named after the Azeri town where Hu-
seinov’s family originated and where Huseinov allegedly built an illicit fortune as director of the 
town’s wool combine (Bölükbaşı 2011, 188). 
The Aliyev Dynasty 
 Heydar Aliyev’s political career started in the Azerbaijan People’s Commissariat for 
State Security (NKVD24) in 1944, where he served with distinction, attaining the post of deputy 
chair in 1964 and then chair in 1967 while holding the rank of major general (CIA 1983; de Waal 
2003, 85). Aliyev’s prominence only continued to rise when in 1969 Soviet Premier Leonid 
Brezhnev appointed him as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Com-
munist Party. As First Secretary, Aliyev routinely promoted other Azeris to high-ranking posts in 
Azerbaijan (Bölükbaşı 2011, 5; de Waal 2003, 85), a practice that would affect later political de-
velopment in Azerbaijan upon independence. For his accomplishments, Yuri Andropov promot-
                                               





ed Aliyev to a full member of the Politburo where he served as First Deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR, his first role outside of Azerbaijan’s party-political structure 
(CIA 1983). Aliyev’s meteoric rise finally came to a halt when Gorbachev accused Aliyev of 
corruption and forced Aliyev into early retirement in 1987 (Remler 2016, 23). Aliyev then re-
turned to Nakhchivan where he served as a deputy to the Supreme Soviet for Azerbaijan SSR 
until a political rival, the leader of the Azerbaijan SSR Ayaz Mutallibov, pressured him to resign. 
However, Aliyev still situated himself to become the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Na-
khchivan Autonomous Republic in 1991 (Bölükbaşı 2011, 159). 
 When independence came to Azerbaijan, Aliyev effectively controlled the Azerbaijani 
exclave of Nakhchivan essentially as a de facto state unto itself. The Nagorno-Karabakh War 
that broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in a number of early Armenian success-
es against Azerbaijan. President Mutallibov resigned which created a power vacuum in the coun-
try. The Azerbaijan Popular Front, led by Abulfav Echibey, took power in Azerbaijan proper, 
while Aliyev used the ensuing political chaos to further entrench himself in Nakhchivan, even 
going so far as to form his own militia. Aliyev used his newfound political stature as the de facto 
leader of Nakhchivan to stave off a coup attempt supported by Minister of the Interior Isgandar 
Hamidov in an attempt to reassert control over Nakhchivan, and to broker a cease-fire agreement 
for Nakhchivan with the Armenian president, Levon Ter-Petrossian. 
 By May 1993, Elchibey’s presidency faced the prospect of a civil war and even the pos-
sible loss of Azerbaijan’s independence at the hands of pro-Russian Colonel Surat Huseynov, his 
own prime minister. The Russian 104th Guards Airborne Division provided extensive support to 




Azerbaijan. Huseynov and Elchibey alleged each other of treason and abuse of power, and 
Huseynov began moving toward the capital of Baku. 
The Aliyev Petro-Patronage Machine 
 Azerbaijan sits atop some of the world’s best petroleum deposits outside of the Middle 
East. After independence, substantial oil revenues supply the Aliyev regime with plentiful rents 
that it can distribute to loyal politicians. The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP, after its name in Aze-
ri) created by Heidar Aliyev offers up a platform based on broad platitudes and vague statements 
of Azerbaijani nationalism. What actually binds the YAP’s members is their desire to secure ac-
cess to oil rents. 
 Azerbaijan’s petroleum sector has been that country’s leading economic driver for dec-
ades starting with the first modern well dug in the mid-1800s. The region of what is now Azer-
baijan has long been noted for its petroleum natural gas deposits. Marco Polo writes in his Trav-
els that,  
“Near the Georgian border there is a spring from which gushes a stream of oil, in such an 
abundance that a hundred ships may load there at once. This oil is not good to eat; but it 
is good for burning… Men come from a long distance to fetch this oil, and in all the 
neighborhood no other oil is burnt but this” (Polo [1300] 1958, 48).25 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Russian wells in Azerbaijan were pumping about 50 million 
barrels annually (Daintith 2010, 157). Oil has since been Azerbaijan’s primary economic driver, 
whether as part of the USSR or as an independent country, with 86% of Azerbaijan’s exports in 
2015 coming from petroleum extraction (Simoes 2017). 
 Not all FDI is created equal: foreign investments serve the petroleum industry almost ex-
clusively (Guliyev 2009, Mir-Babaev 2004, Radnitz 2012, Rasizade 2004). Oil allows Azerbai-
jan to curry favor with the West as guardians against any aggression from Armenia or its ally 
                                               
25 The editor asserts that this passage is “doubtless” a reference to Baku, even though Marco Polo never mentions 




Russia (Kamrava 2001, 224-225). Investments that do not go directly into oil production never-
theless benefit the oil sector by fostering support services to oil extraction such as construction, 
hotels, and service industries.26 Thus, while Azerbaijan does receive considerable FDI, a reliance 
on oil extraction ensures the regime with ready and lucrative rents while also inhibiting the 
growth of any substantial commercial interests that would find common cause with the opposi-
tion. 
 If FDI does not provide the means for opposition parties to sustain themselves in Azer-
baijan, then why do opposition parties continue to compete in rigged elections against the re-
gime? Patronage can buy support, but as the regime can provide greater opportunities than the 
opposition can for rent seeking through its access to oil profits, members of the opposition may 
choose to compete for ideological reasons. Greene (2007) notes that the two main opposition 
parties to Mexico’s ruling PRI occupied the far left and far right of the political spectrum, re-
spectively, and that they relied on their members’ ideological steadfastness to carry the parties 
through multiple electoral defeats. Perhaps Azerbaijan’s opposition parties also rely on strong 
ideological ties to motivate party members to stick by the party through each loss. 
 Furthermore, if Azerbaijan’s opposition parties represented differing ideologies, then 
Azerbaijan’s political discourse should reflect a wide array of issues and policy positions; even if 
the YAP dominates the political center, opposition parties could still differentiate themselves 
ideologically from the dominant party, as well as each other, by adopting the vacated positions 
on the ideological fringe (Greene 2007). The reality in Azerbaijan, however, is that of a con-
strained political space wherein each party, regime and opposition alike, adopts a bland national-
istic agenda in its party manifesto that differs little from the regime’s own positions (Guliyev 
                                               




2017). By accepting what March (2003) considers the “pre-political” values as articulated by the 
regime, Azerbaijan’s opposition fails to present itself as a viable political alternative. 
 However, Azerbaijan’s opposition presents neither democratic nor an ideological alterna-
tive to the Aliyev regime’s “sultanistic semiauthoritarianism” (Guliyev 2005). Rather, the oppo-
sition consists largely of rival elites competing against each other for the regime’s favor. While 
one can find the occasional democrat among the opposition, for the most part it is sadly no less 
prone to rent seeking as members of the regime, the only difference between members of the op-
position and of the regime being whether one is inside or outside the regime’s circle. 
Azerbaijan’s (Limited) Political Opposition 
 If Azerbaijan’s opposition parties organize themselves along ideological lines, then they 
should compete in most districts nationally, as ideology relies only on the transmission of con-
cepts. Granted, certain regions would be electoral strongholds based on a random distribution of 
classes, ages, preferences and interests. What one does see in Azerbaijan instead are concentra-
tions of opposition parties in specific electoral districts that roughly correlate to the country’s 
clan and ethnic distribution (Avioutskii 2007). Figure 5.1 displays the districts where Azerbai-
jan’s four largest opposition parties ran candidates in the 2015 parliamentary elections. One can 
see how the main opposition parties tend to congregate in certain geographic regions. Most nota-
bly, the Popular Front (Whole), a party that splintered from Abulfaz Elchibey’s Azerbaijan 
Popular Front, competes in Nakhchivan and an east-west line of districts running through the 
center of the country. Elchibey himself originated from the Ordubad clan from Nakhchivan 
(Kechichian and Karasik 1998, 8), which, based on where the Popular Front continues to run 




 Azerbaijan began agitating for independence from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, en-
gendered by a longstanding territorial dispute with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic re-
garding the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Solutions from Moscow involving administrative trans-
fers of territory would no longer satisfy the overlapping irredentist claims coming out of Baku, 
Yerevan, Nakhchivan, or Stepanakert. For some time, Azeri and Armenian politicians stoked the 
flames of nationalism in order to bolster their own side’s claims to Nagorno-Karabakh, which 
eventually led both of the Soviet republics to split from the Soviet Union. 
 Yet, despite having an ethnically homogeneous population buoyed by nationalism found-
ed on hatred towards Armenians, the persistence of clan divisions is a noted feature of Azerbai-
jan’s politics (Alieva 2006; Avioutskii 2007; Bölükbaşı 2011; de Waal 2003, 2010; Ergun 2010; 
Guliyev 2012, 2013; Kechichian and Karasik 1995; Remler 2016). This fact about clan identity 
is important: Azerbaijan’s politics does not fit the otherwise conventional mold of political com-
petition in other countries where ethnic fractionalization and inter-ethnic rivalries hold sway, as 
demographically Azerbaijani society belongs essentially to a single ethnic group. However, in-
tra-ethnic competition plays the same role. 
 Competition amongst the various Azeri clans provides the Aliyev regime with a divide-
and-conquer strategy to ensure the regime’s survival. Loyal clans support the Aliyev regime in 
exchange for access to oil rents, while the presence of oppositional clans gives the regime lever-
age against defection by threatening disloyal clans with replacement by oppositional clans that 
have in turn formed opposition parties to protect their own interests. Even though the populace is 
overwhelmingly ethnically Azeri (according to the State Statistical Committee 2010, about 91% 





 Kathleen Collins defines a clan as an “informal organization comprising a network of in-
dividuals linked by kin-based bonds.” Clans are thus different from interest-based patronage 
networks in that they cohere around inter-subjective conceptions of identity, not just patronage. 
Yet they too perform the important economic and social function of sharing resources according 
to the principle of reciprocity (Collins 2004, 231-4). No wonder, then, that opposition parties 
abound in Azerbaijan’s highly fragmented party system. The Aliyev regime in control of the 
country draws its support from three clans, the YAP only serving as a vehicle for inter-clan co-
hesion. Clans outside of the regime, devoid of any rent access of their own from the state-owned 
petroleum industry, compete against each other for the regime’s favor. 
 As stated previously, Aliyev in his role as First Secretary of the AzCP introduced the 
practice of appointing ethnic Azeris to high-ranking posts in Azerbaijan in the Soviet era. He 
continued this custom when he became president of Azerbaijan by placing many of his former 
comrades and supporters and ex-Soviet nomenklatura into offices of the new independent gov-
ernment (de Waal 2003, 27; Cheterian 2010, 103). Through his office of the president, Aliyev 
has been able to construct a patronage network centered on the Aliyev family and, through the 
first lady’s family, the Pashaevs from Baku. Other important families with ties to the Nakhchivan 
clan include the Talibov, Mammadov, and Heidarov families, all of whom control Azerbaijani 
business interests outside of the lucrative petroleum industry (Guliyev 2012). 
 In addition to Nakhchivan clan associated with the Aliyev family, two other clans domi-
nate Azerbaijan politics. According to Guliyev (2012), these clans are the Yerazi and Kurdish 
clans, the former comprising ethnic Azeris expelled from Yerevan and the latter consisting of the 




 The most prominent clan that fell from political favor in Azerbaijan belongs to the former 
president Abulfaz Elchibey. Elchibey promoted a strong Azeri nationalism based on its Shiite 
and Turkic heritage, with a strong eye towards courting Ankara instead of Moscow for foreign 
support (Bölükbaşı 2011). The Ordubad clan in Nakhchevan near the Iranian border served as 
Elchibey’s main source of support, where his popularity were such that “armored carriers and 
dozens of loyal soldiers protected [Elchibey] from potential attacks after his demise from power 
in June 1993” following Surat Huseinov’s rebellion (Kechichian and Karasik 1995, 8). 
 Political power in Azerbaijan passed from father to son when Heidar Aliyev nominated 
his son Ilham as the party’s presidential candidate for the October 2003 elections. Ilham Aliyev 
easily won the election amid claims of electoral fraud (Guliyev 2005, Sultanova 2014). Since the 
elder Aliyev’s death in 2003, Ilham Aliyev has been reorganizing the circle of elites. He has been 
purging some of his father’s ministerial appointees, including firing the founder of the Yerazi 
clan, Health Minister Ali Insanov (Guliyev 2012, 127). Guliyev (2012) asserts that the firing of 
the elder Aliyev’s supporters allows the younger Aliyev to sidestep traditional clans and to create 
a new power center based on business leaders from Baku. 
 A clan that deserves mention is the Baku clan associated with former president Mutalli-
bov. Mostly members of this clan were intellectuals who were prominent in the late Soviet era. 
Furthermore, many of the Baku clan also identify as Talysh, an Iranian ethnic group centered in 
Azerbaijan’s extreme southeast. During the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Col. Alikram Hummatov 
briefly established a “Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic” at the same time as Col. Huseyn-
ov’s rebellion against President Elchibey.27 
                                               
27 De Waal (2003, 215) states that Hummadov’s revolt was an attempt to reinstate fellow Talysh the former Presi-
dent Mutallibov, a point that Rubinstein and Smolansky (1995) support, though they acknowledge the republic’s 





 According to my theory explained in Chapter 2, I predicted that the Azerbaijani opposi-
tion, shut out from enjoying rents collected by the state, would have to find alternate sources of 
funding for their political operations, foreign direct investment being one such source. Foreign 
entrepreneurs would naturally ally themselves with opposition parties, as they would prefer the 
transparency that democratic governance brings. Increasing levels FDI would allow the opposi-
tion to sustain themselves through unfair elections, and possibly even boost the opposition’s abil-
ity to challenge the regime in parliament. 
 The data, however, do not bear out my theory. A qualitative investigation of Azerbaijan’s 
politics reveals that its clans, not its parties, structure political life. Social cleavages based on 
numerous competing clans persisted during Soviet times despite centralized rule from Moscow, 
with Heidar Aliyev using his position as head of the Azerbaijan SSR’s secret police, then as the 
First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party to distribute goods, offices, and favors to his 
fellow Nakhchivani clan members. Aliyev continued this practice on a smaller scale in his native 
Nakhchivan after his falling out of favor with Mikhail Gorbachev. In independent Azerbaijan, 
the Aliyev regime utilizes oil rents to create a patronage network within the country to cement 
his rule. Clan politics came to the fore during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, when the sudden 
power vacuum following Azerbaijan’s independence from the Soviet Union allowed various 
clans to vie with each other for control over state assets. 
 Avioutskii (2007) lists the clans both within and outside of the regime, identifying the 
Nakhchivan, Yerazi and Kurdish clans as the three pillars of support for the Aliyev regime, a  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
lic actually had little to do with ethnic politics, and was simply a power grab by a local warlord. Whatever the rea-




Table 5.1. Clans in Azerbaijan 
 
Clan Affiliation Party 
Nakhchivan Regime New Azerbaijan Party 
Yerazi Regime New Azerbaijan Party 
Kurdish Regime New Azerbaijan Party 
Ordubad Opposition Popular Front (Classic) 
Talysh/Baku Opposition Social Democratic Party 
Kharabakh Opposition Azerbaijan Communist Party 
Lachin, Fuzuli, and Gubatli Opposition Independent militias in Nagorno-Karabakh War 
Armenian Opposition National Independence Party 
Yardymli Opposition Civic Unity Party 
From Avioutskii 2007, Bölükbaşı 2011, Guliyev 2012, Kechichian and Karasik 1995, Remler 2016 
 
finding found elsewhere in the literature (Bölükbaşı 2011, Guliyev 2012). More importantly, Av-
ioutskii also lists Azerbaijan’s main clans in opposition (2007, 73). Avioutskii also identifies the 
political parties associated with each clan, which is unsurprising given the extent to which clans 
shape political as well as social life in Azerbaijan. Table 5.1 provides a summary of Azerbaijan’s 
clans and their associated political parties. 
 The Aliyev regime follows a well-established pattern of building an elite coalition using 
access to rents (Fearon 1999, Gould and Sickner 2008, Green 2007, Guliyev 2013, Medina and 
Stokes 2002) to maintain cohesion. The presence of clans outside of the Aliyev circle allows the 
regime to threaten discontented members of the elite coalition with replacement from members 
of another clan. This threat is so because the clan structure of Azerbaijan’s society means that 
many more people depend on rents than just the individual politicians do; politicians are useful 
for their ability to secure patronage to other members of the same clan. Thus, expelling someone 
from the regime coalition does more than just send that someone into the political wilderness: it 
effectively shuts out an entire rival clan from political life. 
 Azerbaijan receives considerable FDI and it does have a plethora of opposition parties. 




parties actually consist of independent candidates running to make names for themselves, there-
by gaining access to rents. Azerbaijan’s clan structure perpetuates patron-client structures, where 
the patriarchs of each clan are the main providers of goods and services to other members of that 
clan. Those in power can use their access to rents to funnel wealth to their kin; alternatively, re-





CHAPTER 6: MOZAMBIQUE 
 The case study examined in this chapter, Mozambique, has low foreign direct investment 
(mean FDI accounts for 4.57 percent of Mozambique’s yearly GDP) and few opposition parties 
(one major and one minor). Mozambique stands in stark contrast to Azerbaijan, and it would 
suggest at face value that a country’s level of FDI correlates to the number of opposition parties. 
However, oppositional politics in Mozambique originate from the wider international situation 
during the Cold War that then morphed into ethnic competition with the adoption of multiparty 
elections in 1994. 
Historical Background 
 Mozambique’s history begins with the Portuguese expansion during the age of discovery 
in the 1540s. The Portuguese selected a few sites near the Zambezi River as stopping points and 
trading entrepôts on the Indian Ocean. The colony never expanded, and not until British, French, 
and even German expansion in east Africa did Portugal begin to build up its colony and assert its 
claim. Even so, the Portuguese granted concessions to foreign investors in Mozambique. 
 The Estado Novo corporatist dictatorship in Portugal, which lasted from 1933 to 1974, 
promoted Mozambique as an integral part of a “pluricontinental” Portugal. For the most part, 
Mozambique’s economy relied on migrant work in mines in Rhodesia and South Africa, and 
rents derived from transporting goods from the interior to the port city of Beira. Cotton only be-
came significant portion of the Mozambican economy during the Novo Estado period, and even 
then, inefficient farming and harvesting methods required steady subsidies from Portugal to keep 
these plantations in operation (Pitcher 1993). 
Following the end of World War 2, African demands for independence had grown to a 




continent. By early 1962, several political organizations had formed in Mozambique, each party 
differing in its views on how best to achieve independence from Portugal. The most important of 
these parties was the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which waged a guer-
rilla war against the Portuguese until 1974, when a military coup in Portugal replaced that dicta-
torship with democratic government, which in turn hastily divested itself of all Portuguese colo-
nies in Africa and brokered a peace deal with FRELIMO. 
 FRELIMO) formed from the merger of three pro-independence organizations, the 
Mozambique African National Union (MANU), the Mozambique National Democratic Union 
(UDENAMO) and the Mozambique National Independence Union (UNAMI). FRELIMO’s 
founding president was Eduardo Mondlane, an assimilado educated in the United States who 
worked for the United Nations and taught at Syracuse University before returning to Mozam-
bique to campaign on behalf of Mozambican independence (Chilcote and Mondlane 1965). The 
leadership of FRELIMO reflected Mozambique’s multiethnic elite stratum, while mestiços, as-
similados, and Indians made up the party’s lower ranks. Against the white Portuguese, 
FRELIMO espoused a unified Mozambican nationalism, where ethnic differences mattered little 
and everyone identified as a Mozambican first (Finnegan 1992; Alpers 1974, 48). 
Cold War 
 The Cold War provided the greatest influence on Mozambique’s politics. FRELIMO 
formed as an independence movement against Portuguese. Under FRELIMO’s founder and first 
president, Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO pursued a pragmatic program with no overt ideologi-
cal cast to it (Reno 2011, 51-7).28 After Mondlane’s death in 1969, the triumvirate of Marcelino 
dos Santos, Samora Machel, and Uria Simango pursued a hardline Marxist-Leninist policy 
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(Simões Reis 2012, Meyns 1981). Soviet influence grew dramatically, and FRELIMO’s general 
anti-colonial message morphed into a strong anti-West and anti-capitalist program; in territory 
under FRELIMO’s control, all forms of tradition (spirit healers, bride prices, polygamy) and per-
sonal property was abolished (Finnegan 1992, Henriksen 1978). 
 Once in power, FRELIMO pursued a policy for transforming Mozambican society. All 
agriculture was collectivized, private property abolished, and religion suppressed. The new con-
stitution proclaimed FRELIMO as the only legal political party in Mozambique, and all civic, 
labor, and professional organizations must have government approval (Alden 2001, 78). Tradi-
tional headmen of Mozambique’s tribes, the régulos, lost all of their privileges maintained under 
Portuguese rule as part of FRELIMO’s modernization efforts to “emancipate” native Mozambi-
cans “from the ‘tribalist’, ‘obscurantist’, ‘feudal’, ‘colonialist’ values” that remained in the coun-
try’s myriad rural villages (Macagna 2008, 224). 
 The minority governments in neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa did not like having 
an independent black republic on their borders, especially one aligned with the Soviet Union. 
Rhodesia began funding Mozambican dissidents reportedly as early as 1975 by using Portuguese 
police files to find likely recruits. Called the Mozambique National Resistance Army (MNRA), 
these recruits conducted a guerrilla war in the south of the country. Later the MNRA changed its 
name to the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), a name that the organization would 
carry to the present. 
 Rhodesia signed an accord with FRELIMO to end support for RENAMO. RENAMO did 
not have to wait long to find a source of outside support, as South Africa’s military intelligence 
began meeting secretly with RENAMO in Rhodesia’s absence. South African support collapsed 




adjunct, Francisco Vaz, which detailed extensive technical and material support from South Af-
rica’s intelligence community for the insurgency (Vines 1991, 24). Revelation of the so-called 
Vaz Diaries prompted South Africa’s government to admit its interfering in Mozambique’s poli-
tics. Complicating matters, South Africa could not outright disavow RENAMO, as South Africa 
was also supporting the anti-communist UNITA in Angola: ending support in Mozambique 
would weaken South Africa’s credibility with its other allies.  
 In contrast to FRELIMO’s systematic ideological program, RENAMO originally offered 
little in the way of a comprehensive platform other than a mealy-mouthed anti-FRELIMO mes-
sage (Hall 1990, 47-9). Over time, as RENAMO faced the task of administering the territories it 
liberated, as well as to garner more foreign support, RENAMO began to articulate its ideological 
program with greater detail to include such platforms as market reforms, multiparty elections, 
and neo-traditionalism (Vines 1991, 111-119). 
Ethnicity and Mozambican Society 
 The previous chapter detailed how Azerbaijan’s clan rivalries structure political life in 
that country, FDI playing little role in sustaining opposition parties. There, clan affiliation creates 
important social cleavages and strong interpersonal ties, both of which facilitate the distribution 
of patronage. More ethnically heterogeneous countries should feature a number of opposition 
parties roughly commensurate with the number of ethnic groups (Fearon 1999).29 Like so many 
other African countries, Mozambique contains a patchwork of different ethnicities. Its borders 
also cross ethnic regions, separating co-ethnics from one another. 
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 Ethnolinguistic regions in Mozambique roughly divide the country along the Zambezi 
River. North of the Zambezi River live the predominately-matrilineal groups of the Makua-
Lomwe, the Yao, and the Makonde. The Makua-Lomwe constitute Mozambique’s largest ethnic 
group overall, and many practice Islam. The Yao are a small ethnic group and have been heavily 
Islamized due to their historically acting as intermediaries to Arab slavers. Finally, overlapping 
Mozambique’s border with Tanzania are the Makonde people (Reno 2011, 56; Hall 1990, 50; 
Opello 1975, 68). FRELIMO was founded in Tanzania with Tanzanian president Julius Nyere-
re’s support, and many of its soldiers fighting in the liberation war came from the Makonde. 
FRELIMO operated out of this border region with Tanzania, and as such, it relied heavily on 
Makonde support to sustain the liberation war.  
 However, not all was well between FRELIMO and the Makonde: a continuing source of 
conflict within FRELIMO originated between the Makonde fighters who served as FRELIMO 
foot soldiers in the liberation war and the ethnically mixed FRELIMO leadership. Most of the 
party’s leadership came from the south (especially the capital of Lourenço Marques) and consist-
ed of whites, assimilados, mestiços, and Indians (Simões Reis 2012, Reno 2011), and were con-
sidered by northerners (like the Makonde) to be “aggressive, domineering, and corrupt” (Opello 
1975, 69). The Makonde, on the other hand, supported FRELIMO because such an alliance fur-
thered tribal leaders’ goals in creating an independent Makonde homeland (Cahen 1999, 45; 
Vines 1991, 6). Situated as they are on the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, the Ma-
konde also play a role in Tanzania’s politics and make up some of the leadership of the Tangan-
yika African National Union (TANU), the ruling party in Tanzania that sponsored FRELIMO in 
Mozambique. Despite these historic quarrels between FRELIMO and the Makonde traditional 




even integrated various FRELIMO propaganda songs into their folk rituals (Israel 2009, West 
2005). In the past the Makonde supported FRELIMO during the liberation war against Portugal; 
now the Makonde support FRELIMO at the ballot box against RENAMO. 
 The ethnic groups living south of the Zambezi are the mostly patrilineal groups of the 
Thonga and the Shona. The Thonga are the largest of the southern ethnicities (Opello 1975, 69), 
and have ties to the cattle-breeding Swazi people of South Africa (Hall 1990, 51). Located along 
the border with Zimbabwe toward the center of Mozambique are the N’dau, a Shona people who 
are related to Zimbabwe’s dominant ethnic group, and who provided much of RENAMO’s sol-
diery in its insurgency against FRELIMO. When RENAMO organized as an insurgency against 
FRELIMO, it operated close to its patron states of Rhodesia and South Africa: many of its first 
recruits came from the N’dau, and RENAMO’s leader Afonso Dhlakama is himself a member of 
the N’dau (Vines 1991, 84). 
 Mozambique’s capital lies in the extreme south, which is where the great majority of the 
country’s non-black population lives. White settlers accounted for about one-half a percent of the 
total population in 1940 (Newitt 1981, 164; Spence 1963, 25). Mestiços, Indians, East Asian and 
assimilados30 made up another half percent, while the remaining population consisted of native-
born Africans. For most of its colonial history, white settlement of Mozambique remained small 
(Basilson 1980), and only really began accelerating with the Estado Novo’s renewed interest in 
its colonies (Newitt 1973, 375; Pitcher 1993). 
 Though Mozambique’s non-black population only accounted for about two percent of the 
total population at the time of independence (Sumich and Honwana 2007), they almost exclu-
sively contributed Mozambique’s skilled labor and intelligentsia and leaving a “relative absence” 
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of blacks in political leadership positions (Alden 2001, 15). When the Portuguese left Mozam-
bique following independence, the remaining non-blacks living in Mozambique were unable to 
provide many of the critical skills needed to run the country (Sumich and Honwana 2007; Finne-
gan 1992, 244; Meyns 1981). This deficit was especially evident under FRELIMO’s ambitious 
plans to revolutionize Mozambican society (Simões Reis 2012, Sumich and Honwana 2007, 
Alden and Simpson 1993, Ottaway 1988, Meyns 1981, Henriksen 1978). 
 Planters, the main class of white settler in Mozambique, benefitted from a large pool of 
native workers to work in the plantations. Poor white laborers benefitted from the lower wages 
given to their black counterparts for the same work, and thus supported racial barriers as a form 
of economic protection against cheap native labor. Colonial administrators and officials, like 
Governor-General Joaquim Augusto Mouzinho de Albuquerque, openly admired the British Em-
pire and its attendant racial policies and wished to replicate these policies in Portuguese Africa. 
They envisioned their presence in the African colonies as part of a larger civilizing mission to 
replace Africans’ intrinsic “barbarism” with Western values and culture (Newitt 1981, 168).31 
 The leadership in both FRELIMO and RENAMO faced criticism for ethnic biases within 
their respective organizations: FRELIMO for southerners despite recruiting Makonde as foot 
soldiers in their campaign against the Portuguese, and RENAMO for N’dau in its ranks. Yet, this 
line of criticism overlooks the practical manpower limitations faced by FRELIMO and 
RENAMO during their guerrilla campaigns, namely that each organization had to recruit from 
the local populations where it operated. 
 In the case of FRELIMO, the use of Makonde people as frontline troops is because 
FRELIMO formed across the border in Tanzania, and its operations took place in the north of 
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Mozambique. The Makonde straddle the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, so recruit-
ing Makonde to serve as fighters was simply a matter of convenience. The Makua and northern 
Muslims avoided supporting FRELIMO, considering it a Makonde organization (Newitt 1981, 
227), despite their proximity to where FRELIMO operated. Similarly, the fact that southerners 
dominated FRELIMO’s leadership has more to do with Mozambique’s capital, Lourenço 
Marques32, being located in the south of the colony. Colonial elites, including mestiços and as-
similados, would have been living in the capital prior to the beginning of the independence 
movement. 
 Racial policies in Portugal’s colonies never formally materialized despite demands from 
the white colonists. The central government in Portugal faced two considerable pressures, one 
external and the other internal, against instituting openly racist policies in its colonies. First, Por-
tugal’s time as a global power had long passed by the 1800s, and it was no position to protect its 
colonies from growing British and German ambitions in the region (Newitt 1981, 169). Portu-
gal’s only recourse to British and German military superiority was to challenge these two powers 
morally, which precluded formally adopting racial policies. Eschewing race laws in the colonies 
also prevented Mozambican nationalists from using racialism and race discrimination as a mobi-
lizing tool against the colonial state (Newitt 169). Indeed, the demographic category of assimila-
do assumed that any black Mozambican could adopt Portuguese customs and learning, and thus 
in turn become a full Portuguese citizen (Spence 1963, 31). 
 According to Vines (1991, 68), splinter groups from RENAMO originated not only due 
to leadership disputes, but also because of mistrust engendered by RENAMO’s continued sup-
port from South Africa. One can assume that these oppositional splinter groups, then, may have 
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had greater reason to organize themselves around ethnic lines: if ethnicity did not play that great 
a role in FRELIMO (individuals could join the government in a pay-to-play fashion), then a 
splinter group breaking from RENAMO would have some credible claim as being more “authen-
tically” African in makeup. Further, breaking off from RENAMO would concentrate the ethnic 
character of that particular faction. RENAMO had a reputation of being dominated by the N’dau 
(Manning 1998; Vines 1991, 84; Hall 1990), and so a splinter group could advance its own inter-
ests independently of another ethnicity’s interests. 
 Despite espousing a message of national unity (Henriksen 1978), FRELIMO’s early years 
were rife with factionalism. A number of splinter groups formed because of disputes within 
FRELIMO (Opello 1975), though none of these splinter groups achieved any political relevance. 
The need for economic restructuring in light of FRELIMO’s failed policies and RENAMO’s ef-
fective targeting of infrastructure exposed rifts within FRELIMO that split along ethnic lines. 
Hardline and ideological whites, mestiços, and Indians opposed moderate black Mozambicans on 
the direction and scope of reforms, as well as issues of army conscription and the lack of blacks 
among the party leadership (Alden 2001, 15). 
 Just as FRELIMO’s reliance on Makonde resulted from where FRELIMO operated 
against the Portuguese, one could say the same about RENAMO and its relation to the N’dau: 
funded by South Africa and Rhodesia, RENAMO formed in Mozambique’s south, which is 
where the N’dau happen to live. Southern Mozambicans would have been the easiest to recruit, 
as they were across the border from South Africa and Rhodesia. Indeed, RENAMO did recruit 
N’dau people as foot soldiers for its insurgency against the one-party state established by 
FRELIMO and used the N’dau language as a lingua franca (Vines 1991, 84). Much of 




eled against FRELIMO that RENAMO had a clear ethnic bias (Alden and Simpson 1993, 45; 
Finnegan 1992 64-6; Vines 1991, 84-5).33 Recognizing the criticisms, RENAMO did incorporate 
other ethnic groups into its leadership ranks, including the Sena, Chope, Lomwe, and even Ma-
konde (Vines 1991, 156). By the mid-1980s, persons from other ethnic groups filled out 
RENAMO’s upper echelons, though the N’dau still predominated (Newitt 1981, 164). RE-
NAMO and FRELIMO cane to be so closely identified with particular ethnic groups, with 
FRELIMO’s leader Samora Machel himself “regard[ing] the Renamo issue merely as an ethnic 
dispute between Ndaus and Senas on the one hand, and the Shangaan on the other over which 
tribe ruled the country” (Cabrita 2000, 208). This quote about FRELIMO’s leader (and thus the 
president of Mozambique) reflects how interethnic competition, whether in the form of election-
eering or open conflict, shapes Mozambique’s political environment. 
 The N’dau had a reputation for both their martial and magical prowess (Finnegan 1992, 
64), the Portuguese seeking out the former trait when recruiting the N’dau for Portugal’s colonial 
army (Vines 1991, 84), and the latter trait exploited when RENAMO recruited Mozambique’s 
traditional healers (curandeiros) and mediums (feiticeiros). Service with Portugal’s colonial ar-
my created a pool of seasoned veterans trained to fight against FRELIMO, while the social up-
heaval caused by FRELIMO’s uprooting the traditional village structure provided the impetus for 
taking up arms against the FRELIMO regime. 
Economic and Political Liberalization in Mozambique 
Mozambique’s Search for Foreign Investment 
 Portugal largely neglected its African colonies until the mid-1800s when the British, 
French and Germans began pressing their African claims. Even so, not until the Estado Novo 
took power in 1933 did Mozambique receive any considerable investment in its economy 
                                               




()Isaacman and Isaacman 1980, and this was confined to cotton (Pitcher 1993). The liberation 
war preceding independence already saw the flight of Portuguese capital (Meyns 1981, 47), and 
FRELIMO’s declaration of a one-party state built along Marxist-Leninist lines did nothing to 
stem the loss of foreign investment in Mozambique. During this time, Mozambique applied to 
become a member of Comecon (Vines 1991, 42), further cementing its ties to the Eastern Bloc.34 
 Years of disastrous economic policies and a destructive civil war forced FRELIMO to 
abandon scientific socialism in its fifth party congress. Though the Soviet Union remained 
Mozambique’s military ally in its fight against RENAMO, the government began courting West-
ern economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Afri-
can Development Bank (Alden 2001, 90; Alden and Simpson 1993, 116). FRELIMO hoped that 
with the sudden turn to market economics it could attract foreign capital and revive Mozam-
bique’s moribund economy.  
 Mozambique’s rejection from Comecon also forced FRELIMO to turn to the West for 
economic assistance and investments. Simões Reis (2012) in his study of FRELIMO’s ideologi-
cal evolution from independence to the late 2000s notes that, not only was economic liberaliza-
tion intended to reinvigorate economy, but it also provided opportunities for party members to 
line their own pockets from the sale of state assets. This fact corroborates an observation by 
Alden (2001, 92) and by Buur, Mondlane and Baloi (2011) that those individuals who benefitted 
the most from privatization happened to be persons with political connections.  
 Furthermore, the discovery of large natural gas reserves of Mozambique’s coast has led 
to an “FDI bonanza” (Toews and Vézina 2017) that stimulated additional 70 percent growth in 
non-extractive sectors. The authors caution that prior to the 2009 discovery of natural gas, 
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Mozambique had racked up unsustainable levels of debt to foreign creditors, which makes this 
new-found economic resource vulnerable to a predatory government wanting to free itself from 
external leverage (Levitsky and Way 2010) and desirous of new patronage sources (Macuane, 
Buur, and Monjane 2017; Castel-Branco 2014). 
 Civil war had devastated Mozambique’s infrastructure. RENAMO deliberately targeted 
bridges and roadways to cripple Mozambique’s economy (Manning 1998, Finnegan 1992). The 
Beria corridor, which linked Zimbabwe to the port city of Biera, was vital for fortifying Zimba-
bwe’s own broken economy. The ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and 
FRELIMO had a close relationship with each other (Reno 2011, 91-2), which eventually drew 
Zimbabwe into FRELIMO’s insurgency against RENAMO (Finnegan 1992, 57-8). Zimbabwean 
troops occupied the Beira corridor as a deterrent from RENAMO attacks (Finnegan 1992, 96). 
Ironically, given the geopolitics of southern Africa, the presence of Zimbabwean troops only in-
vited further RENAMO attacks.35 
Multiparty Elections Come to Mozambique 
 The Rome Peace Accords signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992 set a time-
table for elections to take place in 1994, the first-ever multiparty elections in Mozambique’s his-
tory. FRELIMO expected to win, even as a UN force of 7,000 peacekeepers maintained the 
ceasefire (Meldrum 1993) and heavy international monitoring watched for dirty electioneering 
(Turner, Nelson, and Mahling-Clark 1998, 157; Lloyd 1995, 154; Isaacs 1995, 21), because 
FRELIMO had controlled every aspect of the state for the twenty years prior. Its party cells had 
penetrated into every village (Manning 2005, 230), and it could reliably count on support in the 
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extreme south near the capital, where much of its leadership originated and operated, and in 
Mozambique’s north among the Makonde. 
 In contrast, RENAMO had a weak political wing that was distinctly subordinate to its 
military hierarchy (Vines 1991 80), and the organization as a whole only controlled the center of 
the country, especially in N’dau territory. Western funding to RENAMO nevertheless ensured its 
competitiveness, though it still failed to unseat FRELIMO from power. Initially RENAMO of-
fered no other political program other than taking a broadly anti-FRELIMO stance (Hall 1990). 
FRELIMO’s policy of revolutionizing the rural villages and stripping the régulos of their cus-
tomary authority provided RENAMO with recruits in its insurgency against the regime. In return 
for the régulos’ support and manpower, RENAMO would reverse FRELIMO’s socialist policies 
and restore the régulos to their role as village headmen: “The traditionalists welcomed Renamo 
and they were called mulunguisse or those who have come to ‘straighten things up’” (Cabrita 
2000, 196). 
 Magic became an integral part of RENAMO ritual: one story of RENAMO’s first leader, 
Andre Matsangaissa, relates how he and his men had magical powers that made them invulnera-
ble to bullets as long as they used their powers to (Vines 1991, 74). Another story of Matsan-
gaissa’s supernatural prowess tells how a point-blank shot from an automatic rifle left no mark 
on him, and how his death from a rocket-propelled grenade cursed Matsangaissa’s killer with 
madness (Finnegan 1992, 66). Not to be outdone, Afonso Dhlakama, Matsangaissa’s successor 
and the current leader of RENAMO, frequently called upon spirits before battle to render his sol-
diers invisible, to cause FRELIMO soldiers to shoot each other, and other such miracles (Finne-
gan 1992, 64). The peoples living along the Zambezi River expressed societal upheaval through 




Portuguese, the introduction of colonial economics, and urbanization and industrialization were 
all reinterpreted through kupilikula, which allowed the régulos to maintain their social standing 
amidst changing social circumstances; the establishment of a socialist state by FRELIMO was no 
less significant an upheaval. A key difference between the period off one-party rule under 
FRELIMO and past periods of turmoil in Mozambique’s history is that in its drive to force mod-
ernization on Mozambican society FRELIMO officials stripped the régulos of their traditional 
authority, which denied the villages of their coping mechanism for systematic change. 
 With the end of the insurgency and the introduction of multiparty elections, the régulos 
have become a key constituency in Mozambique. Much like the casting away of Marxism during 
its ideological rebranding, FRELIMO has reversed its policies towards traditional life and now 
courts the régulos for votes, consolidating at the local level what it had lost with the dismantling 
of the one-party state (West and Kloeck-Jensen 1999). For its part, RENAMO has always relied 
on the régulos for material and moral support.36 Both FRELIMO and RENAMO wish to gain the 
electoral support from the régulos, as the régulos occupy a key intermediate position in Mozam-
bican society whereby they can turn out voters for either party or help distribute patronage to the 
various localities (Obarrio 2010, Logan 2009). Thanks to its control over the state and the re-
sources that such control brings, FRELIMO has been peeling away régulo support from 
RENAMO, leading to an increase in tension starting in 2012 that flared up into the renewal of 
violence between elements of RENAMO and FRELIMO (Kayuni 2016). RENAMO lacks the 
organizational strength to challenge FRELIMO at the ballot box, bypassing Mozambique’s for-
mal political institutions and preferring “informal negotiations between its own leadership and 
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the government” (Manning 2005, 721). For RENAMO, losing the régulos to FRELIMO means 
losing a valuable resource for RENAMO’s leveraging its share of power from the government. 
Conclusion 
 My original theory predicted that as foreign direct investment increased within a given 
country, opposition parties would increase in their organizing power as FDI would provide a 
source of political funding unconnected with the state. A major assumption in my theory was that 
foreign investors would have a natural affinity for the political opposition over the government.  
 While the political economy literature on the preferences of investors for a particular re-
gime type remains contentious, the fact that investors prefer transparency and stability is well 
established. In the case of Mozambique, however, investment has largely remained in the pur-
view of the government: elite capture of key industries (sugar, natural gas, coal) during liberali-
zation ensured that any foreign direct investment into the country would enrich regime insiders, 
which, given FRELIMO’s strong partisan cohesion, would mean that opposition figures would 
lose out on economic opportunities. 
 Partisanship and ethnicity overlap in Mozambique, such that FRELIMO and RENAMO 
each came to be associated with certain ethnic groups within Mozambique. After the Rome 
Peace Accords established multiparty elections, FRELIMO and RENAMO would appeal to their 
ethnic bases for electoral support. FRELIMO abandoned its revolutionary nationalism in favor of 
a relatively narrower (but still broad overall) alliance between the Makonde in the north and the 
Maputo-based non-black intelligentsia, while RENAMO relied on its N’dau ethnic core in the 
center of the country for electoral victory. 
 As the government controls much of the economy, either directly through state-owned 




toral victory ensures the winning political party with extensive rents for politicians and patronage 
goods to distribute to loyal supporters. Eifurt, Miguel and Posner (2010) have found that ethnic 
identity gains increasing saliency closer to elections. Mozambique provides a case of how ethnic 






CHAPTER 7: MALAYSIA 
 Case studies of Azerbaijan and Mozambique reveal a clan/ethnic substrate to their poli-
tics, that is, that communal interests shape contemporary politics in both countries. The same is 
true for this chapter’s case study, Malaysia. However, in Azerbaijan and Mozambique, when 
one-party rule gave way to electoral politics, ideologically-motivated parties eventually reverted 
to tribalism, becoming organizations not for promoting differing principles of government, but 
rather as vehicles for securing material benefits for a particular ethnic community. Malaysia’s 
parties, on the other hand, have nakedly represented their respective ethnic constituencies from 
their very beginnings. Both the New Azerbaijan Party and FRELIMO still espouse a big-tent, 
broadly nationalist ideology that papers over deeper clan/ethnic cleavages in Azerbaijan and 
Mozambique, respectively. The ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) of Malaysia also pro-
motes a big-tent ideology, but each constituent party advocates narrow, sectarian interests that 
sometimes clash with the interests of its other coalition allies. This chapter investigates how po-
litical parties, ruling and opposition, behave when political competition is consciously ethnic 
competition. 
Historical Background 
 The Malay ethnic group predominates in Malaysia. The Malays were consummate sea-
farers and traders, and established a number of small kingdoms throughout the Malay Peninsula 
(properly Malaya) and the East Indies (properly the Malay Islands).37 This area of the world has 
been a major crossroads for various peoples and civilizations, and Chinese, Indian and Arab 
traders have plied the waterways for centuries. All of Southeast Asia displays a fusion of these 
three civilizations with the many native cultures, making for a patchwork of unique societies, 
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Malaysia being no exception. Indian and Chinese traders came to the Malay Peninsula in the first 
century CE, and Islam arrived in the early 15th century with the founding of the Malacca Sultan-
ate. The Malacca Sultanate’s literary and missionary efforts effectively formed Malay culture. 
 Even though significant cultural exchange occurred, very little population change hap-
pened in the pre-colonial era; not until the arrival of the British did Malaysia undergo any large-
scale demographic shifts. The British imported laborers from southern India, while Chinese mer-
chants flocked to the booming colonial cities. Native Malays grew increasingly marginalized in 
their own lands, though Malay elites who were tied to the British were still able to enjoy their 
customary positions in Malay society. Immigration had so altered Malaya’s population profile 
that the British 1931 census of Malaya records Malays as forming 44.7 percent of the population, 
Chinese making up 39.0 percent, and Indians as 14.2 percent (Vlieland 1932, 36). British non-
interference and indirect rule over the Malay states generally allowed their sultans to retain their 
social status as titular rulers, though this same policy also meant that the Chinese and Indians had 
to rely more on the British for economic opportunities and political protection (Siddique and 
Suryadinata 1981, 666). The “divide and rule” approach taken by the British towards the three 
Malayan ethnic groups would shape that country’s politics for decades after independence. 
 Japanese occupation during the Second World War would have dramatic consequences 
for Malaysia’s postwar political development. For one, Japan’s victories against the British in the 
early stages of the war revealed that Europeans were not invincible, and that the Europeans could 
be defeated – and by Asians themselves, no less. Secondly, Japan promoted an “Asia for Asians” 
ideology against Western imperialism, and this idea resonated with many colonized peoples in 
Southeast Asia.38 Thirdly, Malay nationalism formed during Japanese occupation: while under 
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British colonialism the Malays were largely apolitical and socially sidelined, under Japanese oc-
cupation the Malays were the favored at the expense of the Chinese (Slater 2010). 
 Eventually the British did come back, and the reorganized its various colonial posses-
sions on the peninsula into a single Crown colony, called the Malayan Union. The terms the Brit-
ish imposed on the native Malay sultans practically stripped them of their political power, threat-
ening the rulers’ approval for the creation of the Malayan Union with trying the rulers for collab-
orating with the Japanese and dethronement (Omar 1993, 46); but the sun had finally begun set-
ting on their empire. Malay and Chinese intellectuals raised in British schools and familiar with 
European concepts of governance began appealing for independence; meanwhile, rural Malays 
began agitating for the creation of a Malay state and against what they perceived to be Chinese 
dominance of the economy. Governmental officials from the United Kingdom began meeting 
with these native elites for setting a timetable for Malaysian independence. 
 When independence came to Malaya in 1957, the new multiethnic state faced the prob-
lem of creating a national identity palatable to each of its three, hostile communities. The first 
general elections took place in 1957 shortly after Malaya declared independence as the Federa-
tion of Malaya.39 Ethnic Chinese constituted roughly half the total population at the time of inde-
pendence (Kent 2005), and almost the entirety of the middle class. Malaya’s cities were electoral 
strongholds for the Chinese, and due to their position as merchants and intermediaries during the 
colonial period, they wielded (or at least were perceived to wield) the country’s economic power. 
Political power, however, belonged to the Malays: the sultans’ ties to the British and the Malay-
sian Constitution’s legal recognition of the Malays as a protected class strengthened the hand of 
the otherwise rural and poor Malays. “[I]n the 1950s and early 1960s, the emphasis in Malaya 
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was on the consolidation of indigenous political power and the institutionalized guarantees of 
indigenous ‘special rights’” to compensate for Malays’ lack of economic power (Omar 1993; 
Siddique and Suryadinata 1981, 672). Each ethnic group founded its own party to contest the 
first general elections, and each ethnic group sought to position itself as the dominant group. 
 If the contest between Chinese and Malays in the run-up to independence and the first 
elections was not enough to hinder Malaysia’s nation-building efforts, a communist insurgency 
by the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) begun in 1948 erupted from Malaysia’s jun-
gles. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) formed the MNLA as a resistance group against the 
Japanese occupation, and drew largely from the Chinese population. After the Allies had ex-
pelled the Japanese, the MNLA then proceeded to fight a guerrilla war against the United King-
dom, which had by then resumed rule over its former colonies in the region. The “Emergency,” 
as the conflict was called, provided a dilemma for Malaya’s squabbling ethnic groups: the com-
munist insurgency threatened the property and privileges of the elites from each ethnic group, 
whether Chinese, Malay or Indian. Rather than fight with each other for a political preeminence 
that might not mean anything in light of a communist revolution, the ethnic elites unified in an 
interethnic coalition to maintain their positions of power (Slater 2010). This “protection pact” 
(Slater 2010, 5) among Malaysia’s ethnic elites became the basis of the “Alliance” electoral coa-
lition that would later rule Malaysia for decades after independence. 
 The three parties comprising the Alliance electoral coalition were the United Malays Na-
tional Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and Malaysian Indian 
Congress (MIC), each one representing one of Malaya’s ethnic communities. This multicultural 
elite compact signaled that Malaya would control ethnic tension and sectarian violence through 




Leong 2013). Despite the Alliance’s adopting a consociational system (Lijphart 2008; 177; 1969) 
that has succeeded in managing inter-group conflict, however it has not removed that conflict 
altogether (Jarrett 2016) – and, in fact, may have only helped to crystalize that conflict. 
 When the Emergency ended, the urgent threat of a communist revolution dissolved and 
with it the need for an inter-ethnic coalition to protect elites. UMNO grew in power relative to its 
coalition partners, and “it became clear that the original conciliatory coalition had been weak-
ened, even though its founding parties remained as members. Non-Malays were not disfran-
chised, but they lost their ability to affect a great many decisions of the central government, and 
they increasingly became opposition voters” (Horowitz 2014, 11). The ethnically based electoral 
system fostered territorialization of the political parties, as the Chinese and Indians lived in the 
cities, while Malays resided in the country’s rural areas (de Miguel 2017). As such, not only did 
each member party of the Alliance have its particular ethnic community from which to draw 
support, but the urban/rural divide fell along ethnic lines, which would help UMNO draw gerry-
mandered districts to bolster Malay voting power (Horowitz 2014, 10-11). 
 The Chinese and the Indians feared UMNO’s obvious power move. Communal hardliners 
in the MCA and UMNO began pressing for their own ethnic concerns: Chinese businesses 
pressed for greater electoral representation within the Alliance, while Malays refused to increase 
the proportion of Chinese politicians running for election under the Alliance banner for fear of 
diluting the Malays’ political dominance (Chandra 1979, 79; Slater 2010, 117). Ethnic relations 
only worsened when the British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo and the 
city of Singapore on the mainland joined the Federation of Malaya in 1963 to create the Federa-
tion of Malaysia. The population of Sabah and Sarawak consisted of a number of indigenous 




not ethnically Malay, UMNO nevertheless moved to class them as bumiputra, (Siddique and 
Suryadinata 1981, 672). This action would add to the UMNO’s voting base relative to the Chi-
nese and Indians and thus give UMNO a clear demographic advantage in future elections. The 
leading Chinese opposition group, the Singapore-based People’s Action Party (PAP), denounced 
UMNO for its race baiting and discrimination against the Chinese (Slater 2010, 118). PAP coun-
tered UMNO’s bumiputra policies with a call for a “Malaysian Malaysia” focused on multicul-
turalism and civic nationalism rather than ethnic factionalism and Malay nationalism. Tensions 
rose between UMNO and PAP, and in 1965 Malaysia expelled Singapore from the Federation. 
 MCA remained with its Alliance partners, but Malaysia’s radical demographic shift and 
the brazenness of UMNO’s deliberate ethnic politics exacerbated racial animosity between the 
Malays and the Chinese. Many Indians immigrated to India, attracted on the one hand by that 
country’s efforts to reverse its diaspora and repulsed by the growing ethnic hostility in Malaysia 
on the other. A riot broke out in 13 May 1969; the violence was so bad that Malaysia’s constitu-
tional monarch, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, suspended elections, dissolved parliament, and es-
tablished a caretaker government (the National Operations Council, or NOC) to handle the mass 
unrest and the threat of ethnic hatred tearing Malaysia apart at its seams. 
 According to the NOC, the greatest threat to Malaysia’s stability was continued ethnic 
conflict; the root of this ethnic conflict itself lay in “the identification of race with economic 
function” (Siddique and Suryadinata 1981, 675). Promoting Malay identity would necessarily 
marginalize Chinese and Indians, who feared that Malay political dominance would result in ap-
propriating middle class Chinese property (Mauzy 2006, Guan 2002). On the other hand, ethnic 
violence would continue so long as the Malays (rightly) perceived the Chinese as having a dis-




nomic rift between Chinese and Malays would be the key to creating political stability (Bal-
asubramaniam 2014, Siddique and Suryadinata 1981), and the emergency government proposed 
the New Economic Policy (NEP), an affirmative action program that would privilege Malays in 
education, government, and the workforce, and thus eliminate the economic disparities between 
Malays and Chinese. 
 When normal governmental operations resumed two years after the 13 May riots, the Al-
liance adopted a number of changes consummate with the changed social and political landscape 
following the riots. First, it renamed itself the Barisan Nasional, and it allowed other parties 
from the original three to join the electoral coalition.40 BN heeded the NOC’s recommendations, 
and it instituted the NEP. Ostensibly, the NEP was an affirmative action policy designed to move 
Malays out of rural poverty and make them competitive with skilled Chinese and Indians.  How-
ever, with the 1959 race riots fresh in Malaysians’ minds the NEP became yet another tool for 
UMNO’s pro-Malay policies, with Tham (1977) arguing that the NEP was little more than a con-
tinuation of Malays’ efforts to maintain their structural relationship vis-à-vis the Chinese. 
 Under the NEP, the state broke with laissez-faire economic policies in favor of direct 
government intervention designed to tackle endemic poverty and restructure wealth ownership 
(Berma 2003). Initially, the NEP’s goal was to increase bumiputra economic ownership of 
wealth from 2.4% to 30%, and to move Malays out of rural areas and into the cities. Increased 
state intervention and a proliferation of parastatal corporations expanded the civil sector rele-
vance in Malaysian politics. Civil service became an attractive career choice for Malays, as much 
                                               
40 These junior coalition members include the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), Sarawak United People’s 
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of the commercial sector was already in the hands of Chinese and Indians (Puthucheary 1978). 
Considerable restructuring of private corporations into parastatal enterprises (Doner, Ritchie and 
Slater 2005, 354), and the creation of outright government monopolies such as Petroliam Na-
sional Berhad (“PETRONAS” for short) allowed the government to ensure that it could use oil 
revenues as an additional source reach its redistributive goals. Malaysia’s oil production original-
ly belonged to the constituent states, but with increasing economic centralization the federal gov-
ernment (which is to say, the BN) has appropriated more and more control as an additional reve-
nue source, both for funding Malaysia’s ambitious affirmative action policies as well as for graft. 
 Oil rents drawn from PETRONAS also tightened the bonds among the BN’s constituent 
parties. UMNO and MCA already had plenty of private holdings in the media (Gomez 1990; 
Crouch 1996, 86-7; Wong 2000; Nain 2002) and key industries (Searle 1999, 103; Milne and 
Mauzy 1999, 60-1; Greene 2007, 272), so minor parties need some inducement to remain in the 
winning coalition lest they defect to the opposition and threaten BN’s hold on power. These pe-
cuniary incentives came from rent-seeking opportunities made available only by remaining a part 
of the BN regime (Jomo and Hui 2003); the redistributive logic behind the NEP normalized the 
distribution of patronage goods as a standard practice (Gomez 2002). 
 Fueling the NEP’s ambitions was Malaysia’s rapidly growing economy. A switch to 
state-interventionist policies allowed Malaysia to channel investment into industrial develop-
ment, and promote manufacturing over natural resource extraction (rubber and tin) (Mahani 
2001), though Athukorala and Menon (1999) credit Malaysia’s growth in the 1970s and 1980s to 
the government’s commitment to trade openness and attracting FDI. Nevertheless, the state never 
marginalized the private sector, even if the state massively restructured firms to achieve the 




 The NEP did achieve the government’s goal of reducing overall poverty rates among Ma-
lays. By the 1990s, Malaysia’s economy had maintained a mean growth rate of 6.5% over twenty 
years, and urban poverty dropped to around 3% (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2007; 1995), 
though rural poverty remained largely unaddressed by either program. Rapid and sustained eco-
nomic growth coupled with a generally pro-market approach would allow Malaysia to pursue its 
redistributive goals without overly encumbering the Chinese business class (Guan 2000, 26). 
When the NEP expired in 1990, the government followed with the neoliberal National Develop-
ment Policy (NDP) and then the National Vision Policy (NVP) in 2001, both of which aimed for 
the NEP’s original target of 30% Malay ownership of capital, as well as to empower Malay en-
trepreneurship (Berma 2003, Jomo 2004). Unequal economic endowments and the grievances 
therefrom faded in importance as the chief marker of ethnic identity, allowing new forms of 
communal distinctiveness to arise in its place. Furthermore, the state’s close relationship to select 
firms and its authoritarian character made corruption an increasingly salient political issue. Una-
ble to compete against the incumbent advantages enjoyed by the Alliance/BN, opposition parties 
would seize upon these new cultural and political fault lines in their bid to unseat the regime 
from its stranglehold on Malaysia. 
Ethnicity and Politics 
 Much like the Alliance/Barisan Nasional, Malaysia’s opposition parties divide along eth-
nic lines. Since the 13 May riots, these opposition parties have begun forming electoral coalitions 
of their own in order to compete against BN. These coalitions are generally short-lived in part 
because while opposition agree on ending BN rule and preach multiculturalism, the constituent 
parties nonetheless reflect and remain situated in the communal logic of Malaysian politics 




toral setback while still retaining overall political control, and again in 2018 when BN lost power 
for the first time in Malaysia’s history. 
 The main Malay opposition party is the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS, after its name 
in Malay). Much of the Malay population professes Islam, and the tension between the secular 
UMNO and the Islamist PAS has split the Malay vote in recent elections. PAS traces its roots to 
Islamic political movements formed in the postwar period of 1945-1948, which disbanded when 
British authorities arrested Muslim leaders at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency. PAS 
proper formed in 1951 alongside UMNO. Considerable overlap in membership existed between 
PAS and UMNO, with PAS members highlighting political Islam while UMNO focused on secu-
lar Malay nationalism. Both PAS and UMNO campaigned for ethnic Malays, even though their 
programs differed on the nature of the state. 
 In 1959, PAS president Abbas Alias stepped down from his position in favor of Burhan-
uddin al-Helmy. Al-Helmy reoriented PAS toward a radical nationalism. Further, PAS fully dis-
tinguished itself from UMNO, preventing members from also registering with UMNO. The PAS 
was once also a member of the BN, but the tensions between the secular UMNO, MCA and MIC 
over the PAS’s desire to install an Islamic republic modeled on that of the Iranian Revolution. In 
1983, Yusof Rawa attained the party’s presidency. Rawa served as Malaysia’s ambassador to 
Iran, and his election as the party’s leader represented a dramatic shift toward Islamism (Noor 
2014; 2003). He created the office of “First Spiritual Leader of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party” 
for himself in addition to the party’s office of president. In addition, Rawa elevated members of 
Malaysia’s ulema to all officer positions in the PAS. Rawa abandoned Malay nationalism, left 
the BN, instituted the PAS’s to commitment to an “Islamic State,” and advocated for a special 




 PAS was able to capitalize on UMNO’s gradual overtures to Malaysia’s imams. Whereas 
UMNO paid lip service to Islamic principles (such as making Islam the official, but not state, 
religion of Malaysia and allowing for sharia courts to operate alongside state courts in matters of 
family law), doing so only allowed for a fully Islamist party to form that would push for the full 
Islamization of Malaysia (Liow 2007, 2003). PAS has pushed rolling back Malaysia’s secularism 
and institute sharia law as the only legal foundation – in short, establish an Islamic state. Policies 
promoted by PAS demonstrate that party’s hardline fundamentalism. The states of Terengganu 
and Kelantan are PAS strongholds (Noor 2003, 201), consistently returning PAS candidates to 
their respective state governments. These state legislatures have had bills submitted by PAS poli-
ticians that establish hudud punishments for various crimes, including banning the sale of alcohol 
and pork, and cutting off thieves’ hands (Guan 2000, 11; Liow 2003). Because “Malayness” in-
cludes Islam as a critical component, which dates back to the formation of Malay culture during 
the Malacca Sultanate, Islam’s politicization becomes increasingly relevant and PAS as a viable 
alternative to UMNO for Malay voters. Appeals to religion had a distinct advantage over ethnic 
appeals due to its ability to cut across communal cleavages, and PAS eclipsed DAP to become 
the largest opposition party in Malaysia.  
 The PAP’s electoral base has always been among the Singaporean Chinese ever since 
winning the 1959 municipal elections in a landslide, and after Singapore declared independence 
from Malaysia in August 1965, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) formed in 1968 from its 
remnants. The DAP hopes to transcend Malaysia’s pervasive ethnic divisions by creating a pro-
gressive, secular social democracy. DAP courts the Malaysian educated and middle classes, con-
tinuing to use its predecessor’s “Malaysian Malaysia” campaign slogan (Greene 2007, 270). Just 




bers of expressing Chinese “chauvinism,” an ironic charge given that the purpose of the MCA is 
itself for promoting Chinese interests within the BN coalition.41 The DAP had relatively strong 
electoral showings in the 1969 general elections, in which it gained thirteen seats, which, togeth-
er with another 41 seats from other opposition parties denied the Alliance from controlling two-
thirds of Parliament. The election results and the victory parade held by DAP and its partner, 
Parti Gerakan, precipitated the 13 May riots. 
 Implicated by the regime as having instigated the 13 May riots, DAP has faced a number 
of repressive measures designed to undercut any electoral support for the opposition generally 
and the DAP in particular (Crouch 1992, 24; Crouch 1996, 85; Nain 2002, 128-9).42 In the 1999 
general elections, the DAP helped found the Barisan Alternatif (BA) coalition, along with PAS, 
the National Justice Party (PKR, or Keadilan) and the Malaysian People’s Party (Chua 2001, 
142-143). BA gained seats relative to each party’s share from the 1995 elections (the DAP 
gained three seats for a total of ten), though the DAP’s two most prominent candidates, Lim Kit 
Siang and Karpal Singh, did lose their seats. The coalition split in 2001 due to PAS’s insistence 
of forming an Islamic state (Kamarudin 2005). The DAP would then form a new coalition, Paka-
tan Rakyat (PR) for the 2008 general elections, and once that coalition failed due to PAS’s in-
transigence, another new coalition in 2015, the Pakatan Harapan (PH). 
 The multiethnic Keadilan formed in 1999, and since then it has been competing with the 
DAP as Malaysia’s main multiethnic opposition group. The party formed from a bitter dispute 
between Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and the Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim over 
the cause of the Asian financial crisis, wherein Ibrahim and his close supporters were expelled 
                                               
41 The incident in question refers to six DAP members who never swore an oath to the Sultan of Perak in 1978. BN 
revived the incident in 2011 as a smear against the DAP. Shannon Teoh, “DAP: Ismail Sabri’s Racism Claims over 
Kedai Rakyat Exposes Baseless,” The Malaysian Insider, 17 November, 2011. 
42 These Measures included the Sedition Act, that essentially made illegal any discussion of abolishing bumiputra 




from UMNO. Ibrahim formed the Reformasi movement and led several protests highlighting the 
corruption in the BN. Spurred by his wife Ibrahim founded Keadilan to contest the 1999 general 
election as part of the BA coalition (Ufen 2009, 609-610). Keadilan only won five seats, but the 
public row between its founder and the Prime Minister as well as its opportunity to be a popular 
outlet to vent frustration with the government meant that the party’s anti-corruption and anti-BN 
message had resonated with the Malaysian voters. The 2008 general elections would see Ibrahim 
released from jail and the BN lose its two-third majority, and thus its ability to amend the consti-
tution unilaterally, for the first time in Malaysian history (Slater 2012, 28-89). 
 Though the party is predominantly Malay, Keadilan professes a multiracial platform 
based on social justice for all poor Malaysians and not just bumiputra, and a deepening of de-
mocracy, in addition to its original anti-corruption stance (Mazna 2008), though Segawa (2013) 
questions Keadilan’s commitment to multiracialism. Since the 1999 general elections, Keadilan 
has alternated with the DAP as the leading opposition party (see Table 7.1), which Ufen (2012) 
states indicates a realignment in Malaysian politics away from protracted ethnic rivalry between 
Malays and non-Malays (especially the Chinese) and towards a political struggle between crony-
ism and reform. 
 In the 2018 general elections, Malaysia experienced its first turnover of power since in-
dependence.43 BN no longer holds the reins of power in Malaysia, having only won 79 out of the 
Parliament’s 222 seats, despite the continued formal and informal advantages enjoyed by that 
coalition. For the most part, UMNO’s NEP was a success even if it did fall short of achieving 
30% wealth transfer to Malays by 1990 (Ho 1992), bringing many Malays into the urban middle 
class. By succeeding, however, the NEP was also the BN’s undoing: ethnic competition between 
the politically strong Malays and economically dominant Chinese had been resolved by opening  
                                               




Table 7.1 Electoral Returns for DAP, Keadilan, and PAS 
 
Year DAP Keadilan PAS 
1974 9  13 
1978 16  5 
1982 9  5 
1986 24  1 
1990 20  7 
1995 9  7 
1999 10 5 27 
2004 12 1 7 
2008 28 31 23 
2013 38 30 21 
2018 42 49 18 
Data taken from the Election Commission of Malaysia 
 
access to Malaysia’s national wealth to the Malays. In addition, the differing birth rates between 
the Malays and the Chinese eventually ensured that political power would remain firmly within 
the Malays’ hands. The rise of political Islam gradually eroded Malay support for the secular 
UMNO, as religious matters began to supplant economic concerns. Finally, more so than the 
DAP which many voters still considered too closely tied to Chinese interests, the Reformasi 
movement offered a non-sectarian opposition alternative to the BN’s entrenched cronyism. 
Conclusion 
 Ethnic basis for parties and voting can lead to one ethnic group dominating politics, and 
thus dominating minority groups, simply by demographics. In such situations, as long as the ma-
jority can maintain its share of the total population, it can hold onto power forever (Horowitz 
2014). Islam continues to be a growing force in Malaysian politics, and was a contributing factor 
in PAS’s electoral victory. At the same time, Keadilan’s popularity in the 2008 general elections 
forced DAP and PAS to moderate their messages with the hopes of achieving greater electoral 
success as a coalition than what each party can achieve alone (Slater 2012, 29). However, by the 




to form a coalition deliberately aimed at courting Malay Muslim voters. The Malay population 
exceeds the non-Malay population, so the PAS coalition could still possibly rely on ethnic ap-
peals for votes. Conceivably, PAS could combine its Islamic identity alongside religious appeals 
for political reform and clean government in order to succeed (Barr and Govindasamy 2010); 
otherwise, PH’s victory over BN in the 20187 general election suggests that Malaysia is moving 






CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 My original theory for opposition party behavior failed to hold. FDI has a statistically 
significant effect on the percentage of seats held by opposition parties, but the relationship is 
negative rather than positive like I hypothesize. Furthermore, the case studies I used in my dis-
sertation indicate that politics in Azerbaijan, Mozambique, and Malaysia revolve around politi-
cians’ rent-seeking behavior, with parties providing the organizational support for accessing 
these rents. These case studies add more evidence to the already-prodigious body of literature on 
ethnic politics (Chandra 2004, Chandra 2005, Fearon 1999. To this end, rather than simply stat-
ing that my theory fails to explain the data and ending my dissertation without contributing much 
to political science, I will end my dissertation recommending potential avenues of research that 
can possibly explain the relationship between FDI and opposition party formation. 
 My findings reveal a disparity between the quantitative study and the case studies. For-
eign direct investment as a percentage of total GDP proved to be statistically significant even if 
that relationship runs in the opposite direction than what my theory predicts, and actually sug-
gests that increasing FDI inflows weakens, and not strengthens, opposition parties’ abilities to 
compete in electoral authoritarian systems. At the same time, the case studies suggest that ethnic-
ity is the main driver for opposition party behavior. Additionally, two institutional control varia-
bles, electoral system and the threshold of competitiveness, exhibited strong statistical and sub-
stantive significance. 
 One possible explanation for my incongruent findings can be that one of my assumptions 
about entrepreneurs’ behavior is wrong. That is, foreign businesses will continue to conduct 
business in a non-democratic regime if they can still make profits; after all, China’s rapid eco-




shift under paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Even though non-democracies do not need the 
public’s support in order to carry out its goals, compliance nonetheless makes achieving these 
goals much easier. As such, attracting FDI helps non-democratic regimes buy support from the 
public. Scholars are divided about whether foreign investors prefer democracies or non-
democracies, but a consensus has emerged that non-democratic regimes that face more con-
straints appear to attract more than their counterparts with fewer constraints (Bastiaens 2013, 
Hankla and Kuthy 2013), as these regimes with more constraints have less ability to appropriate 
foreign assets . My findings corroborate the notion that regimes seek to improve their domestic 
legitimacy by attracting more foreign investment: greater flows of FDI actually hinder opposition 
parties’ ability to win seats. By attracting FDI and generally improving domestic economic con-
ditions, electoral authoritarian regimes can buy public support for themselves without resorting 
necessarily to costlier forms of electoral fraud and/or political repression. 
 The data do not support my argument that foreign entrepreneurs will seek to work with 
the opposition in favor of promoting policy transparency and political restraint. Rather, foreign 
entrepreneurs seem to prefer dealing with the regime in power rather than risk siding with the 
opposition and endangering their investments. After all, the regime has in its control the levers of 
the state, which includes introducing or withdrawing incentives for entrepreneurs to do business 
in that country. Even if entrepreneurs have a natural affinity with the opposition, their actions 
suggest that they will more readily work with an existing albeit flawed regime than hope to work 
with an opposition party that may never attain power. Further investigation of when foreign en-
trepreneurs do decide to back the opposition can lead to interesting discoveries of the delicate 
balancing act facing electoral authoritarian regimes as they attempt to retain power while also 




 Another way to resolve my quantitative model and my case studies involves understand-
ing that FDI and ethnicity work in tandem with each other in many of my cases. Taking inspira-
tion from Huntington’s (1968, 1) opening statement that a government’s “form” matters less than 
its “degree,” I have considered the suggestion that many of my cases simply lack the state capac-
ity for effective (i.e., fair) electoral competition (Croissant and Hellmann 2018, van Ham and 
Seim 2018, Way 2015). “State capacity” in this instance accords more closely with “coercive 
capacity” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 54-5; Moe 2005; Weber 1918). Coercive capacity details the 
ability of the state to exert its control over the population. Electoral authoritarian regimes are the 
result of fully authoritarian states facing institutional failures that prevent their elites from re-
pressing the opposition completely. Many of my cases in my large-N chapter are states that have 
transitioned away from one-party rule to some form of electoral politics rather than newly emer-
gent states (with a few exceptions), and as such, my evidence of partisan politics in Azerbaijan 
and Mozambique indicate that weak institutions forced these countries to become “pluralism by 
default” (Way 2015). 
 In Malaysia, by contrast, British tutelage made elections and at least a nominal appear-
ance of democracy a precondition of independence, so pluralism was always extant in Malaysia’s 
political system.44 Faced at first with a communist insurgency that threatened British, Malay and 
Chinese elite alike, then with recurring racial riots, Malaysia strove to make a strong state and 
enforce public order. This strong state simultaneously pursued pro-growth and redistributive pol-
icies that eventually reduced ethnic competition over control of the country’s wealth. While poli-
tics in Malaysia largely still remains divided along ethnic lines, sustained growth for over three 
decades and a (relatively) recent turn towards neoliberalism has created opportunities for Malay-
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sians to pursue new interests, and generate new identities that sometimes create cut across exist-
ing sectarian fault lines. 
 In newly or weakly democratized states, the idea of the state belonging to the public at 
large instead of a group of elites has not yet caught hold (Chibber 2003, Geddes 1996). Rather 
than governing on some programmatic basis, the goal for parties operating in that environment is 
to seek rents. Capturing the state requires a coalition just large enough to outcompete rivals, but 
not so large as to dilute each member’s share of the spoils (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). This 
description of elite behavior is the very logic of politics in electoral authoritarianism.  Politicians 
in the ruling coalition treat the state as their property, and elections are the mechanism not for 
rewarding a “set of actors has control over the state but instead to help incumbent autocratic rul-
ers manage the range of intra-elite and societal pressures that threaten their survival” (Hanson 
2018, 18-9). Determining members of the coalition from non-members is essential in order to 
prevent rents from spreading too thin, and thus an ascriptive form of identity “based on features 
not easily chosen or changed by individuals” (Fearon 1999, 5; author’s emphasis) provides a 
hard and fast line between member and non-member. 
 Two commonalities exist in my case studies. First is that some degree of economic scar-
city exists. Under these conditions, politics becomes less about applying a blueprint for society 
and more about securing one’s material well-being (Lasswell [1936] 1950). Ethnicity allows for 
a ready-made social network that facilitates group cooperation onto which parties can later graft 
themselves (Bowles and Gintis 2004). Chandra (2004) finds that voters in rural India vote in-
strumentally for whichever party can maximize their preferred outcomes, not solely on the basis 
of ethnicity; ethnic-based parties have the benefit over other parties in lowering the costs of col-




 The break-up of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in Azerbaijan that the Communist 
Party once provided, while a losing war with Armenia and a concurrent civil war (which was 
perhaps the more destructive of the two) destroyed political institutions within Azerbaijan: 
strong-man rule under Heydar Aliev remained the only institution able to govern. Once the coun-
try stabilized and the economy recovered, petroleum extraction became Azerbaijan’s primary – 
virtually the sole – sector. The Aliev regime siphoned oil rents from the state, and, coupled with 
a loyal security apparatus, graft became the norm for the privileged elites. 
 Mozambique found itself in much the same situation: centuries of neglect left little in the 
way of infrastructure or an intrusive state, so when Portugal turned control of the country to 
FRELIMO, what little capital owned by Portuguese colonists fled overseas. FRELIMO’s Marxist 
policies hardly made Mozambique attractive for foreign investment or for independent govern-
mental operations of the state: like many one-party states, bureaucratic advancement relied on 
one’s standing with the ruling party. The RENAMO that operated largely insurgency deliberately 
targeted hospitals, schools, and party offices with the intention of discrediting FRELIMO. When 
FRELIMO did finally allow multiparty elections, the state had been so severely weakened (Man-
ning 2005; Vines 1991, 87) by FRELIMO and RENAMO alike that the only way for the public 
to get basic services was through their ethnic networks. Though FRELIMO officially promoted a 
unified Mozambican national identity that transcended ethnic affiliation, the reality was that, due 
to the early years of its insurgency against the Portuguese, the Makonde made up a large propor-
tion of FRELIMO’s membership and continued to support FRELIMO in elections (Israel 2006). 
 The second commonality among all three of my case studies is that parties organize 
around clan or ethnic affiliation. Both Chandra (2006) Posner (2007) caution that “ethnicity” is 




series of labels that the bearer can use to varying effect and in different contexts. Thus, as the 
ambitious nation-building programs of many one-party states collapsed with the end of the Cold 
War, a single national identity gave way to new forms of identity, including tribal, religious, ge-
ographic and familial, among others. Nevertheless, identity of some kind forms the basis for 
politics in numerous countries non-Western countries.45 As Fearon (1999) points out, pork-barrel 
politics and ethnic politics tend to complement one another.   
 Azerbaijan lost the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Armenian forces occupy the mountain-
ous region to this day. The Azerbaijani elite refused to build a sufficiently strong national army 
to preserve its territorial integrity, so it should come as no wonder that the state was in no shape 
to provide even basic public services. Rather than turning to an evidently dysfunctional state for 
goods (or even for security for some Azerbaijanis), Azerbaijanis turned to their clans as a social 
safety net. After the cease-fire came into effect, the clans organized political parties for control 
of the state in order to capture rents, and Azerbaijan’s contemporary opposition parties reflect the 
clan composition undergirding Azeri society. 
 Mozambique’s political system evolved out of the Cold War. The ruling FRELIMO party 
established a one-party communist state after Mozambique achieved independence from Portu-
gal. The white minority governments in neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa created and sup-
ported RENAMO as an insurgent group within Mozambique, with the purpose of destabilizing 
the FRELIMO regime. Neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO had an explicit ethnic affiliation, 
FRELIMO deliberately enacting a policy of subordinating ethnic differences to a new national, 
Mozambican identity. FRELIMO’s failed economic policies and RENAMO’s effective insur-
gency forced FRELIMO to agree to multiparty elections in 1994, which FRELIMO won amidst 
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close international scrutiny. Since the introduction of multiparty elections, FRELIMO and 
RENAMO have been orienting themselves around ethnicity to ensure party cohesion, now that 
neither faces the existential threat of military defeat. Economic growth in Mozambique has been 
shaky, leaving public goods an important provider for improving Mozambicans’ material well-
being, and the state therefore a lucrative source of patronage goods for elections. 
 Politics in Malaysia explicitly formed around ethnicity. In this way, Malaysia differs 
from differs from the political situations in Azerbaijan and Mozambique, where ethnic politics 
either remained hidden in the background (Azerbaijan) or gradually replaced (Mozambique) 
what was otherwise a competition of differing ideologies. British colonial practices in Malaysia 
(a model emulated elsewhere in their empire) involved granting native Malay sultans some de-
gree of authority and autonomy over their Malay subjects, largely leaving them to a traditional 
way of life in the colony’s hinterlands. Meanwhile, the British enacted large-scale immigration 
of Chinese and Indian laborers to work the plantations, mines and docks; some of the Chinese 
and Indians later became entrepreneurs in their own right, and created a nascent Malaysian mid-
dle-class. Economic function became inextricably tied to ethnicity, reinforcing cultural, linguistic 
and religious divisions already present. When independence began to emerge, political part ies 
formed with the express purpose of advancing their respective communities above all others. A 
series of riots between Malays and Chinese threatened the social order, and when an emergency 
government returned control to parties after a hiatus of two years, the government enacted exten-
sive policy initiatives in order to begin disentangling each ethnicity’s economic niche as an inte-
gral part of its identity. 
 The literature on ethnic-based parties in sub-Saharan Africa is extensive (Bates 1974, 




whether via clans or ethnicities, may become the foremost organizing principle for political life 
wherever the state is weak and cannot serve as a neutral arbiter for competing political groups, 
and especially in countries where privation is the norm. 
 In all three of my cases, scarcity is the common condition for an ethnic basis to politics, 
but whereas politics in Mozambique and Azerbaijan is becoming more ethnically centered, in 
Malaysia the opposition achieved its first electoral victory by overcoming its communal divi-
sions. The NEP and NDP were both largely successful in growing Malaysia’s economy. More 
importantly, though both policies failed realize their numeric targets for bumiputra ownership of 
the economy, they did bring urban bumiputra poverty rates down close to the non-bumiputra av-
erage. As such, ethnic politics as a struggle for economic control of Malaysia no longer makes as 
much sense; instead, a steady and growing reform movement was able to capture enough dissat-
isfaction among the electorate to unseat the long-ruling ruling coalition. Winning one election, 
however, does not necessarily mean the end of ethnic politics, as Islam forms an integral aspect 
of Malay identity, and increasing Islamization of Malaysian politics may be indicative of a rede-
fining of ethnic competition that focuses less of economic, and more on cultural, factors. 
 Malaysia’s political history does offer some hope: as the economy grew, competition 
among the country’s three ethnic groups diminished. Each ethnic group as a whole became less 
dependent on its own community for material well-being (Malays especially), and individuals of 
any race could secure their own livelihoods. Thus, the proverbial economic pie not only grew to 
grant bigger slices to each ethnicity, but it grew to the point that each Malaysian was able to take 
a slice. The New Economic Policy mandated capital transfers from the Chinese to the Malays 




ment Policy curtailed wealth transfers in favor of creating a Malay entrepreneurial class.46 As 
ethnic competition over scarce resources became less salient in Malaysia, other concerns regard-
ing the governmental corruption and the role of religion took precedence. 
 Looking forward, my research suggests that many cases of electoral authoritarianism re-
sult from a combination of economic scarcity and ethnic salience. The politics of these countries 
revolve around material security, and ethnicity provides the most efficient way of attaining and 
distributing these goods by lowering the costs of collective action. Opposition parties will remain 
in the opposition simply because of demographics. In many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 
Berman (1998) sees certain legacies of the colonial state (the invention of ethnic groups, an ex-
tractive state, and bureaucratic authoritarianism) rooted so deeply into the social fabric that he 
only offers despair about any attempts for political reform. However, Arriola (2013) finds that 
economic liberalization (especially de-politicizing access to financial capital) fosters the devel-
opment of multiethnic opposition coalitions. Arriola’s findings parallel my own findings of the 
multiethnic Pakatan Harapan’s electoral victory in Malaysia. 
 Another implication of my study is that the term “electoral authoritarianism” may be too 
broad a category. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, scholars disagree on the precise definition 
(and thus also the operationalization) of the term, and lists of cases can differ wildly from one 
another. The difficulty in determining what regimes count may lie in the fact that, while democ-
racy is a unique combination of values and practices, authoritarianism is simply the failure or 
absence of any one of those democratic components (Schedler 2002). Thus, non-democratic re-
gimes can have any number of combinations of features, values, and practices that make classifi-
cation difficult – perhaps why Carothers (2002) considered many of the post-Cold War regimes 
to lie within a categorical “gray zone,” suggesting the nebulous and indeterminate. That the most 
                                               




successful electoral authoritarian regimes will be so good at hiding their methods of remaining in 
power that they would be indistinguishable from true democracies only further compounds the 
problem. 
 Scholars commonly make a distinction between two forms of electoral authoritarianism: 
competitive and hegemonic. My quantitative model does show that this division is more than an 
academic exercise concerning the percentage of seats that the opposition can hope to win in elec-
tions. Even though competitive and hegemonic forms exhibit the same definitional features to 
categorize both varieties as subtypes of electoral authoritarianism, the underlying logic of rule 
between both forms may diverge enough that lumping both forms into a single electoral authori-
tarian “cat-dog” (Sartori 1991) violates the principle of parsimony. Hegemonic authoritarian re-
gimes tolerate an opposition because that opposition has been neutralized to such a degree that it 
poses no credible threat to the incumbents. In such an environment, FDI should do little to help 
the opposition, as foreign entrepreneurs would recognize the regime as the only real political 
player (Bastiaens 2013). Competitive authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, do allow the op-
position to exercise some degree of political power, and so, just as the name indicates, political 
competition between the regime and the opposition may make supporting the opposition a viable 
strategy for foreign businesses. Non-democratic regimes can deviate from democracies in any 
number of ways and combinations, and they would therefore differ from one another as many 
ways as well. Further qualitative work would shed light on whether competitive and hegemonic 
authoritarianism are subtypes of a broader electoral authoritarianism, or if they are simply aca-
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN CASES (67%) 
 
Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg  Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg 
Algeria  2002-2008 hegemonic 
Angola  2002-2007 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2008  competitive 
Azerbaijan 1992  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1993-1994 competitive 
       ʺ   1995-2008 hegemonic 
Bangladesh 1972-1974 competitive 
       ʺ  1979-1982 competitive 
       ʺ  1988-1990 competitive 
Belarus  1996-2008 competitive 
Burkina Faso 1998-2001 competitive 
       ʺ  2002-2008 hegemonic 
Cambodia 1972  competitive 
       ʺ  1994-1996 competitive 
       ʺ  1997-2007 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2008  competitive 
Cameroon 1993-2001 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2002-2008 competitive 
Chad  1996-2000 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2001-2008 competitive 
Comoros 1990-1993 competitive 
       ʺ  1994  hegemonic 
Comoros 1996-1998 competitive 
Congo, Rep. 2003-2008 hegemonic 
Congo, DR  2006  hegemonic 
Cote d'Ivoire 1990-1992 competitive 
       ʺ  1994-1998 competitive 
Cyprus  1970-1972 hegemonic 
Djibouti  1998-2003 competitive 
Ecuador  2000-2003 hegemonic 
Egypt  2005-2008 competitive 
El Salvador 1970-1971 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1972-1973 competitive 
       ʺ  1977-1978 competitive 
Eq. Guinea 2003-2008 competitive 
Ethiopia  1995-2004 competitive 
       ʺ   2005-2008 hegemonic 
Fiji  1993-1998 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1999-2000 competitive 
       ʺ   2001-2005 hegemonic 
Gabon  1994-1995 hegemonic 
       ʺ   1996-2008 competitive 
Gambia  1970-2008 competitive 
Georgia  1992-1994 competitive 
       ʺ   1995-2004 hegemonic 
Guinea  1996-2001 hegemonic 
       ʺ   2002-2008 competitive 
Guyana  1970-1972 hegemonic 
       ʺ   1973-1992 competitive 
Haiti  1999-2005 competitive 
       ʺ  2006-2008 hegemonic 
Honduras 1970-1974 hegemonic 
Kazakhstan 1994-2006 hegemonic 
Kenya  1993-2002 hegemonic 
Korea, South 1970-1971 hegemonic 
Kyrgyzstan 1995-2005 competitive 
Lesotho  1970  competitive 
Liberia  1985-1989 competitive 
       ʺ  1996-2002 competitive 
Malaysia 1971-2007 hegemonic 
       ʺ   2008  competitive 
Mauritania 1991-2004 competitive 
       ʺ  2006-2007 competitive 
Mexico  1970-1987 competitive 
       ʺ  1988-2000 hegemonic 
Mozambique 1995-2008 hegemonic 
Nicaragua 1970-1971 competitive 
       ʺ  1974-1978 hegemonic 
Niger  1996-1998 hegemonic 
Panama  1985-1990 competitive 
Paraguay 1975-2008 hegemonic 
Peru  1992-2000 hegemonic 
Rhodesia 1970-1975 competitive 
Russia  2004-2008 hegemonic 
Rwanda  2008  competitive 
Samoa  1983-2005 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2006-208 competitive 
São Tomé 1990-1991 hegemonic 
Senegal  1979-1997 competitive 
       ʺ  1998-2000 hegemonic 
Seychelles 1993-2008 competitive 
Sierra Leone 1970-1972 hegemonic 
Singapore 1975-2008 hegemonic 
Sri Lanka 1977-1981 competitive 
       ʺ  1983-1989 competitive 
South Africa  1970-1988 competitive 
       ʺ  1989-1993 hegemonic 
Tajikistan 1995-2008 hegemonic 
Tanzania 1995-2008 competitive 
Thailand 1980-1983 competitive 
Togo  1993  competitive 
       ʺ  1994-1998 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1999-2006 competitive 
       ʺ  2007-2008 hegemonic 
Tunisia  1999-2008 competitive 
Uganda  2006  hegemonic 
Uzbekistan 1994-1998 competitive 
       ʺ  1999-2002 hegemonic 
Yemen  2000-2002 competitive 
       ʺ  2003-2008 hegemonic 
Yugoslavia 1991  competitive 
       ʺ  1992-2000 hegemonic 
Zimbabwe 1980-1989 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1990-1999 competitive 




APPENDIX B: LIST OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN CASES (55%) 
 
Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg  Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg 
Algeria  2002-2008 competitive 
Angola  2002-2008 hegemonic 
Azerbaijan 1992-1995 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1996-199 competitive 
       ʺ  2000-2005 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2006-2008 competitive 
Bangladesh 1972-1974 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1979-1982 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1988-1990 competitive 
Belarus  1996-1997 competitive 
       ʺ  1998-2004 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2005-2008 competitive 
Cambodia 1972  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1994-2003 competitive 
       ʺ  2004-2008 hegemonic 
Cameroon 1993-1997 competitive 
       ʺ  1998-2008 hegemonic 
Sri Lanka 1977-1981 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1983-1989 hegemonic 
Chad  1996  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1997-2001 competitive 
       ʺ  2002-2008 hegemonic 
Comoros 1990-1992 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1993  competitive 
       ʺ  1994  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1996-1998 hegemonic 
Congo, Rep. 2003-2008 competitive 
Congo, DR 2006  competitive 
Cyprus  1970-1972 competitive 
Ecuador  2000-2003 competitive 
El Salvador 1970-1973 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1977-1978 hegemonic 
Eq. Guinea 2003-2008 hegemonic 
Ethiopia  1995-2000 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2001-2005 competitive 
       ʺ  2006-2008 hegemonic 
Fiji  1993-2005 competitive 
Djibouti  1998-2003 hegemonic 
Gabon  1994-2008 hegemonic 
Georgia  1992  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1993-1999 competitive 
       ʺ  2000-2004 hegemonic 
Gambia  1970-1993 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1996-2008 hegemonic 
Guinea  1996-2008 hegemonic 
Guyana  1970-1992 hegemonic 
Haiti  1999-2006 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2007-2008 competitive 
Honduras 1970-1974 hegemonic 
Cote d'Ivoire 1990-1992 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1994-1998 hegemonic 
 
Kazakhstan 1994  hegemonic 
Kazakhstan 1995  competitive 
       ʺ  1996-1999 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2000-2006 competitive 
Kenya  1993-2002 competitive 
Korea, South 1970-1971 hegemonic 
Kyrgyzstan 1995-2000 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2001-2005 competitive 
Lesotho  1970  competitive 
Liberia  1985-1989 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1996-2002 hegemonic 
Malaysia 1971-2008 hegemonic 
Mauritania 1991-2006 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2007  competitive 
Mexico  1970-1988 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1989-1994 competitive 
       ʺ  1995-1997 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1998-2000 competitive 
Mozambique 1995-2004 competitive 
       ʺ  2005-2008 hegemonic 
Nicaragua 1970-1971 hegemonic 
Nicaragua 1974-1978 hegemonic 
Niger  1996  competitive 
       ʺ  1997-1998 hegemonic 
Panama  1985-1990 competitive 
Paraguay 1975-1988 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1993  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1994-1998 competitive 
       ʺ  1999-2003 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2004-2008 competitive 
Peru  1992  competitive 
       ʺ  1993-2000 hegemonic 
Russia  2004-2007 competitive 
       ʺ  2008  hegemonic 
Rwanda  2008  hegemonic 
São Tomé 1990-1991 competitive 
Senegal  1979-2000 hegemonic 
Seychelles 1993-2008 hegemonic 
Sierra Leone 1970-1972 competitive 
Singapore 1975-2008 hegemonic 
South Africa 1970-1993 hegemonic 
Rhodesia 1970-1975 hegemonic 
Zimbabwe 1980-2000 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2001-2005 competitive 
       ʺ  2006-2008 hegemonic 
Tajikistan 1995-2005 competitive 
       ʺ  2006-2008 hegemonic 
Thailand 1980-1983 competitive 
Togo  1993  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1994-1999 competitive 
       ʺ  2000-2008 hegemonic 
Tunisia  1999-2008 hegemonic 
Uganda  2006  hegemonic 




Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg 
Tanzania 1995-2008 hegemonic 
Burkina Faso 1998-2002 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2003-2007 competitive 
       ʺ  2008  hegemonic 
Uzbekistan 1994-1995 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1996-2002 competitive 
 
Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg 
Samoa  1983-1985 competitive 
       ʺ  1986-2001 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2002-2006 competitive 
       ʺ  2007-2008 hegemonic 
Yemen  2000-2008 hegemonic 
Yugoslavia 1991-1992 hegemonic 





APPENDIX C: LIST OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN CASES (75%) 
 
Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg  Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg 
Algeria  2002-2008 competitive 
Angola  2002-2008 competitive 
Azerbaijan 1992-1995 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1996-2008 competitive 
Bangladesh 1972-1973 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1979-1982 competitive 
       ʺ  1988  competitive 
       ʺ  1989-1990 hegemonic 
Belarus  1996-1997 competitive 
       ʺ  1998-2004 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2005-2008 competitive 
Cambodia 1972  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1994-2008 competitive 
Cameroon 1993-2002 competitive 
       ʺ  2003-2008 hegemonic 
Sri Lanka 1977  competitive 
       ʺ  1978-1981 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1983-1989 hegemonic 
Chad  1996  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1997-2008 competitive 
Comoros 1990-1992 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1993-1994 competitive 
Comoros 1994  competitive 
       ʺ  1996  competitive 
       ʺ  1997-1998 hegemonic 
Congo, Rep. 2003-2008 competitive 
Congo, DR  2006  competitive 
Cyprus  1970-1972 competitive 
Ecuador  2000-2003 competitive 
El Salvador 1970-1972 competitive 
       ʺ  1973  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1977-1978 hegemonic 
Eq. Guinea 2003-2004 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2005-2008 competitive 
Ethiopia  1995-2000 hegemonic 
Ethiopia  2001-2008 competitive 
Fiji  1993-2005 competitive 
Djibouti  1998-2003 hegemonic 
Gabon  1994-2008 competitive 
Georgia  1992  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1993-2004 competitive 
Gambia  1970-1984 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1985-1987 competitive 
       ʺ  1988-1992 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1993  competitive 
       ʺ  1996-2008 hegemonic 
Guinea  1996-2008 competitive 
Guyana  1970-1980 competitive 
       ʺ  1981-1992 hegemonic 
Haiti  1999-2006 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2007-2008 competitive 
Honduras 1970-1974 hegemonic 
Cote d'Ivoire 1990-1992 hegemonic 
Cote d’Ivoire 1994-1998 hegemonic 
Kazakhstan 1994  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1995  competitive 
       ʺ  1996-1999 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2000-2006 competitive 
Kenya  1993-2002 competitive 
Korea, South 1970-1971 competitive 
Kyrgyzstan 1995-2000 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2001-2005 competitive 
Lesotho  1970  competitive 
Liberia  1985-1989 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1996-2002 hegemonic 
Malaysia 1971-1974 competitive 
       ʺ  1975-1986 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1987-2004 competitive 
       ʺ  2005-2008 hegemonic 
Mauritania 1991-2004 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2006-2007 hegemonic 
Mexico  1970-1979 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1980-2000 competitive 
Mozambique 1995-2008 competitive 
Nicaragua 1970-1971 competitive 
       ʺ  1974-1978 competitive 
Niger  1996-1998 competitive 
Panama  1985-1990 competitive 
Paraguay 1975-1988 competitive 
       ʺ  1993-2008 competitive 
Peru  1992-2000 competitive 
Russia  2004-2008 competitive 
Rwanda  2008  hegemonic 
São Tomé 1990-1991 competitive 
Senegal  1979-1992 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1993-2000 competitive 
Seychelles 1993-2002 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2003-2008 competitive 
Sierra Leone 1970-1972 competitive 
Singapore 1975-2008 hegemonic 
South Africa 1970-1977 competitive 
       ʺ  1978-1987 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1988-1993 competitive 
Rhodesia 1970-1975 hegemonic 
Zimbabwe 1980-1990 competitive 
       ʺ  1991-2000 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2001-2008 competitive 
Tajikistan 1995-2005 competitive 
       ʺ  2006-2008 hegemonic 
Thailand 1980-1983 competitive 
Togo  1993  hegemonic 
       ʺ  1994-1999 competitive 
       ʺ  2000-2007 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2008  competitive 
Tunisia  1999-2008 hegemonic 




Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg 
Egypt  2005  hegemonic 
       ʺ  2006-2008 competitive 
Tanzania 1995-2000 competitive 
       ʺ  2001-2008 hegemonic 
Burkina Faso 1998-2002 hegemonic 
       ʺ  2003-2008 competitive 
 
Country  Year(s)  Comp/Heg 
Uzbekistan 1994-1995 hegemonic 
       ʺ  1996-2002 competitive 
Samoa  1983-2008 competitive 
Yemen  2000-2003 competitive 
       ʺ  2004-2008 hegemonic 
Yugoslavia 1991-1992 hegemonic 






APPENDIX D. DATA ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATE MODELS 
 
Table D.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
opp_share 733 22.70 17.45 0 92.65 
fdi 775 3.26 5.76 -14.37 50.30 
loggdp 771 7.94 0.98 4.89 10.66 
logpop 771 8.73 1.61 4.28 11.88 
urban_pct 762 43.85 20.56 8.22 100 
rents 738 7.97 14.77 0 84.74 
ethnic 760 52.30 24.48 0 93.02 
linguistic 745 50.42 28.94 0.21 92.27 
religious 762 45.72 26.47 0.23 86.03 
 
Cold War 
 Frequency Percent 
0 253 32.65 
1 522 67.35 
Total 775 100 
 
Plurality 
 Frequency Percent 
0 538 69.42 
1 237 30.58 
Total 775 100 
 
Federalism 
 Frequency Percent 
0 575 74.19 
1 200 25.81 
Total 775 100 
 
Africa 
 Frequency Percent 
0 424 54.71 
1 351 45.29 










































































































































































Table D.2. Opposition without Lagged Variables 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               opp_pct  opp_pct  opp_pct  opp_pct  opp_pct  opp_pct  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
fdi           -0.33**  -0.42**  -0.35**  -0.35**  -0.29**  -0.29**  
              (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.09)   (0.10)   (0.10)   
loggdp                  1.70                       1.39     1.44    
                       (1.03)                     (1.14)   (1.16)   
logpop                  -0.04                     -0.78*   -0.76*   
                       (0.40)                     (0.36)   (0.37)   
urban_pct              -0.16**                     -0.09    -0.09   
                       (0.05)                     (0.05)   (0.05)   
rents                   -0.05                     -0.14**  -0.15**  
                       (0.05)                     (0.04)   (0.04)   
coldwar                7.56**                      1.35     1.28    
                       (1.50)                     (1.30)   (1.34)   
al_ethnic                        -3.85            9.76**    9.62*   
                                (4.24)            (3.72)   (3.78)   
al_language                      2.39              -2.27    -2.55   
                                (3.58)            (3.08)   (3.30)   
al_religion                      3.15              -1.52    -1.50   
                                (2.57)            (2.34)   (2.34)   
fptp                                     -2.56*   -3.97**  -3.98**  
                                         (1.12)   (1.27)   (1.27)   
fednew                                    -0.13    0.59     0.58    
                                         (1.17)   (1.32)   (1.32)   
heg67                                    20.39**  21.29**  21.40**  
                                         (1.04)   (1.15)   (1.25)   
africa                                                      0.41    
                                                           (1.71)   
_cons         23.80**   13.21   23.36**  15.04**   11.51    10.88   
              (0.73)   (7.97)   (1.85)   (0.91)   (8.58)   (8.98)   
R2             0.01     0.06     0.02     0.37     0.41     0.41    
N               733      705      695      733      679      679    
------------------------------------------------------------------- 





Table D.3. Opposition with 1-Year Lead 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               lead1yr  lead1yr  lead1yr  lead1yr  lead1yr  lead1yr  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
fdi           -0.34**  -0.40**  -0.36**  -0.35**  -0.30**  -0.31**  
              (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.09)   (0.11)   (0.11)   
loggdp                  1.79                       1.40     1.09    
                       (1.02)                     (1.21)   (1.23)   
logpop                  0.19                       -0.32    -0.48   
                       (0.40)                     (0.38)   (0.40)   
urban_pct              -0.16**                    -0.11*   -0.11*   
                       (0.05)                     (0.05)   (0.05)   
rents                   -0.07                     -0.15**  -0.14**  
                       (0.04)                     (0.04)   (0.04)   
coldwar                7.87**                      2.92*    3.35*   
                       (1.49)                     (1.39)   (1.42)   
al_ethnic                        -5.58             5.62     6.57    
                                (4.19)            (3.97)   (4.02)   
al_language                      3.96              -0.57    1.22    
                                (3.54)            (3.28)   (3.50)   
al_religion                      1.15              -1.75    -1.92   
                                (2.54)            (2.50)   (2.50)   
fptp                                     -3.39**  -4.79**  -4.67**  
                                         (1.20)   (1.36)   (1.36)   
fednew                                    0.32     0.55     0.65    
                                         (1.26)   (1.42)   (1.42)   
heg67                                    17.31**  17.06**  16.36**  
                                         (1.11)   (1.23)   (1.31)   
africa                                                      -2.64   
                                                           (1.81)   
_cons         23.84**   10.47   24.47**  16.75**   11.15    15.20   
              (0.73)   (7.88)   (1.83)   (0.97)   (9.09)   (9.49)   
R2             0.01     0.07     0.02     0.28     0.31     0.31    
N               732      703      694      732      677      677    
------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Table D.4. Hegemony Threshold Set at 55% 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               share    share    share    share    share    share   
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
fdi           -0.36**  -0.45**  -0.39**  -0.38**  -0.40**  -0.43**  
              (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.10)   (0.12)   (0.12)   
loggdp                  1.12                       0.59     -0.05   
                       (1.04)                     (1.34)   (1.35)   
logpop                  -0.31                      -0.65   -0.99*   
                       (0.40)                     (0.42)   (0.43)   
urban_pct              -0.13**                     -0.10   -0.12*   
                       (0.05)                     (0.06)   (0.06)   
rents                   -0.04                     -0.10*    -0.09   
                       (0.05)                     (0.05)   (0.05)   
coldwar                6.16**                      2.72     3.76*   
                       (1.52)                     (1.55)   (1.58)   
al_ethnic                        -3.94             -0.43    2.30    
                                (4.28)            (4.36)   (4.43)   
al_language                      1.21              -1.51    2.41    
                                (3.62)            (3.66)   (3.88)   
al_religion                      3.22              4.04     3.42    
                                (2.58)            (2.73)   (2.73)   
fptp                                     -4.85**  -6.97**  -6.64**  
                                         (1.30)   (1.48)   (1.48)   
fednew                                    -1.58    -0.33    -0.08   
                                         (1.38)   (1.56)   (1.56)   
heg55                                    12.01**  12.38**  10.73**  
                                         (1.33)   (1.45)   (1.55)   
africa                                                     -5.84**  
                                                           (2.00)   
_cons         23.90**  20.15*   24.19**  22.32**  26.73**  34.51**  
              (0.73)   (8.02)   (1.86)   (0.96)   (10.07)  (10.36)  
R2             0.01     0.05     0.02     0.14     0.19     0.20    
N               732      704      693      732      678      678    
------------------------------------------------------------------- 





Table D.5. Hegemony Threshold Set at 75% 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               share    share    share    share    share    share   
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
fdi           -0.36**  -0.45**  -0.39**  -0.34**  -0.32**  -0.35**  
              (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.10)   (0.11)   (0.11)   
loggdp                  1.12                       -0.20    -0.95   
                       (1.04)                     (1.26)   (1.26)   
logpop                  -0.31                      -0.59   -1.01*   
                       (0.40)                     (0.39)   (0.40)   
urban_pct              -0.13**                     -0.03    -0.04   
                       (0.05)                     (0.05)   (0.05)   
rents                   -0.04                     -0.18**  -0.17**  
                       (0.05)                     (0.04)   (0.04)   
coldwar                6.16**                      1.94     2.81    
                       (1.52)                     (1.43)   (1.44)   
al_ethnic                        -3.94             3.04     6.02    
                                (4.28)            (4.09)   (4.14)   
al_language                      1.21              -2.10    2.15    
                                (3.62)            (3.42)   (3.59)   
al_religion                      3.22              1.54     0.89    
                                (2.58)            (2.57)   (2.55)   
fptp                                     -3.43**  -5.01**  -4.67**  
                                         (1.23)   (1.40)   (1.39)   
fednew                                    -0.40    0.22     0.41    
                                         (1.29)   (1.46)   (1.45)   
heg75                                    16.13**  17.43**  16.45**  
                                         (1.16)   (1.30)   (1.32)   
africa                                                     -6.41**  
                                                           (1.77)   
_cons         23.90**  20.15*   24.19**  15.39**  22.06*   31.67**  
              (0.73)   (8.02)   (1.86)   (1.11)   (9.38)   (9.66)   
R2             0.01     0.05     0.02     0.24     0.29     0.30    
N               732      704      693      732      678      678    
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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